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There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known
unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don’t know. But there
are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know. ... it is
the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.





A Common Value OTC Network Model
This thesis looks at decentralized client-dealer markets by representing them as a
Bertrand competition over a network of connections and examines the Nash equilib-
rium bid-ask spread properties. We specifically look at OTC financial markets with a
common but unknown true value and show how equilibrium bid and ask prices can be
viewed as the optimal amounts of signal reduction in a common-value first-price auc-
tion. We algebraically examine the equilibrium in the duopoly case and then analyze
the equilibriums numerically in the n-dealer case. Our model suggests that changing
transparency can have non-intuitive effects that depend on both the network struc-
ture and the information asymmetry. Similarly, the model can explain the empirically
observed centrality premiums and discounts found in some OTC markets and other
noted pricing anomalies. We apply our network model to the UK betting market
using data from the UK General Election 2019. In betting markets, win probabilities
are the asset, and dealers are the bookmakers, and we find that bookmakers’ odds
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Many standard financial market instruments, such as common stocks or listed options,
trade on organized exchanges such as the NYSE or the CBOE. However, a significant
number of financial assets, such as most loans, government and corporate bonds,
derivatives, and currencies, have no central exchange, and traders need to locate a
counterparty for each trade. The reason is that, unlike equities, many securities are
not as homogenous, with non-standard expiries and payoffs. In the EU, for example,
there are 6800 listed shares, but Xtrakter’s CUPID database contains information on
over 150,000 debt securities in issue, with only 3000 that trade more than once per
day. This decentralization has led to professional firms becoming intermediaries or
market-makers, and these markets are known as over-the-counter or OTC markets. In
these markets, transactions are bilateral, prices are dispersed, trading relationships
are persistent, and typically, a few large dealers intermediate a large share of the
trading volume, Babus and Kondor (2018). These markets are also characterized
by dealer sophistication due to the illiquid and sometimes complex nature of the
instruments traded. This thesis develops a network model of OTC trade between
clients and dealers that reflects these features.
Our model incorporates two critical drivers of price formation in OTC client-dealer
markets. Firstly, the extent of the participants’ information sets over the true asset
value, a common theme in standard microstructure models, which we model with a
noisy signal or estimate of the true value. Secondly, the topology of the network of
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
connections between clients and dealers, as seen in the large body of work that views
markets as a network. We explore a network model that combines these two drivers,
and we examine the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium dealer pricing strategies.
We investigate how increasing transparency using our network model, where trans-
parency is modeled as a refining of the clients’ information sets regarding the asset’s
true value. We find that the clients’ degree distribution is critical in the direction of
the effect on spreads. Clients with low dealer connectivity (a degree of 1 or 2) ben-
efit from increased transparency through lower bid-ask spreads. In contrast, clients
with a higher degree (3 or more links) suffer increased spreads in equilibrium. This
increase is due to the increasing dominance of the winners’ curse effect and the initial
relative informedness of clients and dealers. This result might offer some explanation
as to the mixed results when regulators have mandated increased transparency.
An effect in OTC markets, known as the centrality premium effect, where more
centrally located dealers make consistently wider or tighter spreads than less centrally
located dealers, has been documented by various authors. Traditional market models
cannot totally explain the range of these effects. Hollifield et al. (2012) find a negative
relationship between bid-ask spreads and dealer centrality in the US securitization
market. In contrast, Di Maggio et al. (2017) and Li and Schürhoff (2019) find a
positive relationship between bid-ask spreads and dealer centrality in the US corporate
bond and US municipal bond market. Our network model predicts these premiums
and discounts. Similarly, our model correctly predicts a centrality discount for the
largest bookmakers in our empirical study of the UK gambling market.
We also apply the model to several pricing anomalies identified by Biais et al.
(2005), such as why safe municipal bonds have bigger spreads than riskier bonds
or equities. Our model explains these effects by the different link distributions of
the clients and asymmetric information. The effect of illiquid bonds having tighter
spreads than very liquid bonds in the US corporate bond market was observed by
Goldstein et al. (2007). Our model shows how these two markets’ topological and
information structures are consistent with this effect.
In our model, the market consists of clients, a set of dealers, and a homogenous
security that has a common but unknown value to all agents. It is a natural assump-
tion to assume a common value element in security valuation, Bilais et al. (2000).
1.1. General 3
Clients requests trading quotes from their connected dealers, as determined by their
links in a network. Each client has an exogenous reason for trading but is not a noise
trader in the traditional microstructure sense. Instead, they are boundedly rational
and attempt to measure the true value before trading. The clients then trade at
the best price observed in their local network, only if the price is better than their
estimate. This classification of client behavior is consistent with the empirical work
of Gode and Sunder (1993), where the machine traders that turned out to be most
similar to human traders were the zero-intelligence ones with budget constraints -
traders who were not allowed to trade at a perceived loss. Similar to de Kamps et al.
(2012), we examine heterogeneous boundedly rational clients who base their trading
decisions on their noisy valuation of the asset. Dealers are risk-neutral and strategic
(they form expectations over other beliefs and actions in the network) and, similar
to the clients, estimate the asset’s true value. They use these to make a bid and ask
price to maximize their payoffs in competition with the other connected dealers.
This thesis follows many authors in representing decentralized trade using a net-
work, and we represent a stylized OTC market as a bipartite network, where node
types are partitioned into clients and dealers. This partition follows naturally from
price makers and price takers’ market functions, leading to a Bertrand price compe-
tition among connected dealers, with the best-priced dealer winning the trade.
In contrast to the majority of papers that examine the OTC inter-dealer market,
this thesis examines the client-dealer OTC network in a similar way to authors such
as Hendershott et al. (2020), and de Kamps et al. (2012). Our interest is how clients
connect to the dealer set and use the empirical results of Hendershott from the corpo-
rate bond market, who found a power-law distribution in client dealer links with an
exponential tail. One-third of clients had only one dealer link, with a small fraction
having a large number of links. Similarly, the UK gambling market can be catego-
rized as an OTC market where bookmakers are the dealers and gamblers are the
clients. Again, 44% of clients have only one account with a mean of 2.7 accounts, UK
Gambling Commission (2019). These empirical observations of the network topology
in the client-dealer network form the basis of our network modeling.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
Although networks offer an excellent description of the topology of who is con-
nected to who, the trading interactions or microstucture1 determine the traded prices
once the network has been set. While much of economics abstracts from the mechanics
of trading, microstructure literature analyzes how specific trading mechanisms affect
the price formation process, and how agents negotiate the terms of trade are critical.
We assume a Bertrand price competition amongst the dealers with each client, and
each dealer does not price discriminate due to not knowing the client’s degree. This
interaction could lead to the usual Bertrand paradox – when a client is connected to
two or more market-makers, price competition will force the price to marginal cost
causing zero profits in expectation. In financial market securities, we assume a com-
mon but unknown value to the security. This uncertainty in the common value causes
competitive dealers to make non-zero bid-ask spreads and, importantly, non-zero pay-
offs in equilibrium. This unknown common value effect on Bertrand competition is
similar to the results of Spulber (1995), who analyzed the independent private values
case and found a similar non-zero profit result. This non-zero profit in competitive
equilibrium leads to the dealer’s price to depend on the client base’s degree of con-
nectivity, which leads to equilibrium prices to depend on the network topology. This
result is in contrast to many microstructure models, for instance, Kyle (1985), who
postulated a zero-profit condition without any game-theoretic foundation but is in
line with the models of Bernhardt and Hughson (1993) and Bilais et al. (2000), who
also predicted positive profits in equilibrium.
Our network model consists of two elements: the nature of the price forming
interactions between clients and dealers, which we assume is a standard Bertrand
price competition with unknown common values. Secondly, the nature of the set of
dealers that the client requests trading prices from, the network structure. Much of
the literature uses search models for this stage, but our model uses a fixed network
which better represents the nature of client-dealer links in many OTC markets, such
as corporate bonds and derivatives. Empirically, while some markets can be described
by random meetings among traders who are small relative to the market, in others,
1Maureen O’Hara defines microstructure as the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging
assets under explicit trading rules.
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in particular, client-dealer OTC markets, relationships are not random. Due to rela-
tionship formation and maintenance costs, clients adopt relatively few links to dealers
to find prices and trade. This formulation is in line with the assumptions of Babus
and Kondor (2018) and others who rely on a fixed network and the empirical work of
Hendershott et al. (2020) in the corporate bond market and Mallaburn et al. (2019)
in the Bank of England empirical study on investment grade and high yield bonds.
The roadmap of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 provides an introduction and
a review of the relevant OTC and microstructure literature, Chapter 2 introduces the
microstructure model that governs the price formation process, Chapter 3 looks in
detail at the nature of the equilibrium solutions in a duopoly dealer market, Chapter 4
introduces networks and specifies the network topology of the network model, Chapter
5 introduces the payoffs in a multi-dealer network game, numerical procedures for
finding them and looks at the effects on the equilibrium in various informational
regimes and network topologies, Chapter 6. presents an empirical study of the UK
gambling market and applies the model to calculating bookmakers odds prices.
1.2 Related Literature
Our model can be split into two main parts. Firstly, the price negotiation process
between individual customers and their connected dealers. Secondly, applying this
microstructure to a network setting of multiple customers and dealers with heteroge-
neous connections. The first part is related to the traditional microstructure litera-
ture, and the second part is related to models of search on a network and specifically
to the extensive work on trade in OTC markets.
1.2.1 OTC Literature
The standard method of analyzing OTC markets has been the search and bargaining
approach, and the cornerstone to modeling decentralized markets was first proposed
in the seminal paper by Burdett and Judd (1983). They proposed a model where
customers search firm counterparties with an associated cost. They considered both
nonsequential search, where consumers decided ex-ante how many firms to contact for
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prices, and noisy sequential search, where customers continue searching until certain
conditions are fulfilled. They show that an equilibrium strategy exists in both cases
and leads to price dispersion in the market.
The most common approach to modeling price formation in OTC markets is
based on this random search and matching approach, typically without a fixed net-
work. This approach to modeling OTC markets was pioneered by Duffie et al. (2005);
Pedersen et al. (2007), who study how asset prices in OTC markets are affected by
the search costs associated with the search for counterparties and subsequent price
bargaining. They show how bid-ask spreads are lower if traders can more easily find
other traders or are connected to multiple market-makers and characterize the equi-
librium pricing. They subsequently extend their search frictions analysis by looking
at the effects of risk aversion and supply shocks.
Another important paper by Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) looks at the liquidity
providing function of dealers and its importance during periods of market turmoil.
Their model involves allowing continuous trading between dealers, but trading with
investors is subject to search delays and bargaining. They examine the dealer in-
centives that satisfy both liquidity provisioning and market efficiency. In their later
paper (2009), they extend the model of Duffie et al. (2005) by allowing unrestricted
asset holding and show how asset demand changes are a key determinant of the bid-
ask spread and other trading metrics. Afonso and Lagos (2015) develop a model of
the federal funds market using the search and bargaining approach of Duffie, where
banks have to search for a suitable counterparty and then negotiate the terms of
the loan size and repayment schedules. Duffie et al. (2017) characterize the role of
benchmarks in OTC markets as a mechanism of reducing informational asymmetry
between dealers and customers, who, similar to our model, are typically less well
informed than the dealers. They show that providing a benchmark in opaque OTC
markets can improve efficiency by encouraging customer entry, improving matching
efficiency, and search costs. This effect is also evident in our model by increasing the
signal precision of the clients relative to the dealers.
By design, in OTC search models, transactions are between atomistic dealers
through non-persistent links. Therefore, using a fixed network, our model’s method-
ology better captures the effects of greater centrality of the few large dealers that
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intermediate the bulk of the trading volume. Empirically, while some markets can be
described by random meetings among traders who are small relative to the market,
in others, in particular, client-dealer OTC markets, relationships are not random but
fixed and persistent through time. Due to relationship formation and maintenance
costs, clients adopt relatively few links to dealers to find prices and trade.
In our model, we take the market network structure (who trades with whom) as
given and, in this sense, are closer to this separate strand of literature that views
agents as interacting on a fixed network, such as the seminal work by Kranton and
Minehart (2001). They looked at a network of buyers and sellers (in an IPV set-
ting) and showed, using Hall’s Marriage Theorem, the existence of a matching in a
bipartite buyer-seller network. They use an ascending price auction representation
of competition to solve for an equilibrium, which they show is efficient and pairwise
stable. The paper demonstrates how buyers’ and sellers’ network structure is formed
and includes the idea of link costs in the formation. Several of these ideas appear
in our OTC model. Firstly, we restrict client networks to a fixed small number of
links due to link formation and maintenance costs. Secondly, we also use a heteroge-
neous asset estimate for each agent; however, we use a common value for the payoffs,
which makes the auction calculations more difficult. Gale and Kariv (2007) develop
a financial network model with similarities to Kranton et al. In this paper, agents
interact on a fixed network structure similar to our model, although they consider
a unimodal network where agents are either buyers or sellers. Blume et al. (2009)
model intermediation over a fixed network and finds that equilibrium strategies are
network-dependent.
1.2.2 Microstructure Literature
The market microstructure literature is extensive (see Biais et al. (2005) for a full
review) but is divided into primarily two distinct approaches - Inventory Models and
Asymmetric Information Models. A key assumption in most microstructure modes
is the existence of a proportion of informed and uninformed traders. This proportion
is generally held to be common knowledge. These trader classes can be viewed as
a simplification of the client group’s level of ’informedness’, and this informedness
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of the clients is covered in our model with the variance or precision of the trader
signal error. Low (relative) signal error corresponds to low variance in the model and
mimics the literature’s informed traders. Conversely, high signal variance corresponds
to less informed traders. Many of the models also assume a zero profit condition in
competition which is an assumption we do not make. Indeed, the non-zero profit
condition is critical to the network effects of the model.
Inventory Models
The inventory-based models assume that a market-maker adjusts the bid-ask spread
in response to the asynchronous arrival of trades. These models assume that the
market-makers’ primary role is as liquidity providers and demonstrate how the bid-
ask spread compensates them for price risk on inventory. Garman (1976) was the first
to model microstructure from an inventory perspective. Briefly, the model considers
a single market-maker and assumes that buyer’s and seller’s arrival follow a Poisson
process. The arrival frequencies depend on prices traded, and the dealer uses a bid-ask
spread to make profits causing lower amounts of trade with a wider spread. The dealer
constraint is that inventories are targeted at a specific level. The asset is assumed to
follow a mean zero random walk, hence ensuring a non-zero probability of bankruptcy
over time. In order to counter this, market makers adjust prices dynamically with
inventory positions.
Similar to Garman, Amihud and Mendelson (1980) extend the Garman model
where the dealer’s inventory is allowed to fluctuate between two bands. Quotes are
updated when inventory approaches these bands to affect the arrival rate of buyers
and sellers. Like Garman, traders are assumed to be uninformed liquidity traders,
and dealers only include inventory in the pricing function.
Ho and Stoll (1981) focus on how risk-averse dealer’s inventory, processing costs,
and adverse selection determine the bid-ask spread. The additional assumptions in
this model are; a dealer with risk aversion with no hedging possibilities and seek to
maximize the final utility of wealth. This model concludes that the bid-ask spread
is independent of the inventory position but is affected by the dealer’s risk aversion.
Ho and Stoll (1983) extend the model and show that inventory affects the dealer’s
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quote level but not the spread magnitude is robust to multi-period and multi-dealer
settings.
More complicated models have been introduced, and some of the major contri-
butions have been: Stoll (1989), Huang and Stoll (1997), which add complications of
adverse selection and, Bollen et al. (2004), who uniquely use option analysis to iden-
tify the components of the bid-ask spread. However, the setup continues with the
assumption of informed and uninformed traders, where by definition, the informed
traders are more informed than the dealer.
Asymmetric Information Models
Asymmetric information models assume that the market comprises agents with vary-
ing degrees of information regarding an asset’s price. Again, the market-maker role
is assumed to provide liquidity to traders who can be either informed or uninformed
about the true asset value. Market-makers make losses when trading with informed
traders and profits when trading with uninformed traders leading to the market-
maker trying to recoup informed trader losses from uninformed traders by providing
a bid-ask spread. Rational, competitive market-makers set their bid and ask prices ac-
cordingly, and more extreme information asymmetries lead to wider bid-ask spreads.
These asymmetric information models are further classified as either strategic trade
models, where clients participate in the market only once, or sequential trade models,
where randomly selected clients sequentially arrive at the market.
Sequential trade models refer to the class of asymmetric information models where
randomly selected traders arrive sequentially at the market. The main assumption in
these models is the existence of heterogeneously informed traders. These are defined
as ”informed traders,” who trade due to private information on the asset’s funda-
mental value, and ”liquidity traders,” who trade for exogenous reasons, like portfolio
rebalancing or liquidity needs.
Copeland and Galai (1983); was the first paper to consider the cost of asymmetric
information. A simple setup of a proportion of informed and uninformed traders
interacts with a dealer who makes a bid and an ask price. The ratios of the types of
traders are known, and the dealers’ optimization problem is simply the maximization
of the expected payoffs from both types of traders.
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Glosten and Milgrom (1985) produced a seminal model in the literature similar
to the Copeland model. An asset has a high or low payoff with a certain probability,
and the informed traders know the actual realization. The uninformed traders trade
randomly. Notably, the dealer is uninformed but knows the proportion of informed
traders and has a zero profit condition. As trades enter, the dealer updates the
probabilities of the expected value of the asset. The model predicts that order flow is
correlated, and bid-ask spreads decline over time as the actual probability precision
narrows.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) extend the Glosten model, where both sets of traders
can decide between large or small trade volumes. There are now two market-makers
and a zero profit condition. The model’s main point is that their bid-ask spreads
are affected by trade size since large trades are correlated with adverse selection. In
their follow-up paper in Easley and O’Hara (1993), they added a no-trade option for
uninformed traders, thereby adding correlation to the timing of trades.
In Strategic trade models, traders and market-makers form expectations over the
other’s behavior in order to find an optimal strategy. The seminal model in this field
is the model by Kyle (1985) and has been extended by various authors. In particular,
Vives (2011), who formulates a model based on Kyle and uses dealer price schedules
to examine equilibrium. Babus and Kondor (2018) then extend the Vives model to a
network setting.
The Kyle (1985) model is set up similarly to the other asymmetric information
models: a single-period model with a random (normally distributed) final value as-
set, a group of liquidity traders, a single risk-neutral insider trader, who knows the
final realization, and a single risk-neutral uninformed market-maker. The liquidity
traders submit orders to buy a random (normally distributed) amount of shares of
the asset, and the insider must decide on optimal trade size. The market-maker must
strategically decide on a bid-ask spread strategy that incorporates the probability of
the insider trading. As order volumes increase, the market maker makes increasing
spreads as the size of the aggregate order flow is correlated to the insider trades. The
insider also models the market maker’s strategy and submits orders accordingly. Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer (1988) provide an extension of the Kyle model by allowing some
uninformed traders to behave semi-strategically by allowing them to time their trades.
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They are referred to as discretionary traders because although they are obliged to
trade, they have some discretion on their trades’ timing. Our model’s clients bear
some similarity to these discretionary traders, but instead of timing, they have a




A Model of Trading in OTC
Markets
An OTC market is distinguished from a centralized market by the network of con-
nections of the participents - who is connected to whom. As clients can only receive
trading prices from connected dealers, the form of the interactions or trading pro-
tocols between the clients and dealers and their link topology can lead to different
prices trading in different parts of the network. We model the interaction between
clients and dealers as a price competition process in the style of Bertrand (1883) with
unknown common values between the clients and their connected dealers. We begin
by defining the agents, properties of the asset, their connectivity in a network, and
finally, the trading protocols that govern the price-setting process.
2.1 Agent Types
There are two agent types in our OTC market model - clients and dealers, which are
analogous to the firms and customers in traditional economic theory.
2.1.1 Clients
Clients have an exogenous reason for trading (and can be either a buyer or a seller).
They are boundedly rational in the sense that they attempt to estimate the true
value but naively use this estimate as their reservation price before accepting a dealer
quote. This client specification is in line with Gode and Sunder (1993), who found
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that the artificial traders that were the most similar to human traders were the zero-
intelligence ones with budget constraints, i.e., traders who were not allowed to trade
at a perceived loss. In our model, each client’s reservation price is a random variable
that depends on the true value and sets the boundedly rational strategy of the clients.
This formulation of the client reservation prices allows us to model differences in
information sets regarding the true value via signal variance differences and is similar
to the fundamentalist client specification in de Kamps et al. (2012), who also used
client valuations to determine their trading strategy.
2.1.2 Dealers
The dealers are risk-neutral strategic agents who seek to maximize their expected
profits by quoting a buy price PB and a sell price PA to the clients. They are strategic
in the sense that they attempt to estimate the true value of the asset traded, form
beliefs as to the competitor estimates, and use these estimates to construct their
buy and sell prices. Dealers fulfill the liquidity-providing market function by being
compelled to both make a price if requested and trade on that quoted price. These
assumptions contrast with the pure uninformed liquidity provider assumptions of
both the inventory and Asymmetric information-based microstructure models. They
set their buy prices and sell prices to maximize their expected profits in equilibrium,
and the difference between their buy and sell prices is known as the bid-ask spread.
Dealers base their bid and ask prices as a function of their estimate of the true value
and an expectation of all other agents’ estimates and assume that other dealers will
be doing the same.
2.2 Common Asset True Value and Signals
In many OTC markets, such as derivatives and corporate bonds, the trading frequency
in each issue and the proportions of buyers and sellers at any one time make matching
trades between clients difficult, suggesting dealers need to have a valuation of the final
payoff of the asset. For example, in the US and UK corporate bond market, each
individual bond issue trades on average 2.4 times per day, Bessembinder et al. (2020).
For illiquid issues, they trade even less often. In the corporate bond market in the EU,
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there are over 150,000 outstanding securities issued where only the top 3000 trade
more than once per day. In addition, average trade sizes are over $1million compared
to equities of $43,000, International Capital Markets Association. Dealers knowingly
assume the opposite side of the client trade and receive any ensuing payoffs from the
asset. Therefore, they have an incentive to value the asset as accurately as possible.
In our model, we assume a common unknown value of the asset to each agent at the
time of trading. For most traded financial assets, the final or true value is the same
for all agents. However, the process of measuring this value a priori is subject to both
measurement and model error.
The clients and dealers estimate the asset’s value before trading but with some
error or uncertainty, which we characterize with some noise N(0, σ). Agents attempt
to measure this true cost (value), and we can model this by each of them receiving
a sample (signal) from a known distribution. This measurement of the true value is
subject to independent and idiosyncratic measurement error or interpretation, and
we use a normal distribution as the common distribution of the error signals. In many
fields, measurement errors (as opposed to systematic errors) are modeled as normally
distributed. We can view measurement as the result of a process, where each step in
the process may lead to a small error with a probability distribution (F.P. Schloerb,
Computational Physics, University of Mass). The sum of these errors over all of the
measurement steps leads to a final error that is normally distributed, whatever the
error distribution in the individual steps.
In our case, since the asset’s true value is subject to many micro-measurements
that may come from any distribution, we can apply a normal distribution. For in-
stance, the price forecast for a stock is dependent on correctly measuring current
earnings, likely sales growth, consumer trends for their products, global interest rates,
and general economic conditions, to name but a few. The central limit theorem says
that the distribution of these price estimates will tend to a normal distribution as the
number of estimated factors grows large.
There is some empirical evidence for investor valuations being normally dis-
tributed: CXO Advisory group analyzed 6582 forecasts1 for the US stock market
between 2005 - 2012, and found that their forecast accuracy was on average close to
1see https://www.cxoadvisory.com/gurus/ for the full analysis
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zero with an approximately normal distribution. Also, the estimates of Vote shares in
forthcoming elections are modeled with a normal distribution by polling companies
in Chapter 6.
In line with Babus and Kondor (2018) and others, we have adopted an additive
(normal) error term as the signal and the statistical form of the beliefs of the true
value. Although stock price and earnings forecasts are not an exact proxy for beliefs
(due to herding and other strategic behavior), SPX forecasts were found to be approx-
imately normally distributed with a zero mean (true value), and Kim et al. (2017)
analyzed individual stock analyst forecasts using IBIS data over a 30 year period.
They found a lognormal distribution best describes the forecasts with a positively bi-
ased mean and unbiased median. Individual forecasts are complex as they are affected
by the individual incentives of the financial analysts, as evidenced by some fat tails
in extreme forecasts. In any event, the normal distribution is a good approximation
to a lognormal distribution when the variance is small relative to the mean value. A
widely used heuristic rule is that if X is LN(m,s), then X is approximately N(m, s) if
m > 6s. Suppose a security has a mean value of 100 with an estimation error or 10
or 15%, then figure 2.1 illustrates the approximation.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the normal approximation to lognormal
when means are greater than standard deviations
As an example of financial market instrument measurement error even in the
simplest of instruments, Cammack (1991) found that empirical bond auction results
suggest that imperfect information is present in the Treasury bill market. This fi-
nancial instrument should have one of the lowest forms of potential measurement
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or interpretation error (short duration and limited pricing factors). She found the
mean auction price for 3-month bills was, on average, four basis points below the
comparable secondary market price for the 1973-84 period. She concluded that this
”downward biasing” is positively related to the anticipated amount of dispersion of
auction bids that suggested that auction bidders use a bidding strategy that accounts
for their lack of agreement about the bill’s value.
Suppose the true asset value is V so that the client i has an estimate Vi which we
model by them receiving a signal Vi = V + εi, where εi ∼ N(0, σT ). Similarly for the
signal of dealer j: Vj = V + εj where εj ∼ N(0, σM ). Note that E[Vi] = V , the true
value, for both clients and dealers. We assume that all dealers have the same signal
error variance, although relaxing this assumption does not fundamentally change the
model or the results. The variance of the signal could also be interpreted as the so-
phistication of the clients. If their level of sophistication is anti-correlated with their
connectivity, this may add an important multiplying effect. We only consider that
clients all have the same signal variance in the model and analyze the dealer behav-
ior towards them. However, if client degree and signal variance are anti-correlated,
certain effects will be magnified, and these will be clear in the later sections.
2.3 Client and Dealer Strategies
As above, dealers and clients begin the trading process by attempting to estimate
the true asset value. The clients set their reservation prices based on their signal
level and have a naive strategy that maps each possible signal (value estimate) onto
a reservation price. The dealers make bid and ask prices around their own signal.
We assume a symmetric linear bidding strategy from the dealers, which is justified
by the equilibrium solutions of Wilson (1969) in the 2-bidder case and both Levin
and Smith (1991) and Wilson (1992) in the n-bidder case and explored in section
2.9 and 3.3.2. That is, each dealer i receives a signal Vi regarding the true value V,
Vi ∼ N(V, σM ) and makes a price quote of (Vi− δi, Vi + δi) to their connected clients,
where δi is known as the semi bid-ask spread. This linear bidding strategy maps each
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signal (asset valuation) onto a trading price.
PBID(Vi) = Vi − δi : Vi → R
PASK(Vi) = Vi + δi : Vi → R
(2.1)
Where, Vi ∈ (−∞,∞), δi ∈ [0,∞).
We assume that the dealers are strategic in their selection of δi. Their buy and sell
prices incorporate a reduction δi to their estimate Vi that is designed to compensate
for the possible error in their estimate, a profit margin, and an expectation of other
dealer strategies. This amount over the estimated true values δ is the semi bid-ask
spread. The dealers do not see the other dealers’ prices when they make their bid
and ask prices. The technical justifications for a linear bidding strategy are discussed
in the next chapter.
2.4 Connectivity in a OTC Financial Market
In OTC markets, empirical observations have shown the network structure to have
three main features. Firstly, a highly connected core of dealers, Li and Schürhoff
(2019) and others. Secondly, a small subset of dealers that intermediate a dispro-
portionate amount of trade, Hendershott et al. (2020), Mallaburn et al. (2019) and
others, and thirdly, client nodes with relatively few but persistent links to the deal-
ers, Babus and Kondor (2018). These empirical observations of the OTC network
topology (detailed in section 4.3) suggest a core-periphery network structure. How-
ever, we do not explicitly model the dealer-dealer subnetwork and focus only on the
client-dealer subnetwork.
The competitive process in OTC client-dealer markets is comprised of two eco-
nomic agent types - clients and dealers. The clients connect to the dealers in some
way and request quotes from these connected dealers. Typically, clients have only
a few links to dealers, as demonstrated by the empirical work of Hendershott et al.
(2020) in the corporate bond market. Clients do not typically connect with them-
selves due to search costs constraints. In OTC financial markets, dealers often also
connect to other dealers in order to trade together due to heterogeneous inventory
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capacities, Chung-Yi Tse et al. (2021). The dealer-dealer behavior is not modeled,
but we assume that dealers are connected in a dense network, Mallaburn et al. (2019),
Li and Schürhoff (2019) (and many others) and use this inter-dealer network to trade
with each other in order to balance inventory, meet liquidity needs and speculate,
de Kamps et al. (2012).
We construct a simplified version of an OTC client-dealer market by representing
it as a bipartite network (a network with two node types), where nodes represent the
dealers and clients and the links represent a possible trading relationship between
them. Suppose there are N dealer nodes and M client nodes.
Figure 2.2: A graphical bipartite network representation of an
OTC market
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a bipartite network representation. Dealers Di
have a valuation VDi of a homogenous asset and make prices Pi to their connected
clients Cj . The clients have a valuation VCj of the asset. Each client can only trade
with the dealer(s) that they are connected to at a price Pi suggested by that dealer.
The client selects the best price of their connected dealer(s), and trade occurs. The
exact trading protocols are discussed in detail in section 2.6.
2.5 OTC Trading Architecture
Most OTC dealer markets have some standard trading protocols, and Biais et al.
(2006), after extensive interviews in the OTC client-dealer market for bonds, identi-
fied several essential features of OTC dealer markets, which guide the trading proto-
cols of our model:
• Clients request quotes from dealers.
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• Dealers respond to these requests for quotes by posting bid or ask prices simul-
taneously and independently. These quotes are firm, and the customer allocates the
order to the best quote.
• There is no pre–trade transparency, in the sense that the customer does not
see quotes before submitting the request for quotes. Neither do the dealers see the
quotes of their competitors.
This schedule of trading interactions can be modeled as a simple Bertrand price
competition with an unknown common ’true’ value V. The dealer with the best price,
P, trades with the client and receives a payoff of P − V . All other dealers who are
also connected to this client receive a zero payoff. We assume that the dealers are
simultaneously pricing with other clients and the dealers do not price discriminate
and make the same prices to all their connected clients.
The model of the OTC market that we use can be described as a 1-period, quote
driven market with a single risky asset traded that has an unknown common value a
priori to all agents. Price sensitive, price-taking clients interact through risk-neutral
price-setting dealers who are strategic in their price setting and who seek to maximize
their payoffs in equilibrium. The dealers make executable 2-way prices (buys and
sells), and the clients contact the dealers and accept their quotes to trade or not,
depending on their reservation prices. We assume a unit demand from the clients for
the asset.
2.6 Model Protocols
• We assume that it is common knowledge that each dealer and client estimate the
true value of the asset with a known (normal) probability distribution. Furthermore,
it is common knowledge that each dealer adds an linear amount to their estimate to
make a trading price
• Dealers estimate true asset price V, modelled by each receiving a signal Vi ∼
N(V, σM )
• Clients Cj estimate true asset price V, modelled by receiving a signal Vj ∼
N(V, σT )
• Dealers construct bid and ask prices based on their estimate of PiB = Vi − δi
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and Pi
A = Vi + δi
• Clients form reservation prices R based on their signal of R = Vj
• Clients Cj request trading prices from their connected dealers N [Cj ]
• If best trading price from connected dealers is better than R, then a unit trade
occurs at the best dealer’s price
• After all trading, true value V is realized and payoffs are calculated
A client asking N dealers for a price in an OTC market, where the dealers do not
see each other’s quotes, is strategically equivalent to the client conducting a blind
first price common value sealed bid auction with the N dealers. In this setup, the
client is the auctioneer, and the dealers the bidders.
Figure 2.3: The trading protocols for a buying client connected to
a subset of dealers
2.7 Payoffs
We begin by examining the base case of the expected payoffs for multiple competitive
dealers and one client. This is then extended to the M client case, where the clients
are connected to the dealers in a sparse network structure which we define in detail
in Chapter 4.
Let there be N dealers and 1 client. Dealers and clients receive independent signals
{Vi} as to the true value of the asset with a signal error that is normally distributed
with mean V and standard deviation σM for each of the dealers and σT for the clients.
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Clients set their reservation price at their signal - a naive estimation, to model the
boundedly rational behaviour of clients. We make the standard assumption that
dealers seek to maximize their expected payoffs in equilibrium.
2.7.1 N dealers, 1 Client payoffs
In an OTC market with one client and n dealers, the payoff for dealer i, in competition
with the N-1 other dealers from a single selling client is :
Πi =
 V − Pi : if Pi > Pj ∀j and Pi > R0 : otherwise
 (2.2)
where Pi is the buying quote of dealer i and V is the true value. Pj represents the
buying quotes of the other N-1 dealers. R is the client reservation price that must
be bettered if a trade is to occur and is a random variable dependent on the client’s
signal variance. The dealer has a non-zero payoff only if they have the highest price
with an analogous expression for the client buying. The dealer with the highest price
gets selected to trade, and the expected payoff is the expected value of this highest
price, conditional on the price being a maximum for buys (and minimum for sells).
Client payoffs are the opposite of the dealer payoffs, and the game is zero-sum;
hence the client payoff is:
Πclient = {Pmax − V : ifPmax = Max(Pi) > R : zero otherwise } (2.3)
There is an analogous expression for a buying client. In this case the dealers make a
buying price of Pi = Vi − δi = V + εi − δi , that is, they reduce their signal by δi and
the payoff for dealer i becomes:
Πi = {−εi + δi : if εi − δi > εj − δj , ∀j & Pi > R : zero otherwise} (2.4)
The dealer with the highest signal error, adjusted by their bid-ask spread, gets
selected to trade. This bidding strategy can lead to a negative payoff problem if
δi is too low and leads to the widely observed phenomena of the winners curse
2.
2Common Value Auctions and the Winners’ Curse, Princeton U Press (2001)
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This phenomenon occurs in common value auctions when bidders do not sufficiently
compensate for the fact that the probability of having an incorrect price is less than
the probability of an incorrect price conditional on being the best price. This non-
strategic behavior can lead to overbidding and negative payoffs.
The expected payoff for buys is the expected value of −(εi − δi) conditional on
this being a maximum in the game and for sells is the expected value of −(εi + δi)
conditional on this being a minimum in the game. When ε is from a symmetric
normal distribution with a mean zero, these payoffs are identical. The expected value
is calculated below for the n-player case.
We assume each dealer Di, uses a linear bidding function (strategy) that maps
their signals Si (estimates) onto a trading price and quotes a selling price (after
receiving their signal) of Pi = Si + δi = V + εi + δi and has a payoff of (εi + δi) if
(εi + δi) is less than all the other (εj + δj) of the other dealers and also less than the
client reservation price εT +R, zero otherwise. Each (εi + δi) is normally distributed
as N(δi, σi).
Consider the N-1 other dealers and the client reservation price. We first need to
calculate the probability that dealer i’s price is less than the minimum of this group.
Formally we are looking for the probability of dealer i, to win a competitive auction
with N-1 other dealers subject to a client reservation price. P (pi = V + εi − δi < Y )
where Y = min{ε1 + δ1, ε2 + δ2, ...., εi−1 + δi−1, εi+1 + δi+1, ..., εN + δN , εT +R}.
Consider N+1 independent normal random variables, X0, X1, ..., XN , where each
Xi has a mean δi and standard deviation σi.
Hill, J (2011), analysed the case of the probability of an independent normal RV
X0 ∼ N(δ0, σ0) being less than the minimum Y of N other normal (independent)
RV’s X1, ..., XN with Xi ∼ N(δi, σi) is :














where δj is the spread charged by dealer j who receives a signal Sj ∼ N(V, σj) and Φ(·)
and φ(·) are the distribution and density functions of a standard normal distribution.
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sPr(X0 = s) Pr(Y > s)ds (2.6)






















Now consider the selling clients. The calculations are the same but now involve
maximum order statistics. Specifically, each dealer makes a buying price (after re-
ceiving their signal) of V + εi − δi and has a payoff of P − V = −(εi − δi) if (εi − δi)
is greater than all the other (εj − δj) of the other dealers and greater than the client
reservation price εT +R, zero otherwise.
Consider the N-1 other dealers and the client reservation price. We are interested
in the probability that dealer i’s price is greater than the maximum of this group. By




















It is easy to show that the payoff functions (2.7) and (2.8) are the same. This is
also apparent by a symmetry argument. In this chapter we are only considering the
case of σMi = σM , that is, all dealers have same signal variance.
Variance of the expected payoffs from a single client can also be calculated as:




























In summary, with one client (buyer or seller) that connects to a sub-network of
dealers D1, ...Dk, and sets a reservation price of Vj ∼ N(V, σT ) and each dealer uses
a symmetric bidding strategy of (Vi − δi, Vi + δi), Vi ∼ N(V, σM ) the expected payoff




















This is the expected payoff to each dealer and depends only on the choice variable δi,
the semi bid-ask spread, and the variance of the client and dealer estimate σM ,σT .
Figure 2.4: Comparison of numerical simulation to the derived
payoff functions
As a check, we ran numerical simulations using vectors of length z of normally
distributed random variables. We compared the payoff to each dealer in each row for
various different spread and variance levels. As an illustration, we look at 3 dealers
and 1 client. All dealers receive a signal N(V, 2) and the client a signal N(V, 3). Dealer
1 uses a spread of 2, dealer 2, 3 and dealer 3, 4. For each random signal realization
we select the dealer with the highest signal and set the payoff to the actual payoff
or zero if their price was not the highest. The average payoff for each dealer over
each sample set was taken and compared to the theoretical level above. The results
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are illustrated in 2.4. Figure 2.5 shows a sample of the 5,000,000 auctions simulated
for the average values with the winner highlighted in red. A client win means the
reservation price was not bettered and no trade occurred.
Figure 2.5: Sample of random realizations in each auction
2.8 Bid-Ask Spreads, Bertrand Competition and Auc-
tions
2.8.1 Bid-Ask Spreads and Bertrand Competition
In the traditional Bertrand model of competition, Bertrand (1883), n firms, each with
a marginal cost C, set selling prices Pi of a homogenous good to a client who selects
the lowest price to trade. This firm with the lowest price captures the whole market
and makes a payoff equal to Pi − C. This leads to a Nash equilibrium solution of all
firms pricing at marginal cost, Pi = C, in competition.
In an OTC market, the dynamics are the same, but in addition, dealers simulta-
neously provide a buying price for the asset. Suppose there are n dealers connected
to a client. Dealers (i = 1 : n), make selling prices, P selli , to a client who buys at the
lowest price, min(P selli ) of their connected dealers. Simultaneously, dealers make a
buying price P buyi to a client, who selects the highest price max(P
buy
i )of their con-
nected dealers. The payoff to the winning selling dealer is P selli − V , where V is the
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true or realized value of the asset. Similarly, for the buying dealer, they have a payoff
of V − P buyi .
If the true value V is known, then in competition, the standard Bertrand results
imply that each dealer would price both buy and sell prices at the marginal cost V,
causing a zero bid-ask spread. However, this common value V is not known ex-ante to
making a price. We need the Nash equilibrium solutions of a Bertrand competition
with unknown common values in order to generate the bid-ask spread. When the
cost is unknown, bidding your signal leads to the winner’s curse problem - the dealer
with the worst estimate gets selected to trade and has a negative expected payoff.
Theoretically, this estimate needs to be ’shaved’ by some amount to compensate for
this.
2.8.2 Bertrand Competition and Auctions
A customer requesting a buying price from n firms, where the customer sells to the
highest price, is the same as a price auction, where the customer is the auctioneer and
the firms the bidders. In the OTC market case, there is a common value asset, firms
do not see the quotes of other firms, and the highest price firm wins the trade. This
is strategically equivalent to the client conducting a first price common value sealed
bid auction with the n dealers. In this setup, the client is the auctioneer, and the
dealers the bidders. Because of the unknown common value, the equilibrium results
of marginal cost pricing in the standard Bertrand model do not hold, however this
auction representation of the competition process can be analyzed using the equilib-
rium results of Wilson (1969, 1977) for the pure common value case and Milgrom and
Weber (1982) for the more general payoff case. These equilibrium results of bidding
strategies will equate to a bid-ask spread around the true value of an asset. This
bidding strategy ’shaves’ an optimal amount from the estimate in order to generate
a bid and an ask price.
The next chapter looks in detail at a two dealer duopoly OTC market and looks at
the nature of the equilibrium solution in a Bertrand unknown common value competi-
tion using the results of the Wilson (1969) equilibrium bidding strategies in common
value auctions. The duopoly problem adds more insight than the general case into
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the nature of the equilibrium solution as most of the equations have neat analytical
solutions.
2.9 Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in First Price Com-
mon Value Auctions
2.9.1 Introduction
Several theoretical and empirical studies have focused on bidding behavior in the
symmetric first-price common-value sealed-bid auction, FPSBA, given different em-
pirical specifications of the distribution of bidders’ signals and the distribution of the
true value (e.g. Thiel (1988); Levin and Smith (1991); Paarsch (1992); Wilson (1992).
This appendix follows the assumptions and methodologies of Levin and Smith (1991)
in deriving the linear form of the equilibrium pricing strategy in an FPSBA when the
seller adopts a naive reservation price strategy. We show that the complication of a
naive client reservation price strategy in an n-bidder FPSBA, where the client sets
the RP at their estimate, is equivalent to an (n+1)-bidder auction where the (n+1)th
bidder uses a naive bidding strategy. This asymmetric variation has a similar solution
as the symmetric variation described by Levin, Wilson, and Milgrom.
2.9.2 Setup
We assume that n risk-neutral bidders are bidding for a particular object, where the
value of the object V is identical but unknown to all bidders prior to bidding. Before
the auction, each bidder receives a private signal Xi concerning the value of the object.
The seller sets an (unannounced) reservation price set at their own estimate Xc, and
the bidder who submits the highest bid that is also greater than the reservation price
is selected as the winner and awarded the object. Each bidder uses their private
signal Xi to form an estimate of V, i.e., E(V |Xi). No bidder knows the estimate of
any other bidder. The bidders’ signals Xi are positively correlated (affiliated) with a
cumulative distribution function F (X|V ). The bidders have prior beliefs about the
true value V which is characterized by the cumulative distribution function G(V ).
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The number of bidders and the distribution functions of Xi and V are assumed to be
common knowledge.
2.9.3 Solution to the Standard FPSB Auction
Levin and Smith (1991), in a comment on Thiel (1988) derive the explicit form of
the equilibrium bidding solution in a standard common-value auction (no reserve
prices). Each bidder observes a random signal Xi with variance σ
2, which is an
estimate of the unknown value V of the item being auctioned. F (Xi|V ) represents
the conditional distribution of the ith bidder’s estimate, and g(V |Xi) represents the
bidder’s posterior density for V given the signal Xi. Let B(X) represent the symmetric
equilibrium strategy used by each of n bidders, with B
′
(·) > 0 such that the inverse
r(B) = B−1 is well defined. If all other bidders are using this strategy, then the ith





(V −B)F (r(B)|V )n−1g(V |X)dV (2.11)
Taking the first-order condition and additionally imposing the following three
conditions proposed by Thiel (1988):
1) Each bidder’s prior distribution of value V is diffuse: g(V ) is constant for all
V.
2) Estimation errors are statistically independent of the item’s true value: F
′
(Xi −
V |V ) = f(Xi − V |V ) = f(Xi − V )
3) Each bidder’s estimate of the value is unbiased: E(Xi) = V .
Leads to the differential equation:
B′(X) +K1B(X) +K2 −K1X − 1 = 0 (2.12)
This has a solution of:
B(X) = X − K2
K1
+ β exp(−K1X) (2.13)
Given the assumptions above and, additionally, the assumption that the estima-
tion errors are normal and independent of the true value, then Levin and Smith
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(1991), show that the optimal bid function in the first-price auction can be derived
as a family of solution with a parameter β ≥ 0










n is the ratio of the second and first moments
of the maximum values of a standardized normal distribution. β = 0 corresponds to
a linear solution.
Wilson (1992) remarked that in practice, bidding strategies are often constructed
on the assumption that the marginal distribution of the common value has a large
variance. For example, suppose that each estimate Xi has a normal conditional
distribution with mean V and variation σ2, and that the marginal distribution of
V has a normal distribution with variance s20. Then with no reservation prices, the
limit of the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy as s0 →∞ is B(X) = X − σan.
That is, bidding strategies converge to linearity as normally distributed priors become
diffuse in the limit.
Empirically, a linear bidding function in FPSBA has been observed in the US
Treasury market, Cammack (1991) and Paarsch (1992) found that a value of β = 0
(a linear bidding function) was statistically the most likely value of β from the data
of 144 separate auctions.
For both theoretical and empirical reasons, we focus on the linear bidding strategy
solution in a standard FPSBA3.
2.9.4 Equivalence of Reservation Prices and Extra Bidder
Although in an FPSB auction with uninformative prior distributions and normal
estimates, the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy is linear in signals; this may
not necessarily hold when we add the complication that the client also receives a
private signal Xc about the true value V and adopts a naive reservation price strategy
RP (Xc) = Xc. In this case the seller’s ask price can be regarded as another bid, since
3From Levin and Smith (1991) ”Linear strategies are not unknown in the literature. Previous
researchers have noted their existence under the restrictions of 1-3 above. Richard Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Robert J. Weber (1979) were among the first to discuss the necessity of a diffuse prior
(restriction 1). Michael H. Rothkopf (1980) and Robert L. Winkler and Daniel G. Brooks (1980)
provided examples in which independent estimation errors (restriction 2) were used to derive linear
bidding functions.”
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bidder i wins the standard n-player auction if {Bi > Bj ∀j }, j = 1...n and wins in a
reservation price auction if {Bi > Bj and Bi > Bc} which is equivalent to an (n+1)
bidder standard auction with no reservation prices, where the (n+ 1)th ’bidder’ uses
a naive bidding strategy B(Xc) = Xc.
Although there are very few general results for asymmetric information cases, the
asymmetry in this auction is solvable since the (n+ 1)th bidder is not strategic.
2.9.5 Signal and Bid Distributions
In the (n+1) player auction, each bidder i = 1, ..., n receives a sample Xi from a
distribution described by a CDF F (V, σ2M ) with mean V and variance σ
2 and the
(n+1)th bidder (the seller) receives a signal from the same distribution F, with mean
V but with variance σ2T . Each bidder uses a bid function Bi(Xi) which we assume is
monotonically increasing in X.
Suppose bidder i wins the auction and we want to calculate the probability that
bidder i was the highest bid. The set of bids {B1(X1), B2(X2), ..., Xn+1, Bi(Xi)},
without knowing B(·), makes impossible forming the distribution of the maximum
Bi(Xi). Note in particular that Xi > Xn+1 does not imply that Bi(Xi) > Xn+1.
Bidder i wins the auction only if his bid was the largest out of the other bidders’
bids and also larger than the (n+ 1)th bidders bid (which by design is their signal).
We can assume a symmetric bidding function B(·) for the n bidders (by homogeneity),
and since the bidding function is monotonically increasing in the signal, then we can
work backward to the order of equivalent signals of the (n+1) bidders by applying an
inverse function B−1(·) to all the bids including the seller. The probability of bidder
i winning the auction is now the same as the probability of bidder i having the largest
signal in this associated signal set.
The n+1 signal set now has the same ordering as the bid set and implies that if
Xi > Xn+1 =⇒ B(Xi) > Xn+1. Since B(·) is an unknown function, we still cannot
calculate the maximum order statistics needed to derive the probability of winning;
however, we know the exact distribution, F of these associated signals (bar one), and
so bidder i wins the (n+1) FPSB auction when his signal is largest in the associated
signal set S = {X1, ..., B−1(Xn+1), Xi}. The {Xj : j = 1, ...., n} are all distributed
as F with mean zero and variance σ2M , but B(·) is still an unknown function whose
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inverse is assumed to exist. Therefore z = B−1(X) may not be described by distn F
(depending on the bidding function B of the n bidders and the nature of F). When F
is normal, and B is linear, a particularly simple form emerges.
2.9.6 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy
Following the derivation of Levin and Smith (1991), we derive the equilibrium bidding
strategy of the (n-1) strategic bidders in a standard n-bidder FPSBA when bidder n
uses a naive bidding strategy of B(X) = X. This auction is strategically equivalent
to an (n-1)-bidder standard FPSBA auction when the n-1 bidders face a seller that
sets a naive reservation price strategy of RP (X) = X as described in 2.9.4. As in the
standard FPSBA derivation, this solution produces a non-linear term when the prior
distribution has a variance σ2 ≡ ∞.
Each bidder i = 1, .., (n − 1) observes a random signal Xi with variance σ2M ,
which is an estimate of the unknown value V of the item being auctioned. F (Xi|V )
represents the conditional distribution of the ith bidder’s estimate, and g(V |Xi) rep-
resents the bidder’s posterior density for V given the signal Xi. Similarly, bidder n
observes a random signal Xn with variance σ
2
T . Let B(X) represent the symmetric
equilibrium strategy used by each of n-1 bidders, with B
′
(·) > 0 such that the inverse
r(B) = B−1 is well defined. If all bidders i = 1, ..., n− 1 are using this strategy, and
we now also assume that the nth bidder adopts a naive bidding strategy that is fixed
as Bn(X) = X then the i





(V −B)FσM (r(B)|V )
n−2FσT (r(X)|V )g(V |X)dV (2.15)
Taking the first order condition B
′













(X)−1 and so :





ΣV |X(V −B)FσT (r(X)|V )(n− 2)FσM (X|V )
n−3fσM (X|V )g(V |X)dV∫
ΣV |X FσT (r(X)|V )FσM (X|V )n−2g(V |X)dV
(2.17)
A symmetric equilibrium must satisfy this differential equation 2.17. We now
apply the three Thiel conditions as in section 2.9.3, making the substitution z =
X − V , and additionally noting that the denominator is simply the probability of


























z(n− 2)FσT (r(z))FσM (z)
n−3f2σM (z)dz (2.21)
Equation 2.19 is an ordinary linear differential equation in standard form, with
solution:
B(X) = X − (1 +K2)
K1
+ βe−K1X (2.22)
Where β characterizes a family of solutions which are a consequence of the inte-
gration constant in 2.19, and we focus on the solution β = 0, (which is the limiting
solution for the uninformative prior beliefs case with independently normal distribu-
tion of signals in the standard FPSBA). Equation 2.22 with β = 0 gives an equilibrium
bidding function that is a linear function of the estimates, B(X) = X − δ
Now applying the normally distributed signal condition gives the coefficients K1
and K2 :









z(n− 2)FσT (r(z))ΦσM (z)
n−3φ2σM (z)dz (2.24)
Where φσ(·) and Φσ(·) are the density and distribution function of a standard
normal with variance σ2. Given equation 2.22 , B−1(X) = X + δ, therefore, z + δ is
also a normal RV and so FσT (r(z)) is a normal CDF, which leads to:
FσT (B






Since z is ∼ N(0, σT ) after the varoable change in equation 2.18. Integrating
2.23 and 2.24 by parts and noting the order statistics result that the expected value
of the maximum of n independent normal Y = max{X1, ..., Xn} but not identical
distributions Xi ∼ N(δi, σi) i = 1, ..n can be written as :



















Which is just the first moment of the first derivative of the distribution function

















































Which, not surprisingly, is similar to the ratio of the 2nd to 1st moment solution
in Wilson (1992) for the standard SBFPA normal case with n-1 bidders.
2.9.7 Summary
The equilibrium bidding solution in an n-bidder FPSBA4 where bidder i = 1, .., n− 1
receive a signal Xi ∼ N(V, σM ) and bidder-n receives a signal Xn ∼ N(V, σT ) and
4Using the same methodology as above, can show that in an n-bidder auction where k-bidders
adopt a naive strategy, the equilibrium bidding strategy for the (n-k) strategic bidders is:
B(X) = X − δ
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adopts the naive strategy B(X) = X is:




































− δ = 0 (2.29)
This is strategically equivalent to an (n-1) bidder FPSBA where the seller adopts
a naive reservation price RP (X) = X.
This function for δ (the amount of bid shaving) is not dependent on any signal
realizations and is the value of δ that satisfies 2.29 and can only be solved numerically.
This theoretical result, along with the empirical evidence of Cammack (1991) and
Paarsch (1992) gives justification for examining a linear bidding strategy in the rest
of the thesis.
2.9.8 Numerical Checks
As a numerical check, We examined three bidders (2 strategic 1 naive) and generated
a vector of (1000 x 3) random normal samples, then calculated the rest response
signal shaving given the other bidders’ strategies. Figure 2.6 illustrates the result
that the mutual best response point (the Nash equilibrium) coincides closely with the
theoretical numerical solution of equation 2.29 as 1.73.
As a further numerical test, we attempted to reproduce the equilibrium spread
levels with varying amounts of client signal variance that we previously calculated by
numerically solving the payoff functions using the relaxation algorithm. The results
appear to be identical and are shown in 2.7 for the 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 bidder cases.


































− δ = 0
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Figure 2.6: Best response functions of the 2 strategic bidders
Figure 2.7: Optimal bid reductions for the n strategic bidders with





To analyze the equilibriums in a two-dealer OTC game, as defined in the previous
chapter, we need the equilibrium results for a two-player Bertrand competition when
there are unknown common values with asymmetric information. Although much has
been written on Bertrand competition, there appears to be little in the competition
literature concerning unknown common values with asymmetric information. The
literature focus is primarily on an Independent Private Values modeling environment,
where each firm or bidder has a private valuation or private marginal cost function,
leading to a payoff that is the difference between the traded price and this private
cost. The cases covered include where either market costs are known to all (the full
information model, Bertrand (1883) and many subsequent complications) or where
one-sided costs are unknown (partial information models, Spulber (1995), Wambach
(1999), Janssen and Rasmusen (2001), Patra et al. (2019)).
The closest solution to this problem is Spulber (1995), who analyses an exten-
sion of the standard Bertrand model using an auction type representation in which
marginal costs are not common knowledge among the competitors but are, for each
firm, independently drawn from a distribution and private information for the individ-
ual firms. This is a one-sided information problem, where private costs are known but
competitor’s costs are unknown. This paper also uses an independent private value
model and does not calculate the equilibrium’s explicit form. This incomplete infor-
mation about costs changes the equilibrium prediction dramatically, and prices are
now set substantially above marginal costs. Other notable contributions are Janssen
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and Rasmusen (2001), who looked at uncertainty in the number of competitors in
price competition and found that prices rise with the reducing probability of greater
numbers of competitors. Wambach (1999) introduced risk aversion into cost uncer-
tainty, to name but a few, but these papers, in common with the majority, all model
an Independent Private Values case, indeed according to Routledge and Edwards
(2020), even the literature concerning informational uncertainty in competition is not
large.
In the first part of this chapter, we examine the simple case of a common marginal
cost to both firms (a common value model), combined with a limited information set
regarding the true value of this cost, where only the estimated cost variance is known
ante to setting a price. The common value case is a more realistic representation for
markets where there is an unknown common cost element, for example, the amount
of oil in a tract of land, the future raw materials cost in production. In particular,
where there is an unknown common value to a financial instrument. However, the
calculation of this value is subject to some measurement error or interpretation.
Price competition models play a significant role in public policy debates in regu-
lation and antitrust; however, the standard full information Bertrand model of com-
petition is subject to what is known as the Bertrand Paradox. This paradox is where
two firms reach a Nash equilibrium state where both firms charge a price equal to
marginal cost, share the market somehow, and earn zero profits.1 However, the full
information Bertrand model’s standard conclusions critically depend on the assump-
tion that firms have full information about the entire market cost structure.
We show that in the uncertain common cost Duopoly, each firm’s uncertainty
about the common marginal costs eliminates the discontinuity in the pricing strat-
egy’s effect on profit. Like Spulber (1995), we also show that all firms earn positive
expected profits in equilibrium and are therefore incentivized to enter the market and
engage in price competition. These results then translate directly into the bid-ask
spread of dealers in an OTC market. The result of non-zero payoffs in equilibrium
of a partial information Bertrand competition model is particularly relevant to other
market models that assume a zero profit condition.
1If all firms have constant marginal cost and if one firm has an absolute cost advantage over its
rivals, it prices at the marginal cost of the next to lowest cost firm and captures the entire market.
Thus, all other firms earn zero profit,
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We model the competitive Bertrand price process as a sealed bid first price com-
mon value auction and use Wilson (1969) standard equilibrium results for a two player
auction. (whose results were extended in the seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber
(1982), who provided a full if a somewhat unfriendly description of the general form
of the equilibrium in auctions.)
This chapter also looks specifically at the case of asymmetric information between
the two firms in a duopoly. We show that in an uncertain common cost environment,
as uncertainty regarding the true value goes up for either firm, both firms’ equilibrium
price also goes up. This is due to the firms’ strategic nature when they know the
level of uncertainty (variances) in the market, and the level of uncertainty is common
knowledge. Intuitively, if one knows one’s competitor is very unsure about the true
costs, one can be less aggressive in one’s own pricing strategy. This result gives further
evidence that public information can reduce spreads in the market. It has the biggest
effect on the worst-informed firms, which affects the best-informed firms’ ability to
exploit their informational advantage.
We also look at asymmetric information between the dealers and the clients and
demonstrate how dealers take advantage of their informational advantage. This result
is particularly relevant to OTC markets since clients are often at an informational
disadvantage to the dealers.
According to Routledge and Edwards (2020), ”our understanding of price compe-
tition in the presence of production cost uncertainty is still rudimentary”, notwith-
standing the large volume of work on competition spawned by Bertrand and Cournot.
Even concerning the century-old standard Bertrand model, ”there is a notable gap
in the research. There are no equilibrium existence results for the classical Bertrand
model when there is discrete cost uncertainty.”
This section adds to the literature in two directions. Firstly, examining in de-
tail the equilibrium in a Bertrand Duopoly price competition with unknown common
costs and asymmetric information using an auction methodology. Secondly, in ap-
plying this competition methodology to financial market instruments, where market
makers replace the traditional firms and marginal cost is replaced by a ’true’ common
value, and pricing takes the form of a bid-ask spread. Bertrand competition’s pricing
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equilibria then translate into predictions for the equilibrium bid-ask spread in finan-
cial markets, which typically accords with the main microstructure models’ findings
but allows for greater flexibility when applied to a network and dispenses with some
empirically questionable assumptions.
The extent of the firms’ information sets when making a price is critical to which
price they make. In standard Bertrand price competition literature, the true cost
is the marginal cost to the firm of supplying the object. In contrast, in financial
markets, the true cost is the true value but is realized only after trading. Agents
attempt to measure this true cost, and we model this by them receiving a sample
(signal) from a normal distribution with an unknown mean but known variance. The
assessment of the true value by the firms of the marginal cost or value is subject to
measurement error or interpretation.
3.2 The Model
We begin by looking at the dual uncertain information duopoly price problem, a
standard Bertrand competition model with unknown common costs to both players:
two identical firms who compete in price for a homogeneous good. Each firm has
a common marginal cost C, which is unknown to both firms a priori. We simplify
the market structure by assuming a unit demand from each customer; however, the
results from a linear demand curve are shown to have very similar effects. Next,
we apply this common value auction methodology to financial market prices where
firms provide a firm buy and sell price to the market customers. The firm with the
lowest price matches the customer buy order, and the highest buy price matches the
customer sell order. The payoff to the firms is price - cost, where the price is the best-
quoted trading price and the cost is the future true value (or can be interpreted as the
future mark to market value). We can model this price competition (Bertrand) as a
common value first price sealed bid auction where the object’s true cost is unknown
but the same to each bidder. In the auction setup, the customer acts as the auctioneer
and the firms as the bidders.
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3.2.1 Information Sets
The uncertainty of the firms regarding the true cost C defines a game of incomplete
information. In line with the methodology of Harsanyi (1967), we convert this game
to a game of imperfect information by assuming a probability distribution over the
true value. As each firm does not know the other firm’s signal, each firm forms a
probability distribution belief around competitor types (error signal distributions),
which we assume is common knowledge along with the bidding functions and own
signal error distributions. This is the standard technique, known as the Common Prior
Assumption, for converting games of incomplete information to games of imperfect
information. We assume that the distribution of each firm’s error signal is common
knowledge which is itself common knowledge. This allows us to specify this structure
as a static Bayesian game and the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as the equilibrium
concept.
Specifically, we assume that the true value estimation is modeled as a draw from
a probability distribution. The firms know the functional form of the distribution
(normal) and know the variance. However, the mean (the true value) is unknown.
3.2.2 Normal Distribution of the Estimation (Signal) Errors
The extent of the information sets that firms have when making a price is critical in
what price they make. Our motivation in this chapter is that firms in general and
financial market participants, in particular, have a payoff that is essentially (price
traded - cost), where the true cost is unknown. In financial markets, the true cost
can be replaced with the true value since the financial instrument will realize a true
value (bond repayment, derivative expiry etc.) at some future time. As in Chapter
2, agents attempt to measure this true cost (value), and we can model this by each
of them receiving a sample (signal) from a normal distribution.
Therefore, we model the true value estimation process by each firm i of common
cost C by them receiving an independent signal Si where firm i receives a signal
Si = C + εi with εi normal N(0, σi) .
.
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3.3 Optimal Bidding Strategies
3.3.1 The Standard Auction Model
The most common equilibrium bidding model is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
with risk-neutral bidders, known as a risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) solution.
Wilson (1969) was the first to develop an RNNE solution to the common value auction
problem, and this methodology was significantly extended to include private values
by the seminal papers of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Although auctions of varying types have been analyzed for a very long time,
Milgrom and Weber’s paper provides a comprehensive solution to the equilibrium of
various auction formats, which launched many papers with varying degrees of compli-
cation. However, in general, the solutions to the equilibriums in Milgrom equations
are not simple to explicitly find. Athey (1997), Lizzeri & Persico (1998) and Ro-
driguez (2000) prove existence and uniqueness results. Athey also develops numerical
algorithms for computing the equilibrium. Laskowski & Slonim (1999) provide an
asymptotic solution for a parametric model. Kagel & Levin (1999) exhibit a bounded
rational solution for a similar model. Hausch (1987) determines the equilibrium for
a discrete setting. Campbell & Levin (2000) solve the equilibrium for a discrete,
parametric model.
The Wilson Model
Wilson set up the framework for the equilibrium solution of the common value prob-
lem. The following brief summary is taken from his seminal paper. Suppose that two
parties, called 1 and 2, will bid for a prize of monetary value v which is not known
with certainty by either party. For simplicity, assume that both parties initially assess
the same prior probability density, g(v), for the value of the prize v. Then, before
the bidding, each party i observes an outcome θ1 of a random variable θ̂1 distributed
with the conditional density hi(θi|v). We assume that conditional on v, θ̂1, and θ̂2
are independent.
Our aim is to identify the equilibrium pure strategies when they exist; say, pi(θ1)
is the bid to be made by party i if he observes θi. He then shows that a pure
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strategy function pi(θi) is monotonic and so an inverse function Πi(pi) exists satisfying
Πi(pi(θi)) = θi. He further assumed that each inverse function Πi is differentiable.
Finally, a utility function for money that is linear in money is assumed for each
party. Each agent chooses his bidding strategy to maximize his expected net gain if
he should win, given his opponent’s strategy. Suppose party 2 chooses p2(θ2) as a
strategy.








where, fji(θj |θi) =
∫∞
−∞ hj(θj |v)gi(v|θi) dv is the posterior marginal density for his op-
ponent’s observation, and the posterior marginal distribution function is Fji(θj |θi) =∫ θj
−∞ fji(ξ|θi) dξ and the function ϕji(θj |θi) :=
Fji(θj |θi)
fji(θj |θi) which yields Π1 as a function
of Π2.
Let v̄(θ1, θ2) be the expected value of the common value v, conditional on the





and the equilibrium solution is obtained by solving the following equation that is
derived from the first order condition:
ϕji(Πj(p)|Πi(p)) = [v̄(Π1(p),Π2(p))− p]Πj
′
(p) (3.3)
In the independent information case, v̄(Π1(p),Π2(p)) = Π1 and by inspection of
the partial differential equation PDE (3.3), a linear solution is apparent. Consider a
candidate linear solution, i.e, p = Πi + β, for some β, then Πi
′
(p) = 1 and its easy to
check that this a solution to the PDE when β = ϕ(Πj(p)|Πi(p)), and so p = Πi − β.
Suppose that the two parties have the same types of information available, mean-
ing that h1 and h2 are identical functions and, therefore, that ϕ12 and ϕ21 are identical
functions. In this case, a solution to (3.1) is Π2(p) = Π1(p). Further, if the com-
mon prior assessment g is a diffuse Normal density and the observations θi are each
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Normally distributed with mean v, then each posterior marginal density fji is a Nor-
mal density function with mean Πi and a common standard deviation, say σ; hence,





and ϕj i(Π1|Π1) = σ
√
π
2 v̄(Π1,Π1) = Π1. The
solution to PDE (3.3) is therefore Π1(p) = Π2(p) = p+σ
√
π
2 and the optimal strategy
functions are pi(θi) = θi − σ
√
π
2 , i = 1, 2.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is calculated as Pi(Si) = Si−σ
√
π
2 , where σ
2 is
the variance of the posterior normal distribution (after observing your sample). From
Bayesian statistical updating, the prior standard deviation, σprior, and the posterior













Therefore, in relation to the prior variance σ of the error distribution (which we
assume is common knowledge), the Nash equilibrium as calculated by Wilson can be
rewritten as:
Pi(Si) = Si − σ
√
π (3.5)
3.3.2 Linear Bidding Functions
As we are concerned with a pure common value representation, we use the results of
Wilson (1969), who gave a linear solution to the simple normal distribution error case
N(0, σ) in a common value sealed bid auction with unit demand function and two
bidders. The solution is of the form b(Si) = Si+σ
√
π, and was derived by solving the
bidding function as a solution to first-order conditions of the payoff functions leading
to a differential equation and certain boundary conditions.
Section 2.9 gives a theoretical basis for examining a linear bidding function in the
more general n-bidder case with normal signal error. Empirically, Cammack (1991)
ran multiple regressions on the Treasury Bill auction dataset, where traders placed
bids in a Treasury market auction, and she finds: ”They imply a linear functional
form between the bidding adjustment and the empirical measures of dispersion of
opinion and number of bidders.”
This theoretical and empirical evidence motivates us to examine a symmetric
linear bidding function for the firms. Specifically, when a firm receives an estimate
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Si, they are aware that if they bid their estimate, this is likely to be too high and leads
to a negative expected payoff. This is because their estimate of the common value is
the highest amongst the other competing firms, and on average, will give a negative
payoff. This is because the probability that the estimate is too high, conditional on
it being a maximum, is greater than the unconditional probability that the estimate
is too high. This is known as the ’Winners Curse’. See Kagel and Levin (1986) for a
comprehensive study into this effect. The firms are strategic in the sense that they are
aware of this conditional probability problem and therefore seek to shave an amount
from their estimate.
3.4 Standard Duopoly Market
3.4.1 Assumptions
Consider a standard duopoly market with a single customer and two firms that com-
pete in price for an identical good. The customer has unit demand and trades at
the best price of the two firms that he is connected to. Each firm can produce this
homogenous good that depends entirely on an uncertain common cost C.
Each firm i attempts to estimate this common cost C and receives an independent
signal Si where firm 1 receives a signal S1 = C+ε1 with ε1 normal N(0, σ1) and firm 2
receives a signal S2 = C+ε2, where ε2 is N(0, σ2) to allow for differences in estimation
precision.
Each firm adds a profit margin δi to their signal and each seek to maximize
their payoff. Firm 1 makes a price P1(S1) = S1 + δ1 and firm 2 makes a price
P2(S2) = S2 + δ2. The firm with the lowest price gets to trade and has a payoff of
Pi − C or zero if the price is higher than the other firm.
We make the common assumption that the firms are risk-neutral and seek to
maximize their expected profits in equilibrium.
This setup can lead to a winner’s curse problem - if δi is too low, then the proba-
bility of trading is increased, but expected profits are low (possibly negative), and if
δi is too high, the probability of winning is low but expected profitability is high. The
Winner’s Curse is the name of the phenomena that is the tendency for the winning
bid in an auction to exceed the intrinsic value or true worth of an item.
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3.4.2 Game setup
From a game-theoretic perspective, we can model this partial information competitive
process as a Bayesian game. The Bertrand game follows the usual protocols. Firms
1, 2, receive signals Si as to the true marginal common cost C. Firms make a price
Pi(Si), where the function Pi(.) is known as a bidding function and is a strategy that
maps each possible cost estimation onto a trading price. The firms do not see the
other firms’ price before making their own price. The client then selects the firm with
the lowest price to trade. The true cost C is realized, and the payoffs are P - C for the
best-priced firm, which captures the whole market. The payoff is zero for the other
firm.
Players: Firms 1 and 2
Typesets: Each player receives a signal Si drawn from a distribution N(C, σ) - the
estimate of the cost C determines types
Strategies: Each firm i, makes a price P, with a bidding function P (Si) = Si+δi, δi ∈
[0, inf) , i = 1, 2, this strategy maps each possible cost estimate onto a trading price
Payoffs: Payoffs are Pi − C if Pi < Pj , zero otherwise
3.4.3 Expected Payoffs
Each firm i=1,2 makes a selling price (after receiving their signal Si) of
P (Si) = Si + δi = C + εi + δi (3.6)
and has a payoff of
Πi = (P (Si)− C)1(εi+δi) = (εi + δi)1A (3.7)
where 1A is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if (εi+ δi) < (εj + δj) of the other
firm, zero otherwise.
We are interested in the probability that firm i’s price is less than firm j’s price.
Formally we are looking for the probability of firm i, to win a competitive auction
with one other firm, that is;
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P (Pi < Pj) = P (V + εi + δi < V + εj + δj) (3.8)
Consider N+1 independent normal random variables, X0, X1, ..., XN , where each
Xi has a mean δi and standard deviation σi. It is standard theory
2 that the probability
of an independent normal RV being less than the minimum of N other normal Rv’s
is














And the expected value of this RV is:
E[X0 : X0 < Y ] =
∞∫
−∞
sPr(X0 = s) Pr(Y > s)ds (3.10)
Therefore, using this result allows us to specify the expected payoff to firm i as:
















This formulation can be easily extended to n firms, but this integral (3.11) has
an analytic solution only in the 2 firm case, and the Expected payoff of firm 1, given
δ1, δ2, σ1, σ2: can be shown to be:



















2 and Φ(·) and φ(·) are the distribution and density functions of
a standard normal distribution N(0, 1).
Similarly firm 2’s expected payoff is:















These expected payoff functions Eqn (3.12) and Eqn (3.13) are decreasing as a func-
tion of σ1 for firm 1 and similarly decreasing in σ2 for firm 2. Superior information
(estimation of true value) translates into higher expected payoffs.
2See for example, Hill (2010) - Minimum of Normally distributed random variables
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As both variances tend to zero limσi→0 E[Π1] = δ1 if δ1 < δ2,
δ1
2 if δ1 = δ2, 0 if
δ1 > δ2, which is the full information set normal Bertrand competition payoffs with
known costs with the familiar discontinuity and the cause of the leapfrogging by each
firm to a price of marginal cost.
3.4.4 Equilibrium
Symmetric Information Case
This 2-player non-cooperative game has a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium by standard
existence theorems and a pure strategy risk neutral (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium was
calculated analytically in the case of a traditional auction for the common estimation
error case, σ1 = σ2 = σ by Wilson (1969, 1977) using the solution to the first
order conditions of a general bidding function. Later, again using an auction setup,
Thompson et al. (2005) assumed a linear type bidding function and solved the first
order conditions of the maximum order statistics using several standard probability













Where φσ is the normal density function with variance σ
2 which is the variance of
the distribution of the normal errors.
The expected payoff at this equilibrium is :
E[Πi(δ






Interestingly, the payoff for both firms at this equilibrium is positive for non-zero σ -
in contrast to the full information Bertrand models. This is similar to the results of
Spulber, who found that uncertainty over competitor’s costs created non-zero profits
in equilibrium (although this was in an Independent Private Values setting). This
non-zero profit in equilibrium in the presence of common cost uncertainty is another
solution to the classic Bertrand Paradox. When σ −→ 0, δ∗ −→ 0 and E[Π] −→ 0 as
in standard full information Bertrand model.
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The more general problem with a greater numbers of firms can be solved in a similar
way but unfortunately the solutions, which can only be expressed as complicated
integrals, can only be solved numerically and offer less insight into the nature of the
equilibrium. However, we provide an analysis of the equilibrium in the important
case of asymmetric information in the 2 firm case below.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical and Numerical Simulation of Signal Reduc-
tion Best Response Curves - Firm1(blue) N(0,1), Firm2(red) N(0,1)
signal error.
To gain intuition, Figure 3.1 illustrates the best response functions of the 2 firms
who both receive a N(0, 1) error signal, and compares the theoretical predictions with
numerical simulations of the mean payoffs from 10,000 auctions. At the intersection
point, both firms have a mutual best response to each others’ strategy and hence





An explicit expression for the Nash equilibrium exists in the uncertain and asymmetric
information case, but simple best response functions cannot be expressed explicitly
and must be calculated numerically. For each choice of firm j, we calculate the best
response of firm i. We do the same for firm i and find the point of intersection of these
best response curves. For intuition, consider the Duopoly market as mentioned above
but now with firm 2 having a less accurate ability to measure the true common cost.
This situation can be modeled by having firm 2 receive a signal that has a higher
variance than firm 1.
Figure 3.2 graphically illustrates the best response functions of the two firms
when firm 1 has a signal error of N(0, 1) and firm 2 has a signal error of N(0, 2).
The intersection of the best response curves is the Nash equilibrium of the system as
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Figure 3.2: Signal Reduction Best Response Curves - Firm 1 has
N(0,1) and Firm 2 has N(0,2) signal error
this is a mutual best response to each other’s strategies. The best response function
of firm 1 (the low variance firm) is less sensitive to firm 2’s strategy than vice versa.
In fact, numerical simulations suggest that the equilibrium levels are equal for any
combination of σ1 and σ2. The payoffs for the 2 firms at these levels are, of course,
very different, with the lower signal error firm making significantly higher payoffs.
This motivates the following proposition which allows us to explicitly calculate the
equilibrium level.
Proposition 1. Given the auction duopoly with unknown common values described
above and firms receive signals S1 ∼ N(C, σ1) and S2 ∼ N(C, σ2) regarding the true
cost, then in equilibrium, where the 2 firms use a bidding strategy B(Si) = Si + δ
∗
i ,





Proof. Assume equilibrium and both firms are choosing their mutual best responses
(δ∗1 , δ
∗



























2 = aZ and let δ
∗
1 = aZ + ∆, where ∆ now becomes
firm 1’s choice variable.
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∆ = 0 is clearly a solution and can be shown to be unique. Similarly, examining
the payoffs of firm 2 and setting δ2
∗ = δ∗1 + ∆
′
gives identical expressions which
demonstrate that ∆
′
= ∆ = 0, hence, δ1
∗ = δ2
∗
This proposition has some interesting consequences. In equilibrium, the 2 firms
tend to make the same signal reduction, independent of their estimation error. In





















The payoffs are decreasing with standard deviation of the error signal and increasing
in the uncertainty of the competitor.
In fact, given this proposition and the payoff functions, we can state the following:
Proposition 2. Given the auction duopoly with unknown common values described
above and firms receive signals S1 ∼ N(C, σ1) and S2 ∼ N(C, σ2) regarding the true
cost, then in equilibrium, where the 2 firms use a bidding strategy B(Si) = Si+δ
∗
i , then














Proof. Follows from proposition 1. Set δ∗2 = δ
∗
1 + z, take partial derivative of payoff
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Also it is easy to check that this is an equilibrium, which then also proves proposition
1.
This expression demonstrates that as uncertainty regarding the true value goes
up for either firm, the equilibrium price goes up. The increase in the equilibrium
price is due to the firms’ strategic nature when they know the level of uncertainty
(variances) in the market. As the uncertainty goes up for one firm, they need to
make greater signal reductions to protect themselves from the winner’s curse. The
other firm knows this and can afford a greater signal reduction, leading to a higher
payoff. As usual, the full information case is covered with σ1 = σ2 = 0 and gives the
standard result of marginal cost pricing in equilibrium.











































These are simply derived by inserting the equilibrium values into the individual payoff
functions (3.12), (3.13). These expected payoffs are always non-zero for any non-zero
sum of the variances (σ21 +σ
2
2), illustrating that even a less informed firm can compete
profitably with a better informed firm in equilibrium. These results are critically
dependent on the information sets of the 2 firms and this particular observation is a
consequence of both firms knowing the variances, σ21 and σ
2
2 of the other firm’s signal
error and pricing strategically.
The fact that in equilibrium, the prices rise for both firms if one of the firms is less
well informed is analogous in some ways to the standard full information Bertrand
model where one firm has a private cost advantage over the other firm. The Nash
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equilibrium of this standard duopoly model is that the equilibrium price is the higher-
cost firm’s marginal cost.
There is some empirical evidence to suggest this effect in real pricing - the disper-
sion of bid-ask spreads in financial markets is relatively small considering the various
firms’ varying estimation abilities and myriad sources of measurement error. The
consistent high profitability of the major financial firms suggests that their spreads
are very profitable. In contrast, small market-making firms appear less so. Huang and
Masulis (1999) analyzed the dealer bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market,
which has some similarities to our stylized model. The fx market is an OTC market
with no central marketplace, and clients contact dealers directly to ask for trading
quotes. They found that average dealer spreads to customers were 0.807% with a
standard deviation of 0.0137%
3.4.5 Customer Payoffs
The expected payoff E[ΠC ], to the customer is the negative sum of the payoffs of
both firms, which is :
















which is the standard formula for the expected value of the minimum of two normal
random variables N(δ1, σ1), N(δ2, σ2), as in Nadarajah and Kotz (2008), who also ex-





where ρ is the correlation coefficient between the two samples (or estimation errors),
the Eqn (3.21) is the more general expression for the expected payoff.
At equilibrium, δ∗1 = δ
∗
2 and the expected payoff to the customer is :







Equation (3.22) is decreasing in the correlation coefficient ρ, that is, as firms
error signals become more correlated, expected payoffs to the customer decrease,
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hence firms’ payoffs increase. As error signals become increasingly correlated, the
competition effect diminishes. This in turn causes equilibrium spreads to decrease.
3.4.6 Non Unit Demand Functions
So far the payoff functions have assumed a unit demand. The equilibriums calculated
also hold for a classic downward sloping linear demand function in the symmetric
information case. Suppose the duopoly is set up as above, with firm 1 receiving a
signal S1 ∼ N(0, σ1) and firm 2 receives signal S2 ∼ N(0, σ2). Suppose that both
firms face a market demand function D(P ) = aP + c, a < 0. The payoff to firm 1 is:
Π1 = D(P )(P − C) = D(P (S1))(P (S1)− C) = D(V + ε1 + δ1)(ε1 + δ1)
if (ε1 + δ1) is less than (ε2 + δ2), zero otherwise. Analogous expression for firm 2.
Then the expectation of this payoff E[Π1] is:
E[Π1] = E[D(V + ε1 + δ1)]E[ε1 + δ1]− 2COV [D(V + ε1 + δ1), ε1 + δ1]
In the linear case D(P ) = aP + c, this becomes:
E[Π1] = E[a(V + ε1 + δ1) + c]E[ε1 + δ1]− 2V ar[ε1 + δ1] (3.23)
The variance of the minimum order statistic (ε1 + δ1) can be calculated
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At equilibrium, δ1 = δ
∗
1 and hence maximizes E[ε1 + δ1] (the unit demand case), and
D(x) is a decreasing function, therefore δ∗1 also maximizes E[D(V +ε1 +δ1)]E[ε1 +δ1].
In the symmetric information case δ∗1 must equal δ
∗
2 by symmetry, therefore, V ar(ε1 +
δ∗1) is the same as V ar(ε1 + δ
∗
2). Therefore, at equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium pair
(δ∗1 , δ
∗
2) of the unit demand case, is also the same equilibrium of the linear demand



















)− (µ1 + µ2)θφ(µ2−µ1θ ) , see Nadarajah (2008)
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case. This allows us to restrict the analysis to the unit demand case as the algebra is
simpler, however, all of the previous results hold for the more realistic case of a linear
demand function.
In the asymmetric σi case, the equal equilibrium price levels no longer hold as
the conditional variance (3.24) of the minimum order statistic is not symmetrical
for the two firms, however, using numerical simulations shows that the downward
sloping demand curves cause the better informed firm to charge a slightly lower price
in equilibrium than the higher demand firm. The effect appears to be much smaller
than the effect of the absolute level of variances through empirical observations.
As an illustration, suppose firm 1 receives a signal S1 ∼ N(C, 1) and firm 2 S2 ∼
N(C, 4), i.e firm 2 has much greater measurement error of the cost C. In the unit
demand case, the Nash equilibrium is (5.16,5.16) for both firms. In the case of a steep
linear demand curve of D(P ) = 100− 10P , then the equilibriums change to (4.6,5.6),
see figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Nunerically Derived Signal Reduction Best Response
Curves - Firm 1 has N(0,1) and Firm 2 has N(0,4) signal error with a
(-)ve sloping linear demand curve
This effect is understandable, albeit quite small relative to the absolute levels of
the variances - if a firm is relatively more confident in their cost estimation, they
benefit from making smaller signal reductions and capturing a greater share of the
market.
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3.5 OTC Market Bid-Ask Spreads
As detailed in Chapter 2, the true security value in a duopoly OTC market is analo-
gous to the costs in a traditional firm/customer Bertrand competition. In this case,
firms (the dealers) make a selling price of true value estimate plus a spread and ad-
ditionally provide a buying price of their true value estimate minus a spread. Similar
to above, each dealer attempts to estimate the true value of the security, which we
model as receiving an independent sample Vi from a normal distribution. We assume
the risk-neutrality of the market makers, so maximizing utility is the same as max-
imizing profits. Choosing the bid-ask spread is a symmetrical problem in which the
firm makes a buy and a sell price for the asset of (Vi − δi, Vi + δi) and they seek to
maximize the expected payoff wrt to the value of δi.
This model of an OTC duopoly is set up as follows; two identical market-making
firms (dealers) who compete in price for a homogeneous security are connected with a
customer. The security has the same common value to both firms, which is unknown
to both firms ex-ante. We also simplify the structure by assuming a unit demand
from the customer, which is a more reasonable assumption in these markets - dealers
often quote prices for a fixed quantity of the security known as ’Exchange Market
Size’ or EMS4 although the results from a linear demand curve are less tractable but
numerical simulations produce similar effects. As in standard models, the dealers
provide a firm buy and sell price to their connected clients. The dealers do not see
the other prices before trading. The firm with the lowest price matches the customer
buy order, and the highest buy price matches the customer sell order, and trades
occur. After trades are matched, the true value is revealed and payoffs are realized.
The payoff to the firms is price - cost, where price is the trading price and the cost
can be viewed as the future true value (or future mark to market value, depending
on the firm’s time frame, which we assume is identical) of the security.
In exactly the same reasoning as above for the Bertrand duopoly problem, the
market makers, who receive a signal (estimate) Vi ∼ N(V, σ) as to the true value V
4The London Stock exchange, for instance classifies every security with a EMS number, defined
as the number of shares used to calculate the minimum quote size for each security and in fact
’must display bid and offer orders at the same time in at least Exchange market size and observe the
maximum spread thresholds set out in parameters’ - Stock Exchange Rule Book 2019
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This result is in line with the vast literature concluding that improved information
about the true value reduces bid-ask spreads. The dealers also make positive profits
in equilibrium, in contrast to the full informational model of Bertrand. This non-zero
payoff in equilibrium questions the ubiquitous zero profit condition prevalent in many
market microstructure models when considering multi-dealer competition.
As the dynamics are analogous to the simple 2-firm Bertrand case, the asymmetric
case is also analogous. If two market makers have a different estimation ability to
correctly value the security, they receive signals S1 ∼ N(V, σ1) and S2 ∼ N(V, σ2),
then in equilibrium, both will make a price of P (Si) = Si+δ








that is, both firms will use the same bid ask spread around their true value estimate.
This is even stronger evidence that public information can reduce spreads in the
market as it has the greatest effect on the worst-informed firms, which affects the
ability of the best-informed firms to exploit their informational advantage.
3.6 Client Reservation Prices
A central thread of this thesis is examining how different information sets between
various agents change the equilibrium and payoffs in the system. The addition of
customer reservation prices allows us to examine the asymmetric information case
between customers and firms or clients and dealers in the OTC market case. Client-
dealer information asymmetry is particularly relevant to the questions of transparency
of information that are an important concern of policymakers. We consider boundedly
rational clients in the sense that they attempt to estimate the true value but naively
use this estimate as their reservation price.
Consider the standard Bertrand financial market competition model as above,
with two identical market-making firms, homogenous security, and error signals S1 ∼
N(V, σ1) and S2 ∼ N(V, σ2) with a true common value V. We now incl;ude that the
clients also set reservation prices that are based on their value estimate. The clients
also do not have an exact knowledge of the value V and also attempt to measure
it and are modeled by them receiving a signal V3 ∼ N(V, σ3), where they set their
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reservation price. i.e., they set their reservation price at the naive level of their
estimation of true value.
From the dealer’s perspective, this formulation of the reservation prices is equiva-
lent to viewing the clients as having a private asset valuation. These private valuations
are normally distributed around the true value V.
The firm’s spread problem now becomes:
Each firm i=1,2 makes a selling price (after receiving their signal Vi) of P (Vi) =
V +εi+δi and has a payoff of P (Vi)−V = (εi+δi) if (εi+δi) is less than the (εj +δj)
of the other firm and also less than the client reservation price ε3, zero otherwise
Formally we are looking for the probability of firm i, to win a competitive auction
with one other firm.
P (pi = V + εi − δi < Y )
where Y = min{ε1 + δ1, ε2 + δ2, ε3}
Using the same methodology as in section 3.4.3 , we can calculate the expected payoff
to firm i , i= 1,2 as:













Unfortunately, this payoff function (3.25) does not have a nice algebraic represen-
tation, therefore, only numerical evaluation of the integral is possible. The dealers’
objective is to maximize the payoff function (3.25) and the best response curves can
be calculated numerically. For every choice of δj by firm j, firm i has a best response
δi and is found by solving the first order condition of the payoff functions.
As an illustration, figure 3.4 is a plot of the 2 payoff surfaces with respect to the 2
delta choices with N(0,1) signal errors and with customer reservation prices set at the
naive valuation level. The best response curves are added which graphically suggest
a single fixed point or point of mutual best responses and hence a Nash equilibrium.
The results of numerical simulations suggest identical effects to the non-reservation
price duopoly case but with much lower payoffs in equilibrium. The reservation prices
also cause spreads to narrow but is dependent on the level of information asymmetry
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Figure 3.4: Payoff surfaces for the 2 firms with the best responses
shown in red and blue
between firms and customers since adding a reservation price is similar algebraically
to adding a third competitive firm into the competition.
3.7 Other Informational Asymmetries
Using numerical analysis, we can determine how prices respond to changes in customer
information sets and how asymmetric dealer information affects the equilibrium when
clients also measure the true value. We model the extent of an agent’s information set
by how accurately they can measure the unknown value by a single variable σ. We
examine numerically how the equilibrium level spread changes for changes in relative
customer/dealer informedness, that is, changes in the ratio of σM and σT
3.7.1 Client-Dealer Asymmetry in Monopoly
Consider the standard Bertrand financial market competition model as above, with
only one monopoly dealer, homogenous security, and error signals SM ∼ N(V, σM )
with a true common value V. The clients receive a signal ST ∼ N(V, σT ), and again
set their reservation price at the naive level of their estimation of true value.
The signal variance differences between the client and dealer lead to different
prices and bid-ask spreads in equilibrium. In the limit, when the client is completely
uninformed, and behaves as a liquidity trader, the dealer will price as large a spread
as is possible.
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The expected payoff to the monopoly dealer can be calculated as:


















M . The monopoly dealer’s objective is to maximize equation 3.26.
In the extreme case of the dealer being perfectly informed, σM = 0, and equation
3.26 is solved with an infite spread as in the standard monopoly Bertrand case.
Figure 3.5: Monopoly dealer equilibrium spread levels varying with
client relative signal variance
In figure 3.5, we fix the dealer’s signal error to 1 and vary the client’s signal
standard deviation. We notice effects that reproduce results from the standard mi-
crostructure models. Clients better informed than the dealers correspond to the
informed trader case in the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model and dealers use in-
creasingly higher spreads to protect themselves from their superior information. Sim-
ilarly, as clients become worse informed, spreads increase as the dealer exploits their
informational advantage. Spreads are lowest when clients are slightly worse informed
than the dealer. The winner’s curse effect - if the chosen spread is too low then there
are negative payoffs, are compensated for by using wider spreads.
3.7.2 Client-Dealer Asymmetry in Duopoly
Consider a market setup as before with two dealers and one client, who sets a reser-
vation price at their naive estimate of true value. In the case where both dealers are
equally well informed, both dealers make the same spread, but the spread level is
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now affected by the client’s strategic actions, which are determened by their signal
variance. Fixing the σ of the dealers at σ = 1 and varying the σ of the client produces
the Nash equilibrium spreads shown in figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Dealer equilibrium spread level with client signal
variance
The shape of the dealer’s equilibrium spread levels are similar to the monopoly
case but dramatically compressed. The equilibrium spreads are tighter when the
client is semi-strategic and worse-informed than the dealers by choosing a reservation
price over the non-reservation price levels. When clients are better informed, dealers
respond by raising their spreads to protect themselves from the better-informed client.
3.7.3 Price Dispersion
Many papers look at price dispersion, and we can examine this in the duopoly case
by calculating the variance of traded prices.
Proposition 3. Given the duopoly OTC market with unknown common values de-
scribed above and dealers receive independent signals V1 ∼ N(V, σ1) and V2 ∼ N(V, σ2)
regarding the true value, then in equilibrium, where the 2 dealers use a symmetric
pricing strategy: Buy(Vi) = Vi − δ∗i and Sell(Vi) = Vi + δ∗i , then for any σ1, σ2, the





Proof. Suppose X1 ∼ N(µ1, σ1) and X2 ∼ N(µ2, σ2). The first two moments of
Y = min(X1, X2) are






)− θφ(µ2 − µ1
θ
) (3.27)
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and


















2 , originally calculated by Nadarajah and Kotz (2008).
We examine the variance in the dealer traded selling prices (equivalently the
client buy prices). As above, dealers make a selling price of Pi = V + εi + δi, where
εi ∼ N(0, σi), therefore Pi ∼ N(V + δi, σi), i = 1, 2 and let P = min(P1, P2).
Therefore, from the clients perspective, P is the trading price and the variance of P
is :
V ar[P ] = E[P 2]− E[P ]2 (3.29)
In equilibrium, δ∗ = θ
√























V θ + 2θ2
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(3.31)























After some manipulation, the variance of P reduces to :






As the signal variance of either dealer goes up, the variance of the traded prices
increases quadratically with theta, or linearly with the sum of the dealer signal vari-
ances, and in equilibrium depends only on the signal variance. The variance of the
buying prices is equivalent by a symmetry argument.
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3.8 Conclusion
We have looked at a particular case of the very well-studied Bertrand competition
model with the added condition of an unknown common marginal cost and asym-
metric information regarding the true cost. The common value case is particularly
relevant for examining price formation in OTC financial markets and how the bid-
ask spread is equivalent to the optimal bidding strategy in a first-price auction. We
use the auction equilibrium results of Wilson (1969) to demonstrate how the bid-ask
spread is affected by the clients’ and dealers’ information sets and extended our anal-
ysis to the asymmetric information case. This chapter’s main narrative is that the
extent of firms’ information sets significantly affects their equilibrium pricing behav-
ior. We examined the nature of the common value equilibrium with normal error
signals and applied it to a competition duopoly. We found that firms with asymmet-
ric information make the same level of signal reduction with a unit or linearly sloping
market demand and how, in equilibrium, even worse informed firms can compete with
better-informed firms. This result also explains why firms with worse informational
costs are not driven out of the market. As with other papers on the subject, in par-
ticular, Spulber (1995), we find that informational uncertainty in the common value
case is enough to resolve the Bertrand paradox of firms pricing at marginal cost and
earning zero profits in expectation. We have assumed that competing dealers connect
to identical clients, so they have the same form of the payoff function and use stan-
dard auction results. When clients are not homogenous, their network connections
will affect the equilibrium payoffs and dealer strategies. These network effects offer
an explanation for observed empirical facts that are otherwise difficult to explain, and






In addition to the trading protocols detailed in Chapter 2, we now add a network
component to the game. Before any trading occurs, each client must first select a
subset of dealers and form potential trading relationships. This process forms the
bilateral network links, and we develop a simple preferential attachment model that
mimics this process. Preferential selection is the mechanism whereby clients express
their preferences over the dealer set by choosing specific nodes over other nodes. This
process of client link choices in the US corporate bond OTC market was highlighted
by Hendershott et al. (2020), who examined the persistence of client links and the
relationship distribution amongst clients and theorized that it was driven by linking
costs and future trading expectations. The empirical result was that clients form a
small number of persistent links to dealers, with some central dealers who execute a
large proportion of the trade. A similar result was found by Mallaburn et al. (2019)
in the UK corporate bond market.
The bipartite market model has been employed in a variety of contexts of eco-
nomic exchange on networks, with and without intermediaries, see the review of
intermediation networks, Conderalli and Galiotti (2015) for a brief summary of Inter-
mediation networks and Manea (2009) for a comprehensive summary of the literature
on bilateral trading on networks.
We take the market structure (who trades with whom) as given and, in this sense,
are closer to the strand of literature that views agents as interacting on a fixed net-
work, such as the seminal work by Kranton and Minehart (2001) (which shares some
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ideas with this thesis using an ascending auction with private values) and others
that were reviewed in Chapter 1. Gale and Kariv 2007; Blume et al. 2009; Gof-
man 2011; Manea 2011; Nava 2015; Condorelli, Galeotti, and Renou 2017; Choi,
Galeotti, and Goyal 2017; Babus and Kondor (2018); Elliott 2015; Rahi and Zigrand
2013; Bramoulle, Kranton, and D’Amours (2014). Like the random network matching
models, the fixed network literature largely views decentralization as a restriction on
the efficiency of trade. However, although we use a fixed network for examining equi-
librium pricing, we think it is a novel approach to develop a method of generating a
continuum of bilateral market networks using two parameters of preferential selection
and client degree distribution to create networks with known degree centrality.
4.2 Basic Network and Graph Concepts
We start this chapter by summarizing some basic network concepts and definitions1
that we use to construct the network OTC model. We also define some standard
network formation models and briefly review the empirical OTC network literature.
We then introduce a methodology to create a network with preferential selection
using a fitness type model. The idea is to represent the trading connections between
the clients and the dealers as a bipartite network, which we then use to define the
dealers’ payoff functions. This representation allows a much-simplified analysis of the
equilibrium pricing levels.
4.2.1 Basic Definitions
The terms network and graph are typically used interchangeably in the literature;
however, graphs are primarily used to refer to abstract mathematical objects, whereas,
networks represent real-world objects in which the nodes represent entities of the
system, and the edges represent the relationships between them. We start by defining
a graph formally. Let us consider a finite set V = {v1, ..., vn} of unspecified elements
and let V ⊗ V be the set of all ordered pairs [vi, vj ] of the elements of V. A relation
on the set V is any subset E ⊆ V ⊗ V .
1The definitions in this section 4.2 are taken from Estrada and Knight (2015). Graph and Network
Theory. In digital Encyclopedia of Applied Physics, Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH Co. KGaA (Ed.).
https://doi.org/10.1002/3527600434.eap726
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We can define a simple graph as the pair G = (V,E), where V is a finite set of
nodes, vertices or points and E is a symmetric2 and anti-reflexive3 relation on V,
whose elements are known as the edges or links of the graph. A directed graph is
defined as one where E is non-symmetric.
In many real world applications, the links or relationships between the nodes
have weights and a more general graph definition is warranted. A weighted graph
is defined as a quadruple G = (V,E,W, f), where V is a finite set of nodes, E ⊆
V ⊗ V = {e1, ..., em} is a set of edges, W = {w1, ..., wr} is a set of weights such that
wi ∈ R and f : E →W is a surjective mapping that assigns a weight to each edge.
For a simple graph, an adjacency matrix A can be defined as Aij = 1, if eij ∈ E,
0 otherwise. The degree of a node in a simple network is simply the number of links
connected to it and in a directed network, we can define an in-degre and an out-degree
representing the number of in-links and out-links that are incident on the node with
a similar weighted adjacency matrix representation of the node edge relationship.
4.2.2 Types of Networks
The simplest type of graph or network is the tree. A tree of n nodes is a graph that
is connected and has no cycles. The simplest tree is the path Pn. The path (also
known as linear path or chain) is the tree of n nodes, n − 2 of which have degree 2
and two nodes have degree 1. We can find a spanning tree for any graph, a subgraph
of this graph that includes every node and is a tree. A forest is a disconnected graph
in which every connected component is a tree. A spanning forest is a subgraph of the
graph that includes every node and is a forest.
An r -regular graph is a graph with rn/2 edges in which all nodes have degree r . A
particular case of regular graph is the complete graph where every node is connected
to each other. Another type of regular graph is the cycle, which is a regular graph
of degree 2, i.e., a 2 -regular graph, denoted by Cn. The complement of a graph G
is the graph G with the same set of nodes as G but two nodes in G are connected if
and only if they are not connected in G . An empty or trivial graph is a graph with
no links. It is denoted as Kn as it is the complement of the complete graph.
2The relation E is symmetric if [vi, vj ] ∈ E ⇒ [vj , vi] ∈ E
3The relation E is anti-reflexive if [vi, vj ] ∈ E ⇒ vi 6= vj and is reflexive if ∀v ∈ V, [v, v] ∈ E
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A graph is bipartite if its nodes can be partitioned into two disjoint (non-empty)
subsets V1 ⊂ V , (V1 6= ∅) and V2 ⊂ V , (V2 6= ∅) and V1 ∪V2 = V , such that each edge
joins a node in V1 and a node in V2. If all nodes in V1 are connected to all nodes in
V2, the graph is known as a complete bipartite graph and denoted by Kn1,n2 , where
n1 = |V1| and n2 = |V2| are the number of nodes in V1, V2 respectively. Similar to the
unimodal case, we can construct a matrix A, known as a biadjacency matrix, where
the entryAij represents the link between nodes i and j.
Bipartite networks have proven to be a useful tool in many fields: condensed
matter physics, socio-economic networks (firms and customers in traditional economic
theory) and is the network structure that we examine in this thesis as the basis of
the interconnectivity between clients and dealers in an OTC market.
4.2.3 Centrality Measures
Node centrality in a network is one of the many concepts that have been created in the
analysis of social networks and then imported to the study of any kind of networked
system. Measures of centrality can be either for each node – local centrality or for
the whole network – global centrality. There is a distinction in centrality measures
between directed and undirected networks. For directed networks, outgoing arcs are
known as measures of influence, and incoming arcs are measures of support. In
our client-dealer-directed network, the dealer links represent incoming price quote
requests from the clients, and the outgoing links represent the trading quotes from
the dealers to their connected clients.
Degree is the simplest of the node centrality measures that use the local structure
around nodes and is the measure we use in identifying central dealers in the OTC
network. In a directed network, degree is split into out-degree and in-degree, and this
concept has been extended to weighted networks (Barrat et al. 2004, Newman, 2004)
and labeled node strength. Other centrality measures, such as closeness centrality
(the inverse sum of shortest distances) and betweenness centrality (the amount that
a node lies on the shortest path between other nodes), have problems when applied
in a bipartite network as many nodes are often disconnected, and it is the behavior
of the competitive process with the dealer nodes that determine equilibrium pricing.
Weighted degree centrality or node-strength then also naturally leads to how the
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weights of an influencing node are distributed and finally to a global concentration
measure.
The simple degree centrality of a node in a network was first considered as a
centrality measure by Freeman (1979) in order to account for immediate effects taking














There are many other centrality measures that are useful depending on the context
of the network studied. The closeness centrality, which measures how close a node is
from the rest of the nodes in the network and in simple networks, the distance metric
dpg = d(p, q) of 2 nodes, p and q is defined as the number of edges in the shortest path
between them. Similarly for directed networks, there is an analogous directed distance
measure which is a pseudo-metric as typically dpg 6= dqp, breaking the symmetry
requirement for metrics. The closeness centrality, CC(u), of a node u, is defined as
CC(u) = n−1s(u) , where the distance sum s(u) is defined as s(u) =
∑
v∈G d(u, v).
The betweenness centrality quantifies the importance of a node in relation to their
position between other pairs of nodes in the network. It can be viewed as measuring
the proportion of information that passes through the target node when there are
communications between other pairs of nodes in the network. For every pair of nodes
in a connected graph, there exists at least one shortest path between the nodes such
that either the number of links that the path passes through (for unweighted graphs)
or the sum of the weights of the links (for weighted graphs) is minimized. The
betweenness centrality for each node is the number of these shortest paths that pass
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Where σst(v) is the total number of shortest paths from node s to node t and σst is
the number of those paths that pass through v.
The Katz centrality is an important measure that can be viewed as an extension
of the simple degree centrality where it seeks to include the influence of distant as
well as close nodes. The Katz centrality Index can de defined, Katz (1953) as:
Ki =
{
[(I− ν−1A)−1 − I]1
}
(4.5)
where I is the identity matrix, A is the adjacency matrix, 1 is a column vector of 1’s
and ν 6= λ1 is an attenuation factor (λ1 is the principal eigenvalue of A).
Another type of centrality that captures the influence not only of nearest neighbors
but also of more distant nodes in a network is the eigenvector centrality. This index
was introduced by Bonacich (1987) and is the ith entry of the principal eigenvector
of the adjacency matrix.
Many of these centrality measures have severe interpretation issues when applied
to a bipartite network as nodes in each disjoint subset do not connect to each other,
hence we restrict the centrality measure to weighted and unweighted degree centrallity.
Notably, in most empirical research on centrality measures, the level of correlation
between the different measures in real market structures is very high, see Valente
et al. (2008).
4.2.4 Random Networks
The simplest and earliest model of a random graph was introduced by Erdös and
Rényi (1959). A random graph in the Erdös Rényi model starts by considering some
isolated nodes. Then, with probability p > 0 an edge is created between a pair of
nodes. Consequently, the graph is determined only by the number of nodes, n and
edges, m such that it can be written as G(n,m) or G(n, p).
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4.2.5 Core-Periphery Networks
The intuitive concept of the set of nodes in a network having one subset that is more
connected and central, and a peripheral subset of nodes that are less connected and
less central has been used in economics since the 1950s. However, the definition of a
core-periphery structure can and has been defined in numerous ways. The standard
discrete model definition of a core-periphery network is a partition of the nodes into
two subsets. One class of nodes forms a cohesive core sub-graph in which the nodes
are highly interconnected, and the second class of nodes consisting of peripheral nodes
that are loosely connected to this core, Borgatti and Everett (2000).
A limitation of this partition-based approach is the excessive simplicity of defining
just two node types: core and periphery. This partitioning could be expanded to a
three-class partition consisting of core, semi-periphery, and periphery, as world-system
theorists have done. ’World-system refers to the inter-regional and transnational
division of labor, which divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries,
and the periphery countries. ’ Barfield, Thomas (1998).
In empirical studies of OTC markets, the network structure is found to have three
main features. Firstly, a highly connected core of dealers, secondly, a small subset of
dealers that intermediate a disproportionate amount of trade, and thirdly, client nodes
with relatively few but persistent links to the dealers. These empirical observations of
the OTC network topology (detailed in section 4.3) suggest a type of core-periphery
network structure by viewing the network as unimodal (core-periphery structures are
not traditionally defined for bipartite networks).
4.2.6 Degree Distributions
The statistical distribution of the node degrees is a network characteristic that has
received considerable attention in the literature. Let p(k) = n(k)/n where n(k) is the
number of nodes having degree k in the network of size n . That is, p(k) represents the
probability that a node selected uniformly at random has degree k . The distribution
of p(k) versus k represents the degree distribution for the network. Depending on
the generating mechanism of the network, the degree distribution could take many
forms. A typical distribution which is expected for a random network of the type of
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Erdös-Rényi is the Poisson distribution. However, a notably common characteristic
of socio-economic networks is that many of them display some kind of ‘fat-tailed’
degree distributions. In these distributions a few nodes appear with very large degree
while most of the nodes have relatively small degrees.
A typical example in the litereature of these distributions is the power-law distri-
bution, which is illustrated in Fig 4.1 taken from Estrada and Knight (2015), along
with the Poisson distribution of an ER network. Other distributions such as lognor-
mal, Burr, logGamma, Pareto, etc. (Foss et al., 2011) fall in the same category.
Figure 4.1: Degree distribution of Poisson and Power Law Networks
In power law networks, the probability of finding a high-degree node is relatively
small in comparison with the high probability of finding low-degree nodes. These
networks are usually referred to as ‘scalefree’ networks. The term scaling describes
the existence of a power-law relationship between the probability and the node degree:
p(k) = Ak−γ with γ referred to as a scale parameter.
Among the many possible degree distributions existing for a given network, the
‘scalefree’ one is one of the most ubiquitously found. Consequently, it is important
to study a model that can produce random networks with such a degree distribution.
That is, a model in which the probability of finding a node with degree decreases as
a power-law of its degree. The most popular and one of the original models of these
networks is the one introduced by Albert and Barabási (2002). Power-law degree
distributions (with exponential tails) have been found to model the link structure
in numerous OTC networks and other socio-economic network structures; however,
”knowledge of whether or not a distribution is heavy-tailed is far more important than
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whether it can be fit using a power law”, Stumpf and Porter (2012). This observation
is especially true in OTC competition networks.
4.3 Empirically Observed Market Networks
Most OTC markets, such as bonds, swaps, interbank lending, foreign exchange, real
estate, and domestic energy, exhibit a stable core-periphery network structure. Abad
et al. (2016), European interest rate, foreign exchange and credit derivatives and
Hendershott et al. (2020), US corporate bonds, Di Maggio et al. (2017) and Li and
Schürhoff (2019) in US municipal and corporate bonds, among others, find using
TRACE and DTCC datasets, a power law link structure in numerous OTC financial
markets. Although core-periphery structures are technically only defined for one
node (unimodal) networks, the critical point is that core dealers tend to have higher
centrality than periphery dealers. Abad et al. find that in financial markets4, roughly
the same 10-15 dealers form the core, with the vast majority of trades having one of
these core dealers as a counterparty. The largest 16 derivatives dealers, for instance,
known as the ’G16’ intermediate 53% of the total notional amount of interest rate
swaps and 62% of credit default swaps. Craig and von Peter (2014) find a core-
periphery structure in interbank lending markets.
There is an extensive literature of empirical observations of core-periphery net-
works and an equally large number of theoretical papers that attempt to explain the
endogenous formation of a core-periphery structure. They range from some dealers
having an ex-ante special advantage (for example, Chang and Zhang (2016)) to Far-
boodi (2015), who argues that the core-periphery structure is endogenously generated
by counterparty default risk management. Notwithstanding, this configuration seems
to be a defining feature of OTC bilateral markets. We find that the ubiquitous nature
of this network structure is a key determinant of the more centrally located dealers’
spread behavior.
4These statistics were computed by Abad et al. (2016) using EMIR dataset
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4.4 Preferential Attachment Network Models
Real-world network structures do not resemble the random network structures of the
Erdos Renyi model, and core-periphery structures and power-law degree distributions
are observed in many socio-economic structures, Kolotilin and Panchenko (2018). A
common explanation for this is a random network formation process with preferential
attachment. Albert and Barabási (2002) built the first theoretical model of network
formation with a preferential attachment that differed from random network forma-
tion in two key ways. Firstly, growth - the random network model assumes a fixed
number of nodes, whereas, in real networks, the number of nodes continually grows
due to the addition of new nodes. Secondly, these new nodes prefer to connect to
more popular nodes (as opposed to random connections) in a process known as pref-
erential selection. These two characteristics, growth, and preferential attachment,
define a network structure that more accurately models observed socio-economic net-
works and have dramatic implications for degree distributions. In OTC markets,
these degree distributions determine the level of competition faced by the dealers and
determine the amount of market power that firms have when pricing the product in
a network and critical in affecting the equilibrium pricing behavior.
Although there is extensive literature on preferential growth networks, such as
Cooper and Frieze (2003), who detail a more general model, and Jackson and Rogers
(2007) with a hybrid homophily (nodes attach to similar nodes) preferential attach-
ment model, the main mechanism of preferential selection (certain nodes are preferred
in some way and results in a core-periphery structure in a unimodal network and con-
centrations of centrality in bimodal networks) is the basic generating feature of these
economic market network models.
Although the network generating process is outlined above, we consider the net-
work as fixed when we examine the pricing and equilibriums in a one-period game.
4.4.1 Bipartite Model with Preferential Selection
The traditional BA model of network formation in a unimodal network assigns a
greater preference of newly created nodes to connect to nodes that already have a
greater number of links. The ideas of the BA model of network formation can be
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illustrated by applying them to our bilateral OTC network as follows: We start with
m0 dealer nodes and zero client nodes at t = 0. We add a new client node that
connects to a dealer node with one link at each timestep. The probability that a link












That is, the probability is skewed from pure randomness ( 1m0 ) by the degree of the
dealer nodes ki = Deg(Di) - the more clients that are connected to a dealer, the more
likely they are to get selected by new nodes. As new clients enter the market, they
increasingly make a connection to the higher degree dealer nodes. This process leads
to a core-periphery structure for the client-dealer network, resulting in a small number
of dealers having more links to the clients and executing a disproportionate amount
of trade in the network - a result consistent with empirical evidence detailed in 4.3.
After a large number of new client nodes have been formed, the resulting network has
an almost identical structure to the BA unimodal model of network formation with
a degree distribution of the dealer nodes that have a power-law distribution. The
BA model has been subject to some criticism with regard to real-world networks.
BA themselves recognize that the initial configuration is critically important to the
eventual link distribution of the network. This model makes it difficult for any new
nodes to become significant once the network is established (it is a pure rich-get-richer
model). In a competitive market network with firms and clients, this feature is not
desirable as new entrant firms can often become popular (aggressive pricing, superior
technology, marketing, etc.).
Although existing degree (popularity) is the source of preferential selection amongst
new client nodes in the BA model, we examine a more general situation where there
is some attribute of the dealer nodes that allows the clients to rank them in terms
of preference. In terms of modelling, this does not change the analysis. Suppose we
have m0 dealer nodes that a new client node could connect to. If there was no pref-
erence, then each dealer node gets randomly selected with probability 1m0 . We add
preferential selection by allowing some nodes to have a greater probability of being
selected.
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Suppose dealer node 1 is preferred by clients in some way (perhaps because of size,
risk management or marketing strategy or some combination of defining features) and
this is modelled by dealer 1 having an excess probability of being chosen of α, where
0 ≤ α ≤ m0−1m0 . We assume that α is constant. The preferred dealer node 1 has a












This formulation is more flexible than just using node degree for preferential selec-
tion. We can control the exact amount of preferential selection in the network, which
allows us to examine the relationship between this preferential selection parameter
α, (which also maps linearly onto weighted degree centrality), and the equilibrium
prices charged in the network.
More generally, if we assign a constant probability pi to each dealer node being
selected, then after the creation of N client nodes, the expected degree distributions
follows: E[deg(Di)] = Npi. and the ratio of the expected degree of any two nodes,




We formulate these ideas of network formation and preferential selection in more
detail in section 4.8.
4.4.2 Higher Degree Client Node Networks
So far, we have looked at each new client selecting only one link, but the clients
may select more links than this in order to receive a more competitive price. The
amount of connectivity (degree) of clients and their degree distribution may affect
the equilibrium pricing level. The price quoted in a 1-link monopoly structure is
often different from that quoted in a multi-link connection with competing firms.
Indeed, dealers’ price quotes depend on the amount of competition they face with
other dealers and, hence, the quotes charged in the resulting equilibrium strategies.
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This simple model can also incorporate this client characteristic by allowing a
distribution over the clients’ link structure. Suppose clients have a degree that is
distributed with a probability mass function f, such that P (ki = s) = f(s) where kj
ranges from 1 : m0, that is, there is a probability mass function that determines if
a client connects to only 1 dealer (monopoly) up to m0 dealers (fully competitive).
Suppose a new client node is created that has a degree of k links and connects to
the dealer set D, |D| = m0 ≥ k, we want to calculate the expected degree of the
preferred and non-preferred nodes in D. The probability that a link from this client
node connects to a preferred dealer node D1 is calculated and then used to calculate
the expected degree. The probability pi of being selected by the i
th link (and not








(m0 − j + 1)
+ α
)
And so the probability P (k) of the preferred dealer node receiving a link from a client
















Suppose that N client nodes have been created (with fixed m0 dealer nodes), and let
β1, ...βm0 be the proportions of the N clients that have a degree of 1, ...,m0, where
0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 and
∑
βi = 1, then the expected degree k1 = Deg(D1) of the preferred
dealer node is:




Various distributions of β = [β1, ..., βm0 ], of the client degree, give rise to various famil-
iar economic network structures. If we classify each generated network by parameters
(α, β), then the particular network (α = 0, β = {1, 0, 0, .., 0}), case, corresponds to a
bilateral star network where each client connects to only one dealer randomly (evenly
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to the dealers in expectation). This is a monopoly market with multiple monopoly
dealers, each with their own client base. At α = m0−1m0 , (it’s maximum value), and
, β = {0, 0, ..0, 1} corresponds to the complete network, the totally competitive mar-
ket. By varying these parameters of client degree β and preferential selection α we
can generate the entire space of possible competitive networks.
These two generating characteristics, the distribution of the client links to the
dealers β and the amount of preferential selection α for the dealers by the clients
when forming their links, constitute the basis of out OTC network model. We will
also map these parameters onto a network centrality measure in section 4.8.
4.5 N Dealer, M Client Network Game
Following the network structure described in section 4.4.1, how the clients connect to
dealers (in our model represented by the tuple (α, β)), is the key element in determin-
ing the amount of competition in each potential client-dealer transaction and hence
the equilibrium pricing choices of the dealers. We introduce two types of agents:
Dealers Di : i = 1, ...., N Clients Cj : j = 1, ....,M . Due to restraints of search costs,
each client node Ci, maintains contact with a finite number ki = Deg(Ci) (≤ N) of
dealer nodes from whom they request quotes. ki is the number of links with the
neighborhood set N [Ci] that can be maintained given the clients’ search and mainte-
nance cost constraints. The intuition is that it is a lengthy (and hence costly) process
to create and maintain trading relationships with dealers, limiting the number of
connected dealers.
We characterize each client Ci(Vi, N [Ci]) with 2 parameters, Vi, which is the
clients’ value of the asset and N [Ci] , the neighbourhood set (sub-network) of dealers
{D1, ...., Dki} that the client is connected to, in order to request prices.
The links characterize potential trading relationships between the clients and the
connected dealers, and the OTC game of the set of {Di} dealers and {Ci} clients
can be represented by a bipartite graph game G = (D,C,E,Π), where E denotes the
links or trading relationships between the dealers and clients. Cardinality |C| = M
|D| = N and Π, the payoff functions for each dealer given their pricing choices pi.
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The biadjacency matrix of G is a |C|x|D| matrix E, where eij = 1 if a trading
relationship exists and 0 if not. |C| >> |D| or M >> N , (there are many more clients
than dealers). We use the simplified notation that G(Cj , N [Cj ]) is the competitive
price game comprising client Cj and their connected dealer neighbourhood set N [Cj ].
ΠDiG(Cj , N [Cj ]) is the payoff to Di in this sub-network (with dealer prices p =
[p1, .., pn]).
This chapter is primarily concerned with the network structure and connections
between the clients and dealers. However, in order to simplify the OTC competition
network, we introduce some game structure to the bilateral network. Clients connect
to the dealers and form a network structure given by (α, β). We assume that α and
β are common knowledge.
The trading protocols follow the usual structure. The clients request a trading
price from their connected dealers (their neighbourhood sets N [Ci]) and each dealer
Di quotes a trading price pi to their neighbourhood client sets N [Di]. The quoted
trading price represents the dealers’ strategy in this game. Each client and dealer has
a valuation Vi for the homogenous good. The clients choose the best price from these
dealers, and trade occurs in a Bertrand price competition. process.
Figure 4.2: Clients C1, .., C5 and associated neighbourhood sets
and valuations
Figure 4.2 shows a typical OTC market network. The second image illustrates
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a subsection of the main network involving clients C1, ..., C5 who are connected to
dealers D1, D2, D3. The clients submit requests for trading prices to these connected
dealers and these dealers respond with prices p1, p2, p3. Both clients and dealers have
a valuation of the asset Vj
The payoff toD1 is the payoff from interacting with his neighbourhhod setN [D1] =
{C1, C2} and hence is the sum of the payoffs of the sub-games G(C1, N [C1]) and
G(C2, N [C2]). The probability of trading and the trading price is affected by the
prices pi of the dealers and the payoff to each dealer is a function of each dealer’s
valuation level which we explore in greater detail in the next chapter.
4.6 Network Payoffs
Let there be N dealers and M clients connected in a network represented by Γ =
[{C,D}, A] where C,D are the sets of client and dealer nodes, connected via a biad-
jacency matrix A. Let G = [Ci, N [Ci], A
∗] be a subnetwork consisting of a client Ci
and it’s connected dealer set N [Ci].
We introduce the notation that E[ΠDiG(Cj , D1, ..., Dm|δ1, .., δm, σM , σT )] is the
expected payoff to dealer Di when connected to a client Cj , who is also connected to
m dealers D1, ..., Dm and each of these dealers uses semi bid-ask spreads of δ1, ..,δm.
The set of connected dealers of Cj is the neighbourhood set N [Cj ]. It is understood
that the expectation is conditional on the action set {δ1, ..δm} of the dealers and
error variances σM and σT and so we will drop this from the notation for brevity.
Generally, the clients are connected to different subsets of dealers and so the expected
payoff of dealer i is the sum of payoffs over all the clients they are connected to and
each interaction with each client may have different numbers of competing dealers.
Let Ci ∈ {C1, ..., CM} and let N [Ci] be the neighbourhood set of dealers of client Ci.




E[ΠDiG(Cs, N [Cs])] (4.11)
where N [Di] is the neighbourhood set of dealer i, Di. N(Cs) is the neighbourhood
of client Cs and each Cs is a member of N(Di). This expression is just the sum of
4.7. Weighted Biadjacency Matrix Representation 81
payoffs over all subgames with connected clients of dealer i.
For intuition, consider a subset of a dealer network that comprises {Di, D1, D2, D3, D4}
with a topology described in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Example of a 5-dealer market with clients C1,C2, C3
and associated neighbourhood sets
It is clear that dealer Di’s payoff depends on both its neighbourhood set N [Di]
and the neighbourhood sets of this neighbourhood set, N [N [Di]] = {N [C1], N [C2]}.
Although Di is not connected to C3, the pricing decisions of D3 with C3 affect the
pricing decisions with D3 and C2, which in turn affects the pricing decision of Di with
C2. Through this mechanism, pricing and information flows through the network and
causes interconnectivity of pricing strategies.
Equation 4.11 is the sum of payoffs from each individual client that dealer Di is
connected to and each term of the sum has the form of equation (2.8). The dealers
all seek to maximize this expected payoff function (4.11) in equilibrium by choosing
an appropriate bid-ask spread δi that is used in all of their sub-network games.
This formulation is the essence of the OTC game structure - a sum of competition
payoffs with multiple clients in a network configuration with each dealer using a single
choice variable δi, the bid-ask spread.
4.7 Weighted Biadjacency Matrix Representation
The links that represent potential trading relationships between clients and dealers
have been characterized as an unweighted bipartite network, where each link has
a weight of 1, which represents a potential trading relationship. This unweighted
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network can be converted into a weighted bipartite network, which reduces the total
number of possible market topologies (only a limited number of ways to connect
to the dealer set) and allows us to measure the effects of dealer centrality more
easily. The interactions between the set of D dealers and C clients through the
links can be represented by a network game G = (D,C,E,Π), where E denotes the
links or potential trading relationships between the dealers and clients. Cardinality
|C| = M , |D| = N and Π, the payoff functions. The biadjacency matrix of G is a
|C| X |D|(= M X N) matrix E, where eij = 1 if a trading relationship exists and 0
if not. |C| >> |D| or M >> N .
We introduce a more compact form G∗ = (D,C∗, E∗), where the clients are now
partitioned into sets with the same topological link structure. i.e., if two clients are
both connected to the same set of dealers, we can use one node and a weighted link.
This is allowable because we assume that the expected payoff to a dealer from two
identical clients is the same. The biadjacency matrix of G* is a weighted biadjacency
matrix E*, where eij = εij are the proportion of clients with a certain link structure
and 0 ≤ εij ≤ 1.
Monopoly case
Consider a monopoly market network (star network) with M homogenous clients and
a single dealer; we can represent this as a weighted network with 2 nodes: a client
node and a dealer node as in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Strategic equivalence of monopoly market, M clients
Node C1 represents the only strategic choice of the clients. The payoff for the
dealer D1 only depends on the weight M. We can equivalently express this as M =
1, which is 100 % of clients connect to the dealer D1 with one link. Importantly, we
assume the expected payoff from each client with the same link structure is the same,
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then the expected payoff in the network game G from this node is the sum of the




E[ΠDi(Cj)] = ME[ΠDi(C1)] (4.12)
Duopoly Case
Figure 4.5: Strategic equivalence of duopoly market, M total clients
Similarly with a 2-dealer market, here clients can either have 1 link to either dealer
or connect with both in a competitive process as in figure 4.5.
The link weights are the proportions of M that have that particular topology. α+β+γ=1
and C1, C2, C3 represent all the possible strategic choices of the clients. i.e. C1 rep-
resents the clients’ choice to have a single link to dealer 1, D1. C2 is the set of clients
with a single link to D2 and C3 represents the set of clients that connect to both. If
clients have no preference for a particular dealer, then α=β in expectation.
If clients choosing the same strategy (topology) are assumed to be homogeneous,
then no information about the network is lost in this transformation.
General case
Every possible bipartite network adjacency matrix E(NxM), can be represented with
a new single matrix E(N x 2N − 1) with different biadjacency weight parameters
representing the partition of the client topology.
In a general network of N dealers and M clients with each client connecting to k
dealers, there are CNk possible nodes (+ n dealer nodes) in the network (where C
N
k
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are the binomial weights). Each dealer is involved in 2N − 1 distinct auctions (some
will be empty depending on the network)
Therefore the union of all these networks (k=1:N) represents the network of all strate-
gic possibilities for the M clients - these are the only ways to connect to a dealer
subset.





N − 1 (4.13)
4.7.1 Dealer Payoff in Weighted Network Representation
Again, using the notation that G(Cj , N [Cj ]) is the competitive game played be-
tween the client Cj and its neighbourhood set of connected dealers {D1, ..., Dk} and
E[ΠDi(G)] is the expected payoff for dealer i in game G. Let the set of dealers
be a vector D = [D1, ...., Dn] and the set of possible clients’ connective strategies
C = [C1, ....., Cp] where p = 2
N − 1, i.e. we group together all the clients that have
the same topology or equivalently, identical neighbourhood sets. Let A be the biad-
jacency matrix of connections where aij is the weight of the connection 0 ≤ aij ≤ 1
and represents the proportion of clients connected in this way. The expected profit
of a dealer is the sum of expected profits from each of its connected client groups.
Let there be N dealers and M clients and let αi be the proportion of clients
connected to each possible dealer subset, of which there are 2N − 1 possible subsets
(the binomial permutations). See section 4.7. The payoff to dealer i who is connected
to multiple clients C1, ..., Ck, where each client Cj is connected to a subset of dealers




αjE[ΠDiG(Cj , N [Cj ])] (4.14)
Which is the sum of payoffs from each individual client that dealer Di is connected to
and each term of the sum has the form of equation (2.8). The dealers all seek to max-
imize this expected payoff function (4.14) in equilibrium by choosing an appropriate
bid ask spread δi that is used in all of their sub-network games.
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In general and in matrix form, the expected payoff for the dealers:
E[ΠD(G)] = MAE[ΠD(C)] (4.15)
, where D = [D1, D2, ..., DN ]
T , E[ΠD(C)] = [E[Π(C1)], E[Π(C2)], .., E[Π(Cp)]]
T
M is the number of clients and A=weighted biadjacency matrix of connections, N ×
(2N − 1) and E[Π(Ci)] is the expected profit from one of the possible client auction
games Ci. If the dealer is not connected to a client, we set the payoff in this game to
zero.
Example in a 3-dealer network
There are 23 − 1 = 7 client strategic possibilities in this game (represented by the
columns of the biadjacency matrix)
A =

α1 0 0 β1 β2 0 δ1
0 α2 0 β1 0 β3 δ1




αi + βi + δi = 1
C = [E[Π(G(D1))], E[Π(G(D2))], E[Π(G(D3))], E[Π(G(D1, D2))],
E[Π(G(D1, D3))], E[Π(G(D2, D3))], E[Π(G(D1, D2, D3))]]
Consider dealer D1, represented by the first row of matrix A. D1 is connected to C1,
C4, C5 and C7. The expected payoff is a function :
E[ΠD1] = α1E[ΠD1(C1)] + β1E[ΠD1(C4)] + β2E[ΠD1(C5)] + δ1E[ΠD1(C7)] (4.16)
and in terms of distinct games:
E[ΠD1] = α1E[ΠD1(G(D1))] + β1E[ΠD1(G(D1, D2))]
+ β2E[ΠD1(G(D1, D3))] + δ1E[ΠD1(G(D1, D2, D3))]
Where for example G(D1,D3) is the distinct auction game involving dealers 1 and 3
and the E[ΠD1(G(D1, D3))] is the expected payoff for D1 in game G(D1,D3)
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4.8 Simplified Preferential Attachment Network
4.8.1 1 and n Degree Client Case
To simplify client network choices but maintain the sensitivity between higher and
lower client degree choices, we assign each client to either a low or high degree class.
The low degree class has only one link to a dealer, and the high degree class connects
to all of the dealers in the network. These simplifications model the fact that some
clients only choose limited price competition due to link creation costs, whereas other
clients choose many firms to quote with. Therefore, firms would like to have a dif-
ferent pricing strategy depending on how much competition they face in each client
interaction. This simplification is consistent with the observed power-law link dis-
tributions observed in OTC markets, Hendershott et al. (2020) and Mallaburn et al.
(2019).
The weighted biadjacency matrix has a simple form and becomes:
A =

α1 0 0 0 0 0 γ
0 α2 0 0 0 0 γ
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . γ
0 0 0 0 0 αn γ

which is an nx(n+1) matrix and
∑
αi + γ = 1
The payoff vector for the N dealers with M clients is: E[Π(D)] = MAC , where
D = [D1, D2, ..., DN ]
T and C = [E[Π(C1), E[Π(C2), .., E[Π(CN+1)]
T
The payoff for a dealer i is:
E[ΠDi] = αiE[ΠDi(G(Di))] + γE[ΠDi(G(D1, ..., DN ))] (4.17)
which is the expected payoff for dealer i from 2 distinct competitions - the monopoly
game G(Di) and the complete game G(D1, ., ., , DN ).
(In equilibrium, generally E[ΠDi(G(D1, ..., DK))] 6= E[ΠDj(G(D1, ..., DK))] - as the
payoff and choices for each dealer in equilibrium are affected by the spread choices in
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all the other subgame competitions that each of the dealers are involved in.)
We now also add preferential selection to the simplified matrix representation by
allowing one of the dealers to be more popular. Each dealer with 1 link is equally
likely to be selected, with probability 1/n. Suppose dealer n, Dn is preferred and
its’ probability of being selected is increased by α. The probability p of Dn being






of being selected. Suppose also that a proportion β of clients have degree


















0 . 0 0 (1− β)
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. . . . . . .
. . . . . . (1− β)







The biadjacency matrix has 2 parameters, α and β, where:
α characterizes the amount of preferential selection of the preferred dealer and
maps linearly to weighted degree centrality, 0 ≤ α ≤ (n − 1)/n and determines the
distribution of centrality in the network
β represents the proportion of low degree clients in the network and determines
the average centrality in the network 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
By varying α and β, we can examine how the equilibrium prices change for different
types of competition market networks. α=0 corresponds to no central node, α=1 is 1
central dealer trading exclusively with all low degree clients and equally participating
with the high degree clients (weighted degree centrality =1). β=0 corresponds to a
complete network, β=1, corresponds to the monopoly network.
NB:
(α,β) = (0,0) corresponds to the complete network (total competition)
(α,β) = (1,1) corresponds to the star network (monopoly market)
The idea is to move between these 2 extreme networks by varying these parameters
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We can now use this variable network representation in the payoff function of a dealer
in this network auction game: The peripheral dealers {Di} have a payoff function:







E[ΠDi(G(Di))] + (1− β)E[ΠDi(G(D1, ..., Dn))] (4.18)
and the central dealer Dn has an expected payoff:






E[ΠDn(G(Dn))] + (1− β)E[ΠDn(G(D1, ..., Dn))] (4.19)
where E [ΠDi (G)] is the expected payoff for Di from the game G
We could equally have chosen 2 links and n-1 links as the 2 examples to simplify
the network problem, but this is complicated by the connection permutations and
the results are identical. The important features are captured in this representation,
being the 2 extremes of the client game choices, which is a blend of monopoly and
fully competitive payoffs.
In the following chapter, we specify the exact form of E [ΠDi (G)], which is the
Bertrand price competition payoff with unknown common valuations.
The expected weighted degree centrality DC(Dn) of the central dealer described
above given the parameters (α, β) can be calculated as:






+ (1− β) (4.20)
and the peripheral dealers, Dp (p=1,..,n-1), have an expected weighted degree cen-
trality as:







+ (1− β) (4.21)
Where as before n is the (fixed)number of dealers, and (α, β) are the network generat-
ing parameters as described above. For a fixed preferential selection α, the centrality
of all dealer nodes is an increasing linear function of the amount of low degree clients
β and similarly for a fixed β the centrality is an increasing linear function of α for
the core dealer and a decreasing linear function for the periphery dealers.
Although both α and β affect the centrality calculation, they affect it in different
ways. β affects the global level of dealer centrality and network density, whereas
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Figure 4.6: Relationship between α and weighted degree centrality
with 50% low and high degree clients
Figure 4.7: Relationship between α and relative degree centrality
DC(Dn)/DC(Dp) of central to peripheral dealers with various
proportions of low degree clients
α affects how unequally the links and centrality are distributed. Figure 4.7 shows
the centrality of the central dealer, normalized by the centrality of the non-preferred
dealers. Our next chapter examines the centrality premium effect, that is how central
and peripheral dealers make different prices in equilibrium that is related to their
relative centrality in the network and so we will typically fix β and vary the amount
of relative preferential selection (and hence the centrality measures of the central and
peripheral dealers) α to better understand the origins of this centrality effect.
4.9 The OTC Network as a Static Bayesian Game
We can represent our OTC market network game model as a Static Bayesian game
as in Chapter 2 with the addition of the network generating parameters. All other
protocols remain the same. A Bayesian game is a game in which the players have
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incomplete information of the other players’ strategies or payoffs, but they have beliefs
over other players’ types with a known probability distribution. With a network
setting, types now refer to both network position and signal realization. A Bayesian
game can be converted into a game of complete but imperfect information under the
common prior assumption. Each player knows the probability distribution over types,
and this itself is common knowledge among all the players. Firstly, clients connect
to dealers with a probability mass function p(·) that is determined by the generating
parameters α, β. Secondly, dealers and clients receive an independent signal Vi as to
the asset’s true common value, and this pre-game process determines player types.
Dealers quote a buy and a sell price to the clients with a bidding strategy that maps
their signal (or estimation of the true value) onto real numbers, such that,
PBID(Si) = Si − δi : Si → R
PASK(Si) = Si + δi : Si → R
(4.22)
Where, Si ∈ (−∞,∞), δi ∈ [0,∞).
We assume a symmetric bidding strategy, (each dealers’ bidding function has the same
linear functional form) and is common knowledge, as is the probability distributions
of signals and client link distributions in the network and, as is usual with Bayesian
games, we assume risk neutrality, so maximizing utility is the same as maximizing
payoffs.
(i) Players: M client nodes and N dealer nodes
(ii) Action spaces: Dealers: δi ∈ R+ , Clients: {0, 1} where 0 indicates no trade
and 1 indicates a unit trade with a connected dealer depending on their reservation
price
(iii) Distribution over player types:
Dealers: dealer i’s type space is a 2-tuple (Si,N(Di)) where each signal Si is IID
normal RV drawn from N(V, σM ) and dealer i’s neighbours (clients) are drawn from
a known distribution.
Clients: Client j’s type space is a 2-tuple (Sj ,N(Cj)) where each Si is IID normal
RV drawn from N(V, σT ) and client j’s neighbors N(Cj)(dealers) are also drawn from
a known distribution.
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Proposition 4. In the OTC network game described above, the dealers can form an
expression for their expected payoff function without a full knowledge of the network
connections and it is sufficient to know the generating parameters of the bipartite
network (α, β).
Proof. Consider Di, dealer i. Nature chooses their signal, Si and their local network of
connections to clients, N [Di]. Dealer i knows their own signal (their estimate of true
value) and their neighbourhood (the number of clients they are connected to). They
don’t know the signal realizations of the other dealers and clients and importantly,
doesn’t know the network properties of other dealers or clients. Importantly, they
doesn’t know the network properties of their connected clients. We use the common
prior assumption, Harsanyi (1967), and dealer Di then forms a belief about the type
of each client and dealer in the market, conditional on their own signal and their
neighbourhood set realization (signals of each client and dealers and beliefs about the
likely network connections).
As before, let ΠDi(Cj , {N(Ci), δi, δ−i})be the payoff function for dealer Di, in an
auction game with client Cj who has a local network of dealer connections {N(Cj)}.
Dealer Di now forms an expectation of this neighbourhood set, given the network
link distribution, which is common knowledge. He also forms an expectation about
the signals of other players.
In a bipartite network, each client has at most 2N − 1 possible connections to
different dealer sets (identical neighbourhoods) and so must belong to 1 of these
client types. Each of these 2N − 1 clients types occurs with probability p(·) which is
determined by the probability mass function that we are taking as common knowledge.
The expected payoff to dealer i in the whole network Λ, using a spread of δi
and other dealers using a bid ask spread of δ−i, is the sum of expected payoffs from
each subnetwork of these client node types, Cj , j = 1, .., 2
N − 1 each of which has a




p(i)E[ΠDi(Ci), N [Ci]] (4.23)
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As in section 2.4, we use a simplified network structure with preferential selection,
generated by parameters (α, β) where the probability of only 1 link was calculated










E[ΠDi(G(Di))] + (1− β)E[ΠDi(G(D1, ..., DN ))]
)
(4.24)
and the core dealer DN ’s expected payoff becomes:








E[ΠDN (G(DN ))] + (1− β)E[ΠDN (G(D1, ..., DN ))]
)
(4.25)
Where E [ΠDi (Λ)] is the expected payoff for Di from the entire network, Λ and is
the same as the payoff functions in section 4.8, and demonstrates that knowledge
of the network generating parameters (α, β) is sufficient to form an expectation of
the payoffs. The exact knowledge of the network is not strictly necessary as long as
dealers cannot price discriminate.
As before, each of these 2 subgames is a distinct auction with an associated
expected payoff function derived in section 2.7.1
Dealer i forms an expectation, given the probability mass function of the network,
of all the weights in the network, then sums all these payoff expectations of each
subgame (distinct client neighbourhood sets) to get an expected payoff.
The objective for each dealer is to maximize their payoff functions, described by
equations, 4.24, 4.25. The existence of an equilibrium point is given in the following
section 4.10.1 and a numerical methodology to find it is given in section 4.10.4.
4.10 Equilibrium Pricing Solutions
4.10.1 Existence
Proof of existence of a pure strategy equilibrium can be accomplished by showing that
an equilibrium exists for a subnetwork of 1 client and arbitrary numbers of dealers
and that this then can be extended to an irregular network by standard theorems.
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4.10.2 Case 1 - the regular network
The regular network is defined by each client having the same number of links and each
dealer is connected a similar subnetwork of clients. This network can be generated
from the α, β parameters by setting β = 1 and α = 0 and fixing the client link number
k, so that the resulting network is a k-regular bipartite network. The competition
process with each client can be viewed as a first price sealed bid auction with unknown
common values. This problem was first analyzed by Wilson (1969), extended by
Milgrom and Weber (1982). Suppose there are N dealers and M clients. Each client
connects to k dealers randomly. The expected links of each dealer comprise of MkN




E[ΠDi(G(Cj , N [Cj ])] (4.26)
Each subgame E[ΠDi(G(Cj , N [Cj ])] comprises a first price auction with client Cj and
k− 1 other dealers, where the client can be viewed as the auctioneer and the dealers
the bidders.
The solution in terms of bid ask spreads is given by both Wilson (1969) who gave
a general partial differential equation of the bidding functions for the duopoly case
and Thompson (2005) who provided an explicit solution in the common value linear
bidding case. I have restated their common value auction results substituting a semi
bid ask spread s instead of bidding functions as:
Theorem 1. (Wilson (1969) Thompson (2005)) Suppose we have an OTC market as
described above with a set of k homogeneous dealers, each receiving a signal Vi = V +εi
Where εi is drawn from a distribution with zero mean and SD σ. For any (continuous)
distribution of the signal errors with density fσ and distribution Fσ there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium spread strategy δ∗, where each dealer’s bidding strategy is of
the form B(Vi) = Vi + δi. Suppose the client sets no reservation price and trades at
the best price that is observed. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium semi spread for each
dealer using the auction results of Wilson is:













The equilibrium not only exists, it has an explicit formulation. However, as reser-
vation prices and network differences are added, the solution no longer has such an
analytical form.
4.10.3 Case 2 - the irregular network
The irregular network has an added complication. Each dealer may be involved in
multiple auctions, each of which no longer has the same form as in the regular case.
For example, a dealer might be connected to 1 client who only connects to them - a
monopoly market and also to a client that is quoting prices with many other dealers
in the network (competition). In order to justify the existence of the equilibrium in
this network we state 2 simple propositions.
Lemma 1. Suppose there are two separate auctions A1 and A2 for a homogenous
product with unknown value V in both auctions. Let signals and bidding functions be
as before. Let the set of bidders in A1 be denoted X = {a1, ..., ak} with equilibrium
point (δ∗, ..., δ∗)and in A2 by Y = {b1, ...bl} with equilibrium point (β∗, ..., β∗), then
if there is a bidder x that is in both X and Y , and this bidder seeks to maximize
their total expected payoff across both auctions using a single bid ψ in both auctions,
E[Π(A1|ψ) + Π(A2|ψ)], then both auctions A1 and A2 still have an equilibrium point.
Proof. Both A1 and A2 are single common value first price auctions and therefore
have a Nash equilibrium point by the existence theorems of Wilson (1969), and in
our case, we assume a linear bidding function, therefore it is both continuous and
differentiable. It can be shown that each bidder has a (unique) best response to any
actions of the other bidders (the payoff functions have a single maximum) , which
means they also have a best response if one player does not play (locally) optimally.
Fix actions of other players, then x has a best response to these actions (payoffs are
concave and sum of concave functions is concave). Therefore A1 and A2 both still
have a Nash equilibrium point.
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Proposition 5. The irregular network OTC market as described above has a Nash
Equilibrium point (δ1, ..., δN )
Proof. This is a consequence of the above Lemma. Suppose we have a network market
as described above. Each separate sub-network can be viewed as a separate auction
which has an equilibrium point. If one of the dealers is involved in another auction,
then the remaining dealers adapt their best responses to account for the sub-optimal
choice of this dealer (in the sense that the choice is different from the local nash equi-
librium) and by lemma 1 also has an equilibrium point. This reasoning then follows
iteratively : if another dealer then also plays locally sub-optimally the remaining deal-
ers still have a best response and so this subnetwork also has an equilibrium point.
Therefore the entire network has an equilibrium point.
These equilibriums can only be solved numerically, except in the regular network case.
Alternatively, the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium to the network
game exists follows from the following theorem, reported by Asu Ozdaglar (MIT)
(2010) and is a result obtained separately by Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), and
Fan (1952):
Theorem 2. (Debreu (1952)) Consider a Bayesian game with continuous strategy
spaces and continuous types. If strategy sets and type sets are compact, payoff func-
tions are continuous and concave in own strategies, then a pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium exists.
It is possible to show that the payoff functions satisfy these conditions and that
they are also continuous and concave by showing that any local maximum is also a
global maximum. Graphically it appears obvious for any combination of parameters.
Fix δ−i of the other dealers to obtain the payoff wrt own spread choices. See figure
4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Dealer payoff function wrt spread choice, keeping other
dealer spreads fixed
4.10.4 Numerical Solution of equilibrium
The equilibrium solution set of bid-ask spreads is simply a matter of jointly maximiz-




p(i)E[ΠDi(Ci), N [Ci]] Di = D1, ..., DN (4.28)
Following the work of Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000) we can compute an equi-
librium for the network game numerically. Their method is briefly described here.
We have i = 1, ..., n dealers participating in the OTC game as described above. Each
dealer can take an individual action of δi in the Euclidean space R+. All players com-
bined can take a collective action, which is the vector ∆ = (δ1, . . . δn) ∈ R+×. . . .×R+
Let Πi : δi → R be the payoff function of dealer i, choosing the action δi Let
∆1 = (δ1, . . . δn) and ∆





is defined as (δ1, . . . , δi−1, ζi, δi+1, . . . ., δn) which is the action set where
the ith dealer ’tries’ ζi while the remaining dealers play δj , j = 1, 2, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , n
Let the collective action set be as above and let Πi : δi → R be the payoff functions
of the n dealers. A point ∆∗ = (δ1
∗, δ2
∗, . . . .., δn






at δ∗ no dealer can unilaterally improve their payoff and is a Nash equilibrium.
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Let Πi be the expected payoff function of dealer i. The Nikaido-Isoda function,





wrt to the action sets defined above. Each summand can be viewed as the difference in
payoff for each dealer when that dealer tries a different spread action ζi. An action set
∆∗ contained in ∆ (the total action space) is a Nash equilibrium if max
δi∈∆
Ψ(∆∗,∆) = 0
The Optimal Response Function, Z, at the point ∆1 is defined as: Z(∆1) =
arg max
ςi∈∆
Ψ(∆1,∆) which is a function that returns the set of dealers’ actions (best
response vector) where all dealers unilaterally try to maximize their own payoffs given
∆1. Using these concepts, the relaxation algorithm as suggested by Krawczyk et al.
(2000) can be summarised as follows:
Suppose there is an initial game state ∆0 = (δ1,....,δn) , where each dealer would like
to find their maximum payoff and we aim to find the Nash equilibrium. Given the
optimal response function Z(∆) is single valued (vector), the relaxation algorithm is
given by:
∆t+1 = (1− γ)∆t + γZ(∆t) (4.31)
where γ is a fixed constant (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1). The result is a weighted average of the
improvement point Z(∆t) and the current point ∆t . The convergence to the Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed if certain conditions on the payoff functions are met. It is
sufficient for the payoffs to be concave functions in own strategies(i.e have a single
maximum and no local maximums). I will just state without proof that the conditions
are met in our dealer auction game. Specifically, we numerically find the equilibrium
for each dealer by iteratively finding the best response of each dealer to the current
dealer action set. The sequence of spreads adopted by a dealer i at step (t+1) is:
δi(t+ 1) = γδi(t) + (1− γ) arg max
δi
E[Πi(δi, δ−i(t))] (4.32)
for each i in turn and for some step size γ (typically 0.7 is a reasonable choice). It is an
iterative sequence of best responses to other dealers’ best responses or alternatively
a dynamic hill climbing optimization algorithm (the hill changes slightly after each
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step).
See appendix 4.10.5 for an evaluation of the algorithm convergence to the equi-
librium solution and appendix B.0.2 for a comparison with an Agent Based Model
solution. The algorithm converges to the equilibrium point in approximately 15-20
iterations of the algorithm, even in quite complex networks.
4.10.5 Algorithm Convergence to NE
As a test for the algorithm, we can see how the solution converges to a known solution.
We can use the solution to the common value auction optimal linear bidding strategies
as calculated by Wilson (1977)). Suppose we have an OTC market as described above
with a set of n homogeneous dealers, each receiving a signal V i = V + εi Where εi is
drawn from a distribution with zero mean and SD σ. For any (continuous) distribution
of the signal errors with density fσ and distribution Fσ there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium spread strategy δ∗. Suppose the client sets no reservation price and trades
at the best price that is observed. Then expected dealer i payoff is,







FσM [t+ δj − δi]
 fσM (t)dt












Now consider the network comprising of M clients, each connects to all n dealers.
This is a complete bipartite market network and we group client games as before
The payoff from this game for each dealer is equivalent to the payoff in a single
client network as above, and so we can check the algorithm against the algebraic
expression for the Nash equilibrium. We could also use a symmetry argument for the
M clients and the N dealers. Let n=5 and assume a standard normal distribution of
errors (with mean 0 and sd 1) and indeed, the algorithm finds the theoretical Nash
equilibrium quickly, which is:
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This is the spread that each dealer adopts in equilibrium. From the clients’ perspec-
tive, the observed spread ∆, in equilibrium when n=5 is: E[∆] ≈ 0.7696
A slightly more complicated market: M clients, all with degree 2 who connect to
the 5 dealers randomly. The expected network has M clients with degree 2 and 5
dealers with degree 2M/5. Grouping the clients with same game structure together
gives a regular sparce network:
Figure 4.10: Network with client grouping, G(Di,Dj), represents
game G played with dealers Di and Dj
For each subgame, G(Di,Dj), the NE formula above can be used to give a NE
spread of ≈ 1.7725 ( ≈ 1.2083, effective spread to client) and since it is the same NE
spread in all subgames, it must be the NE spread for the whole network. Again the
algorithm correctly converges to the theoretical NE:
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Figure 4.11: Algorithm convergence to Nash equilibrium in the 2
networks, N(0,1) signal errors
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Chapter 5
Equilibrium Pricing in the
Network
5.1 Introduction
Traditional market microstructure models are designed for liquid markets, where
dealers can offset trades by adjusting their bid and ask prices. Unfortunately, OTC
markets are characterized by low liquidity and relatively large trade sizes and these
models cannot totally explain the range of empirically observed pricing anomalies
and in particular, the Centrality Premium Effect, which as been documented in many
OTC financial markets. Hollifield et al. (2012) find a negative relationship between
bid-ask spreads and dealer centrality in the US securitization market. In contrast,
Di Maggio et al. (2017) and Li and Schürhoff (2019) find a positive relationship
between bid-ask spreads and dealer centrality in the US corporate bond and US
municipal bond market.
The centrality premium problem illustrates the limitations of standard market
microstructure models and assumptions. In financial OTC markets, the effects of
competition, asymmetric information sets, and network topology interact in the price
formation process. The microstructure of the market is greatly affected by the topol-
ogy of who is connected to who. We focus on the observed core-periphery network
structure and the link distribution of the clients to dealers and find that these features
interact in non-linear ways, producing effects that are magnified by any asymmetric
information.
We also examine the effects of increasing transparency using our network model,
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where transparency is modeled as a refining of the clients’ information sets regarding
the asset’s true value. We find that the clients’ degree distribution is critical in the
direction of the effect on spreads. Clients (or markets) with low connectivity (a degree
of less than 3) benefit from increased transparency through lower bid-ask spreads. In
contrast, clients with a higher degree suffer increased spreads in equilibrium. This is
due to dealers raising spreads in equilibrium, to compensate for the increasing risk
of the winners’ curse which is increasing in the relative information sets of clients
and dealers. This result might offer some explanation as to the mixed results when
regulators have mandated increased transparency.
Finally, we apply the model to apparently unconnected empirical puzzles, such as
why do safe municipal bonds have bigger spreads than much riskier bonds or equities,
and find the answers are very related to the same fundamental drivers of the cen-
trality premium, namely, heterogeneous client link formation, preferential selection,
and asymmetric information. The effect of illiquid bonds having tighter spreads than
very liquid bonds has been documented by Goldstein et al. (2007) from an analysis
of the US corporate bond market spreads and liquidity. Our model shows how these
markets’ topological and information asymmetries are consistent with this effect.
5.2 Bid-Ask Spreads and Uncertainty
Our model predicts that bid-ask spreads will rise with uncertainty over the final asset
value. As the asset becomes increasingly hard to measure, bid prices will fall and ask
prices will rise.
Our model’s equilibrium in a regular network is linearly related to the standard
deviation of this measurement error. In fact, if δ∗ is the equilibrium dealer bid-ask
spread in a market with M clients all connecting to N dealers, and each receiving a
signal with standard deviation σT = λσM and σM , with λ an asymmetry coefficient,
then if they receive signals aσT and aσM , a > 0, the equilibrium dealer spread will
be aδ∗.
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This can be seen in the set of payoff equations, for dealers i=1,..,N at the equilibrium:




















Set σM = aσM , and σT = aλσM , where λ is an asymmetry coefficient, giving a new
set of payoff equations:




















Substitution aδi for δi, then a simple change of the integration variable from s to aS,




















Leads to the same equation as equation 5.1 (with a higher constant multiplier a,
signifying higher profits). This equation 5.1 has an equilibrium point of δ∗, therefore
equation 5.3 has an equilibrium of aδ∗. This result shows that the equilibrium bid-ask
spreads scale linearly with standard deviation and therefore scale to the square root
of time in a multi-maturity asset.
Another implication of this result is the standard observation that reducing asset
value uncertainty will reduce transaction costs (and dealer profits) in a market. From
a dealers’ incentive perspective, they should dedicate resources in the hardest to value
complex instruments with the most informational asymmetry. Complex derivative
securities probably fall into this category.
An empirical example of this time uncertainty effect can be seen to occur in the
US Treasury market for increasing the maturity of bonds. As the bond’s maturity
increases, the factors that go into the pricing become more uncertain (inflation ex-
pectations amongst others), and so spreads will rise. This effect was documented by
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), who analyzed the US treasury market and concluded
that ”Considering the three pieces of evidence together, we are confident that the yield
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changes associated with orderflow imbalances are not attributed to liquidity/inventory
risk premiums. The evidence is instead fully consistent with (and further supportive
of) our hypothesis of price discovery”. Figure 5.1, taken from Brandt, shows the
increases in spreads in on-the-run US treasuries with increasing maturity.
Figure 5.1: Dealer spreads in US Treasuries
We can use the model to predict the shape of the bid-ask spreads relative to
maturity, and we plot these results on the right of figure 5.1. This plot gives the
bid-ask spreads of the yield curve normalized at the bid-ask spread for the 0-6 month
security.
The bid-ask spreads in our model scale with the square root of time; that is, a
security with double the maturity has a bid-ask spread of
√
2 of the spread in the
shorter maturity. This scaling is consistent with a measurement uncertainty whose
variance is linear in the maturity and consistent with our model assumptions on the
estimation of true value. A similar effect appears to be present in these empirical
observations.
The US Treasury market has 22 primary dealers that make bid-ask prices for US
Treasury securities. This OTC market’s price-setting process, similar to other bond
markets, has some similarity to a sealed-bid first-price auction.
5.3 Bid Ask Spreads and Transparency
There are two driving features in our OTC game: first, the agents’ information sets,
characterized by their signal error over the true common value, and the competition
effect introduced by multiple dealers and their network topology.
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Market transparency refers to the ability of market participants to observe infor-
mation about the trading process, Madhavan et al. (2005) and can be viewed as a
potential to refine the agents’ information sets by observing prices and trades of other
agents. It has been a major focus of financial market regulators, particularly since
the financial crisis of 2008/9. In our model, we can examine the changes to quoted
price equilibriums by varying the signal variance to the clients and dealers to mimic
changes in transparency. We use the representation that clients receive a normal
signal with standard deviation σT and dealers σM but could equally view σT = λσM ,
with λ an asymmetry information parameter. With increased transparency of prices,
both sets of agents get an opportunity to refine their estimation of the true value by
either a Bayesian updating approach or a heuristic methodology (for example, the
increasingly popular learning process presented by DeGroot (1974), which uses an
averaging process to refine the agents’ signals) and these learning processes lead to a
reduction in the variance of the estimates.
We will examine two main network configurations: a regular market network
where clients have a fixed number of links, connecting equally to the dealers, and a
second network with a preferential selection for one of the dealers.
We focus on a five dealer market, and therefore, each client can connect to the
dealers with 1 to 5 links. The network with each client having only one link is
the monopoly type network, and the network with each client having five links is the
complete or fully connected network, where every client is connected to every possible
dealer.
We fix the variance of the homogenous dealers’ signal error at 1 and vary the
signal error of the clients to mimic changes in relative client information sets. This
is then equivalent to varying the asymmetry coefficient λ above. We then compute
the dealer equilibrium bid-ask spreads using a numerical algorithm for each set of
signal variances at each point, by solving the joint maximization problem using the
algorithm described in the previous chapter.
5.3.1 Preferential Selection Network Payoffs
As in section 4.8, we introduce an element of preferential selection into the dealer
network by allowing one of the dealers (DN ) to have an increased probability α of
106 Chapter 5. Equilibrium Pricing in the Network
being selected from pure randomness. Each dealer with 1 link is equally likely to be
selected, with probability 1/n. Suppose dealer N, DN is preferred and its’ probability
of being selected is increased by α. The probability p ofDN being selected is p =
1
N +α








selected. Suppose also that a proportion β of clients have degree 1 and (1-β) have
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We can now use this variable network representation in the payoff function of a
dealer in this network game: The non-preferred dealers {Di} have an expected payoff








E[ΠDi(G(Di))] + (1− β)E[ΠDi(G(D1, ..., DN ))] (5.4)
and the preferred dealer DN has an expected payoff:






E[ΠDN (G(DN ))] + (1− β)E[ΠDN (G(D1, ..., DN ))] (5.5)
Where E [ΠDi (G)] is the expected payoff of Di from the game G.
And the exact payoff in each subgame is given by equation 2.10 in section 2.7.1 giving:
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Equations 5.4, 5.5,( together with 5.6 and 5.7) give the exact payoffs for all dealers
in the OTC network game using a Bertrand price competition with an unknown
common value asset. Our aim now is to jointly maximize these payoffs to find an
equilibrium solution of the dealer action set of bid ask spreads (δ1, ..., δN ).
5.3.2 The Regular Network
We define the k-regular network as a bipartite network where each client has k links
and connects to the dealer set equally. Since all of the dealers are connected to the
same client subsets, the equilibrium spread is the same for all dealers. To recap, the
payoff to dealer i, in competition with N-1 other dealers is:




















Where here, we calculate for each N the number of dealers from 1 to 5, setting σM = 1,
varying σT and solve for the equilibrium.
The results are illustrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 which shows how, in equilibrium,
as the relative signal error of the clients rises, dealer spreads reduce up to the point
that clients and dealers are roughly equally well informed (similar to the Glosten
Milgrom microstructure results). After this point, the dealer spreads progressively
increase in the 1 and 2 client degree networks but progressively decrease in the 3,
4, and 5 client degree networks. Two main features drive the equilibrium pricing.
Firstly, the information asymmetry causes spreads to rise - for protection against
the winner’s curse in better-informed clients and for increased profits in the case of
worse-informed clients. Secondly, the amount of competition causes spreads to fall.
The speed of both of these opposite effects is different for different client degrees,
causing the curve shapes in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
The intuition for this is that with only 1 or 2 dealer connections, the spread
lowering effect of competition is very dominated by the spread increasing effect of
the increasing relative signal error. In contrast, in the higher degree networks, the
beneficial competition effect of the extra dealers quickly dominates the client’s lack
of information.
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Figure 5.2: Dealer spreads to degree and asymmetric information
As client signal error becomes relatively greater, clients make more ’mistakes,’ and
it becomes increasingly profitable to trade with them, therefore in equilibrium, the
dealer spreads tend to reduce. The behavior of 1 and 2-degree networks with respect
to asymmetric information is markedly different to 3 or more-degree networks. It
appears that a minimum of 3 competitors is needed for the competition effect to
dominate asymmetric information; if clients do not set reservation prices, a mini-
mum of 4 dealers is required for the competition effect to dominate any client-dealer
asymmetric information.
Bessembinder et al. (2020) analyzed the corporate bond market after the intro-
duction of the TRACE reporting system of increased transparency. He finds a small
spread cost advantage to large traders, and a much larger spread cost advantage to
smaller customers. Although the network configuration is not discussed, it is rea-
sonable to assume that larger traders’ degree is greater than that of smaller traders.
Again, the empirical paper by Hendershott et al. (2020) supports this assumption in
the UK corporate bond market. In addition, the corporate bond-buying program in
the UK, as part of the QE mandate, caused all corporate bonds’ prices to rise. How-
ever, the bid-ask spreads of those sterling corporate bonds eligible for the program
narrowed by 5.3 basis points more than the ineligible bonds after the announcement.
Bank of England report on the effects of the QE program on corporate bonds (2018).
This QE announcement effectively reduced the uncertainty over these eligible bonds’
value, and our model suggests that a reduction of bid-ask spreads would accompany
this.
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Figure 5.3: Effects of increasing information transparency with
client degree when clients have high signal error
The effect of increasing transparency in asymmetric information networks is ap-
parent and summarized in Table 5.3, assuming that clients are initially much worse
informed than the dealers. Decreasing client signal variance, which can be viewed
as a proxy for increasing transparency, reduces spreads to the lowest degree clients
(degree 1 and 2) until clients become as well informed as the dealers. At this critical
point, spreads rise again (similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and other informed
trader models), but for those clients with a higher degree (> 3), the decreasing signal
variance translates into higher spreads from the dealers regardless of their signal vari-
ance. The important feature here is that increasing transparency (reducing relative
client signal error) is a non-linear effect - it can reduce spreads for the least connected
clients (2 or fewer links) but can increase it for the most connected clients. The client
degree distribution in the network will determine the effect of increasing transparency
on overall market spreads. This transition between degree 2 and degree 3 can be seen
more clearly in figure 5.4 by extending the client asymmetry and removing the degree
1 curve.
5.3.3 Bipartite Preferential Attachment Network
We can extend this analysis by examining the effects of preferential selection of certain
dealers on bid-ask spreads and the resulting network structure. We have the same 5-
dealer network, but now clients connect to each dealer with equal probability and to a
core dealer with a probability related to the variable α, which is the excess probability
from random chance that a dealer is selected. P(central dealer is selected)= 15 + α,
0 ≤ α ≤ (n−1)n . The dealers now form two groups - the central dealer and the
peripheral dealers. Critically, we have non-homogenous client degree - there are 50%
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Figure 5.4: Dealer spreads to degree and asymmetric information
low connectivity (degree 1) clients and 50% high connectivity (degree 5) clients. This
simplification is a model of the common degree distribution found in OTC market
networks. For instance, in the UK corporate bond market, the average degree is 3.5,
BOE (2019)). Furthermore, one-third have a degree one, Hendershott et al. (2020).
In the UK betting market, 44% have degree one with a mean degree of 2.7, Gambling
Commission (2019).
Figure 5.5: Equilibrium Spreads with Asymmetric Information
The dynamics of the equilibrium show similar effects as seen in Figure 5.5 - equi-
librium spreads decrease for the central dealers with reducing client signal variance
up to a critical point, at which point spreads start to increase as the similarity of the
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information sets causes an increase in the adverse selection problem. The peripheral
or non-central dealers show a different effect - increasing transparency causes them
to increase spreads for high levels of α since they are connected to more high-degree
clients. In this example, we numerically calculate the equilibrium spreads for dealers
in a market with β = 0.5 (50% low degree clients, 50% high degree clients) in varying
amounts of central-peripheral effect, α. Dealers receive an N(0,1) signal error, and
clients receive a varying signal error. As it becomes more central (popular), the core
dealer raises its spread faster with increasing client signal error than the periphery
dealers. This U-shaped spread effect is due to the clients’ non-uniform link distribu-
tion - the dealers are balancing the spreads to clients in low and high competition
sub-games. These non-linear effects in transparency changes are critically dependent
on the extent of client information asymmetry. The extent of the central-peripheral
structure compounds the effect, and these effects lead naturally to the centrality
premium puzzle.
These results offer insight into the mixed results when regulators have tried to
increase transparency in financial markets. The empirical literature on transparency
mainly agrees that increases in transparency reduce bid-ask spreads - it also tends to
find that average client connections are also low, for example, the Bank of England
report on corporate bonds1 find client degree around 3 and Municipal Bonds in the
US at less than 2. Biais (2005), in his paper summarizing some empirical findings
of bid-ask spreads in OTC financial markets, noted that Edwards et al. (2007) had
found that increasing transparency in US corporate bond markets reduces spreads.
Additionally, increasing transparency in the New York stock exchange in 2001 led
to a reduction in bid-ask spreads (see Boehmer et al. (2005)). In contrast, when
transparency was increased on the Toronto stock exchange, this caused spreads to
increase (see Madhavan et al. (2005)).
Two features determine the effect of increasing transparency - the initial state of
the client’s relative informedness and the client link distribution. Our model suggests
that if clients are less informed than the dealers, increasing transparency will reduce
spreads in low degree networks; however, if the clients are equally able to value
1Bank of England study into UK corporate bond market found average degree of clients is 3 -
Staff Working Paper No. 813 Resilience of trading networks: evidence from the sterling corporate
bond market (2019) David Mallaburn, Matt Roberts-Sklar, and Laura Silvestri.
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the asset as the dealers, increasing transparency may cause bid-ask spreads to rise
independently of the network topology. Since it is reasonable to assume that in most
markets, professional trading firms have a better ability to measure the true value of
an asset than clients, and clients typically have very few links, we would expect that
increasing transparency would reduce most market spreads.
5.4 Centrality Premiums in the Network Model
The centrality premium effect can be described as the tendency for more centrally
located dealers in a network to make wider prices than those less centrally located,
and has been empirically observed fact in many OTC markets by many authors.
In terms of existing literature, numerous other models predict a centrality dis-
count, including Neklyudov (2013), Weller (2013), and Zhong (2014), but these mod-
els do not provide a natural explanation for a centrality premium. In Zhong (2014),
a centrality premium can arise unconditionally, but there is a centrality discount
conditional on trading volume. Similarly, other models predict a centrality premium
and use a trading volume reasoning, for example, Uslu (2015), who provides condi-
tions for both a centrality premium and a centrality discount. A centrality premium
arises when core dealers intermediate large enough trades in equilibrium. Another
example is by Hollifield et al. (2012), who describe an outside options analysis of the
securitization market, which tends to exhibit a centrality discount.
In the empirical results, a centrality premium is found by Di Maggio et al. (2017)
for corporate bonds and Li and Schürhoff (2019) for municipal bonds, whereas a
centrality discount is found by Hollifield et al. (2012) in the securitization market.
Our theoretical model, similar to Hollifield, provides conditions on when a centrality
discount or a premium can arise. In contrast to the general outside options analysis
of Hollifield, our model tackles the root payoff functions of the dealers in a price
competition (a common value auction) game and find that the centrality effect is a
consequence of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium pricing strategy in a network auction
game when there are some preferential selection and asymmetric information.
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The centrality premium effect, which is observed in many OTC markets, is typi-
cally characterized by having a large unsophisticated client base, whereas the central-
ity discount appears to be confined to specialized markets with a more sophisticated
client case, as also noted by Hollifield et al. (2012).
In our model, if clients are less informed than the dealers and there exists a pre-
ferred dealer (core-periphery structure), then the preferred dealer will have a higher
centrality and will make wider prices in equilibrium than other dealers. The pre-
ferred dealer feature implies a central/less central or core-periphery dealer network
structure, which is empirically observed across most OTC markets.
5.4.1 Stylised Model of OTC Network
Similarly, as before, we can model the effect of a single dealer being more or less popu-
lar and central than the other dealers by way of the biadjacency weights and using the
matrix derived in section 4.8. The idea is to vary the dealer’s attractiveness (the core)
relative to the others (periphery) and examine the Nash equilibrium dealer strategies.
Similarly, for the clients, we can vary our parameter β, to change the proportion of
low-degree clients in the market. This will give some insight as to the sensitivity
of the dealer equilibriums to the client link distribution. (as mentioned previously,
client links are often distributed in an approximately scale-free distribution)
Consider a 5-dealer market and suppose dealers have equal probability of being
selected by the clients and we vary dealer 5 probability of being selected by α. Dealer
5 now has probability (0.2 + α), dealers 1-4 have probability of (0.2− α/4) of being
selected. We vary α between 0 and 0.8, so probability of dealer 5 getting selected by
the 1-degree clients, varies between 0 and 1.
Suppose there are β clients with degree 1 and (1-β) clients with degree 5. The
expected network has a biadjacency matrix:
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0 0 0 0 β(0.2 + α) (1− β)

Where as before, α is a parameter determining the attractiveness of a core dealer,
and β is a parameter describing the proportion of low link clients in the network.
Case 1 - Dealers Better Informed than Clients
Relatively better-informed dealers would correspond to the majority of real client
dealer markets, where the dealers’ analytical and informational resources dominate
those of the clients. Setting client signal error to be higher than that of the dealers
and varying the parameters, alpha, and beta gives a centrality premium of spreads
for the core dealer. See figure 5.6
Figure 5.6: Centrality premium sensitivity to various network
configurations
As dealer 5 becomes more popular (increases in α), its spreads increase and the
other dealers’ spreads decrease to compensate for their lack of popularity. The cen-
trality premium, described here as the ratio of the core dealers spread divided by the
peripheral dealers’ spread, is increasing in the amount of the core dealers’ centrality,
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α and also increasing in the proportion of low-link clients, β (analogous to the scale
parameter in a power distribution).
The centrality premium is a direct consequence of the network properties (scale
parameter and preferential selection) and asymmetric information. In other words,
heterogeneous clients, dealers, not being equally preferred, and clients that are worse
informed than dealers cause this effect. Applying extra transparency to this market
Figure 5.7: Centrality premium sensitivity to increasing
asymmetric information
may cause the centrality premium to decrease, as presumably, the clients are the main
beneficiaries of the extra information. Absolute signal noise levels do not affect it - if
transparency has an equal effect on the dealers, then the centrality premium will not
change.
Markets with a high proportion of unsophisticated low link clients and a set of
preferred dealers will exhibit the highest centrality premiums.
The centrality premium is quite sensitive to asymmetric information between the
clients and dealers and is typically increasing in information asymmetry. As a corol-
lary to this sensitivity to the relative signal error, in a period such as the financial
crisis of 2008-2009, we would expect that the centrality premium in a given market
would increase during this period, where presumably, it was much harder for clients
to assess the true asset value accurately.
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This effect can be seen in the analysis of Di Maggio et al. (2017), where they
analyze the corporate bond market spreads over the financial crisis period and find
that central dealer spreads appear to rise more than the peripheral dealer spreads in
the uncertain crisis environment - i.e., the centrality premium increases.
Case 2 - Dealers Equally (or Worse) Informed than Clients
Conversely, some OTC markets have a very sophisticated client base, for example,
the markets for asset securitization, which have almost no retail clients, Biais et al.
(2005). We will model this by having both dealers and clients receive the same signal
error, i.e., they are both equally able to accurately value the asset. If clients have the
same or better signal noise, we predict a centrality discount:
Figure 5.8: centrality discount when clients equally informed
Similar to the first case, as dealer 5 becomes relatively more popular, its spreads
decrease, and the other dealers’ spreads increase. The centrality discount, described
here as the ratio of the core dealers spread divided by the peripheral dealers’ spread,
is increasing in the amount of the core dealers’ centrality, α and also increasing in
the proportion of low link clients, β (analogous to the scale parameter in a power
distribution).
If clients are equally or better informed, the equilibrium monopoly spread is less
than the equilibrium spread charged in competition with multiple other dealers.
An empirical example of this effect was analyzed by Hollifield et al. (2012), and
they found that in the securitization market, which is characterized by having almost
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no retail clients and only sophisticated investors but still showing a scale-free link
distribution, there was a centrality discount in the spreads charged by the dealers.
The absolute centrality effect. (+)ve or (-)ve, is increasing in core dealer centrality
and proportions of low degree clients, regardless of the signal error.
Figure 5.9: Envelope of centrality premia with asymmetric
information
The envelope of centrality premiums is stretched higher with increases in relative
client signal error, and the centrality premium is increasing in the proportion of low-
degree clients and the extent of the dealers’ preferential selection.
For a given level of core-periphery structure, the centrality premium has a maxi-
mum value at approximately 70% low link clients. (The UK domestic energy market,
by coincidence, has 70% of users with 1-link and the core suppliers charge much higher
prices than the smaller competitors - it appears that the centrality premium for the
core suppliers is around 50%. A similar model can be applied to this game, and we
would forecast, given the topology, that the core suppliers would have a very large
centrality premium in equilibrium).
These premiums and discounts in spreads charged by core and peripheral dealers
are common in all markets where there is a degree of preferential selection, and
this simple model gives some intuition about the network structures that produce
the greatest effects. From a regulatory perspective, the easiest way to combat this
centrality premium is to decrease the proportion of low link clients in the network.
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5.4.2 1 and 2 Degree Client Case
In a similar manner to the 1 and n-link (monopoly and maximum competition) exam-
ple outlined above, we can also construct the biadjacency matrix and expected payoff
functions for the more messy 1 and 2 link case. Suppose we have n dealers and M
clients which have either 1 or 2 links to the dealers. Suppose a proportion 1−β clients
have degree 1 and β have degree 2. As before each dealer is initially equally likely to
be selected with probability 1n . Now let dealer n be preferred by an amount α and the
probability of being selected by the one degree clients is now (1−β)( 1n +α), with the
remaining n-1 dealers now having probability (1−β)( 1n −
α
n−1) of being selected. The
probability of the central dealer being selected with one link and another dealer with
































where β ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ [0, n−1n ]. These are just the
sum probabilities of either being selected by the first link combined with the proba-
bility of being selected by the second link, given that you weren’t selected from the
first link.




ψ1 0 0 0 0 γ12 γ13 γ14 γ15 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ψ2 0 0 0 γ12 0 0 0 γ23 γ24 γ25 0 0 0
0 0 ψ3 0 0 0 γ13 0 0 γ23 0 0 γ34 γ35 0
0 0 0 ψ4 0 0 0 γ14 0 0 γ24 0 γ34 0 γ45
0 0 0 0 ψ5 0 0 0 γ15 0 0 γ25 0 γ35 γ45

To recap, the rows represent each dealer. The columns represent the distinct topo-
logical connections of the clients and there are 5C2 +
5C1 = 15 of these. Columns 1-5
represent the client 1-degree strategies and columns 6-15 represent the 2 link strate-
gies. The entries represent the proportion of the clients that are connected in this
way, so
∑
aij = 1. For example a11 = ψ1 is the proportion of clients with 1 link that
select dealer 1, a16 = a26 = γ12 is the proportion of clients that select dealers 1 and
2 etc. All of the ψi and γij are generated by the network parameters (α, β), that is,
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for a give (α, β), each of the proportions are fixed.
There are general expressions for the values of these biadjacency matrix coeffi-
cients and I show the results for the n dealer case. For the (n-1) non-preferred dealers
i=1:n-1:






















and the nth preferred dealer:





























The expected payoff function of dealers 1-(n-1) is the sum of the payoff from the
1 degree clients and the 2 degree clients that they are connected to and is :




E[ΠDi(G(Di, Dk))] + Γ2E[ΠDi(G(Di, Dn))
(5.11)
where E[ΠDi(G(Di, Dj))] is the expected payoff to Di in a price competition with
Dj and E[ΠDi(G(Di))] is the payoff to Di in a monopoly client structure.
Obviously E[ΠDi(G(Dj , Dk))] = 0 for j, k 6= i as this represents the payoff to a dealer
in a game they are not involved in.
Similarly, the expected payoff to the preferred dealer, Dn is:







The expected degree centrality of dealer 1:(n-1) is simply:
E[DC(ki)] = Ψ1 + (n− 2)Γ1 + Γ2 (5.13)
and the preferred dealer Dn is :
E[DC(kn)] = Ψ2 + (n− 1)Γ2 (5.14)
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for β ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ [0, n−1n ]
These degree centrality measures of the central dealer are strictly increasing in α
and β and are plotted in figure 5.10 with n=5, a 5 dealer network.
Figure 5.10: Raw centrality of central dealer relative to changes in
network parameters α, β
Figure 5.11: Relationship between α and relative degree centrality
DC(Dn)/DC(Dp) of core to peripheral dealers with various
proportions of low degree clients
Although both α and β affect the centrality calculation, they affect it in different
ways, β affects the global level of network centrality and density, whereas α affects how
unequally the links and centrality are distributed. Figure 5.11 shows the centrality
of the preferred dealer, normalized by the centrality of the non-preferred dealers.
We can check the equilibriums in this network. All the connections between
the clients and dealers are determined by the generating parameters (α, β). Figure
5.12 graphically summarizes the relative spreads between the central and peripheral
dealers in the 1,2 link and 1,n link case. These plots demonstrate that if clients are less
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informed (or less sophisticated) to the dealers, the central dealers increase spreads
as preferential selection increases. Intuitively, if the clients are equally (or better)
informed than the dealers, the central dealer makes tighter prices as preferential
selection goes up.
The results are identical to the 1 and n dealer network centrality premium results
- as the core dealer relative degree centrality increases, spreads increase.
Figure 5.12: At the equilibrium, when clients are equally informed
there is a centrality discount and when the clients are worse informed
there is a centrality premium
5.5 Empirical Anomalies in OTC Markets
5.5.1 Low-Risk and High-Risk Bonds Bid-Ask Spreads
Spreads in low-risk municipal bonds are higher than medium-risk bonds, which are
greater still than risky equities in a survey of the empirical literature conducted by
Biais et al. (2005). A possible explanation for these counterintuitive observations is
likely to be a network effect similar to the drivers of the centrality premium effect
discussed above. Municipal bonds have a substantial proportion of retail clients who
typically have very few dealer links (the market has a high scale parameter (see Li
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and Schürhoff (2019)). These retail clients would typically have a high signal error
and so tend to be charged closer to a monopoly price in a transaction. There are over
2200 broker-dealers in the municipal bond market, and it is infeasible that a retail
client would have access to more than a handful. In contrast, institutional clients
would be more likely to have multiple dealer-accounts for quoting prices. It is also
likely that the retail clients have a higher signal error than the dealers causing an
exaggerated centrality premium, as detailed previously combined with high bid-ask
spreads. There is also a significant amount of preferential dealer selection, with the
top 12 dealers (the core) intermediating over 72% of all transactions.
In summary, high information asymmetry combined with a large proportion of low
degree clients causes a large centrality premium and large average bid ask spreads.
According to Biais et al. (2005), ”The results obtained by Harris and Piwowar
(2004) and Green (2005) are remarkably similar, in spite of the different methods used
in the two papers. This convergence of the results speaks in favor of their robustness.
Overall, they suggest the Municipal Bond market is highly illiquid, and dealers earn
significant markups. Such low liquidity may stem from the lack of transparency of
this market. The opacity is such that it is very difficult for retail traders to estimate
the market valuation of the security. This puts them in a weak bargaining position.”
Conversely, corporate bonds have a much broader blend of client types, hence a
higher average client degree, and so the competition element forces the spread down.
The core dealers in this market intermediate around 40% of trades, and retail clients
account for only 9% of notional volume. This relatively more sophisticated client
base causes average degree to rise and relative uninformedness to decline. These two
parameters were demonstrated to be primary drivers of both bid-ask spreads and
centrality premiums.
In summary, low information asymmetry combined with a large proportion of high
degree clients causes a small centrality premium and small average bid ask spreads.
This market structure would tend to suggest high (average) bid-ask spreads and
high centrality premiums in the municipal bond market and smaller (average) spreads
and smaller centrality premiums in the corporate bond markets. These bid-ask spread
predictions were empirically observed by Di Maggio et al. (2017) for corporate bonds
and Li and Schürhoff (2019) for municipal bonds.
5.6. Conclusion and Discussion 123
5.5.2 Liquid and Illiquid Bonds Bid-Ask Spreads
Goldstein et al. (2007) have documented the effect of illiquid bonds having tighter
spreads than very liquid bonds in an analysis of the US corporate bond market spreads
and liquidity. They found that lower liquidity corporate bonds often had tighter
spreads than more liquid issues. Similar to the previous reasoning, the model offers
two possible reasons for this: firstly, as above, if low degree clients are more attracted
to the liquid issues, spreads will be higher in the liquid bonds, given the same signal
error. Alternatively, dealers are very well informed about both sets of bonds’ true
valuations due to their extensive research resources; however, clients find it harder to
measure the illiquid bonds’ true value. This leads to a situation where the clients’
relative un-informedness is greater in the illiquid bonds than the liquid ones. Our
model would predict that in this case, if the clients have a sufficiently high degree,
the illiquid bonds would have a tighter spread. Intuitively, this is because clients
would typically make more trading ’mistakes’ in the illiquid bonds, which leads to
higher dealer profits, which leads to lower spreads in equilibrium. Which explanation
is more compelling depends on the clients’ network properties in these two markets -
if clients who trade illiquid bonds quote with multiple dealers, notwithstanding their
ill-informedness, then spreads could be relatively low. It illustrates perfectly that
the combination of relative information and network properties drives the eventual
pricing outcomes.
5.6 Conclusion and Discussion
We have set out a simple theoretical network model of the trading process in a general
client dealer market where there is a common unknown asset value, and clients and
dealers attempt to estimate the true value of this asset. Clients, either retail or
institutional, request quotes from their connected dealers, who then respond with a
firm quote to buy and sell, and the client order is executed against the best quote.
Typically, markets are studied either as a monopoly or as a perfectly competitive
structure. Our model offers some insight into the interesting behavior that occurs
between these two extremes by examining the network topology with the backdrop
of asymmetric information sets. By using an auction-based approach to the payoff
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functions and finding the dealers’ Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy, we can un-
derstand something of the effects of different network configurations and asymmetric
information.
As in many market models, for example, the model of Biais et al. (2005), we find
the winners’ curse problem to be a significant driving force in the determination of
dealer spreads and is the main reason why the spreads charged by centrally located
dealers can be either a premium or a discount to peripheral dealer spreads. This is
an information set phenomenon, but the network effects of client degree distribution
and preferential selection play an equally significant role.
We also examine the effects of increasing transparency in these markets, where
transparency is modeled as a refining of the clients’ information sets regarding the
true value of the asset. We find that the degree distribution of the clients is critical
in the direction of the effect on bid ask spreads. Markets that have low connectivity
clients (a degree of less than 3) benefit from increased transparency by way of lower
bid ask spreads, whereas clients with higher degree suffer increased spreads in equilib-
rium. This is due to the increasing dominance of the winners’ curse effect but is also
dependent on the initial relative information sets of clients and dealers - relatively
uninformed clients benefit most. This could offer a possible explanation for some of
the mixed empirical results on the effectiveness of increased transparency on bid-ask
spreads.
Finally, we show how our model can offer some explanation to some other puzzles
in the empirical literature that are contrary to established economic theory. We
saw how the spreads in low-risk municipal bonds can be greater than medium-risk
bonds, which are greater still than risky equities. These observations are driven by
the client degree distribution and extent of the relative information sets over the true
value. Similar reasoning explains the observation that illiquid bonds can have tighter
spreads than liquid bonds. These phenomena can also be explained by adding the
network topology of preferential selection and degree distribution into the analysis.
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Chapter 6
Gambling Markets as Common
Value OTC Markets
6.1 Introduction
The UK general election betting market in 2019 offers a unique data opportunity to
examine the individual bid-ask spreads in a bilateral market with a common unknown
outcome that is likely to be impacted by news events. This market structure is ideally
suited to be modeled by an unknown common value price competition over a network.
Due to the public nature of bookmakers’ individual prices, we were able to collect both
the individual bookmaker prices, the best prices in the overall market and exchange
prices, and importantly, the betting prices on the range of outcomes from interval
level bets (allowing us to create a model of the belief distribution). The betting data
was collected over one month leading up to election day.
This chapter’s purpose is twofold: first, to understand if the analysis of price
formation in the preceding chapters is actually observed in real markets and the extent
of any informational content in the betting market prices. Our novel contribution
is to look at bookmaker prices with a bid-ask spread price representation in win
probabilities and use an unknown common value Bertrand competition methodology
in a bilateral network as a model for the trading dynamics between customers and
bookmakers.
In terms of betting market microstructure, we can assume a clear partition be-
tween bookmakers and customers’ functions, allowing a bilateral network represen-
tation and their symmetric information sets over the final outcome, modeled by the
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equal variance of error signals. There is little chance of any insider knowledge over
the final result, and more generally, it is unlikely that anyone has a notably greater
knowledge of the final general election outcome. The network of connections between
the customers and the bookmakers is sparse (UK Gambling Commission Report);
that is, customers only connect to a small number of the total bookmakers and can
be represented by a sparce bilateral market network.
I find that, contrary to the standard zero profit assumptions of the full information
Bertrand model, bookmakers prices are very close to the predicted Nash equilibrium
spreads in an unknown common value FPSBA network model. The regression of
predicted values to observed values has an R2 of 90% with a nearly 1:1 slope between
the two with a zero intercept (and well within 95% confidence bounds).
Our model setup of the election gambling market starts with both bookmakers
and customers forming a belief as to the true probabilities of each party’s chance
of winning the election. The bookmakers then post odds prices to their connected
customers, and if the implied probabilities of the prices observed are less than the
customers’ estimation of the true probability, then a unit trade occurs.1 The book-
makers need to price the initial event probabilities as accurately as possible as it is
often difficult that bets can be totally profitably offset.
The odds prices quoted also include some margin or spread so that each bet that
the bookmaker lays has a positive expected value. Understanding that his estimate
is subject to error is the driving force behind a large part of the bid-ask spread ( the
bid ask spread is referred to as the overround in betting markets). Indeed, even if
the overround were zero, the bookmaker would be expected to lose money over time
in competition. This is a function of the celebrated winner’s curse – the conditional
probability of someone having the wrong price given they were the best price is greater
than the unconditional probability of having the wrong price.
We can also compare the bilateral betting market with betting exchanges, which
have been a feature of the betting market since 2000. These exchanges are traditional
peer-to-peer continuous double auction marketplaces that are open to all participants
1For example, if the best offered odds price was 2:1 (a : b = b
a+b
) implying a win probability
of 1
3
and the customer believed the true probability was 1
2
, then they would back the event at 2:1,
effectively buying the probability at 1
3
. If the true probability is indeed 1
2
then they would have an






) x (their stake).
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and trade the same or similar products as the individual bookmakers. By far the
largest exchange is the Betfair Exchange, which has over 1m customers worldwide
and provides bid and ask odds on election betting. Although prices are typically
preferable to bookmakers’ prices, betting exchanges still account for only a small
share (< 15%) of the total online gambling market for reasons that are not well
understood. The main differences between the betting exchange and the bilateral
market mechanism are; customers can both buy and sell odds on an event, trade
with each other rather than just their selected bookmakers, and unwind bets at any
time with another counterparty. Most importantly, since opening an account with a
bookmaker has a certain cost (time to complete opening procedures and depositing
of initial amount), the search costs for the best prices are greatly reduced.
In addition to individual bookmaker data, we also collected the data from this bet-
ting exchange, which enables us to compare the two market mechanisms in real-time
and answer questions of market efficiency. We notice that although win probabilities
are similar, there is a measurable amount of the well-documented longshot bias in
the bookmakers’ prices compared to the betting exchange – that is, the bookmakers’
prices tend to under-price the probability of favorite outcomes and over-price prob-
abilities of longshots. These are similar to the results of Franck et al. (2009), who
compared the prices between bookmakers and betting exchanges on football results.
They concluded that a strategy that placed bets with bookmakers when their odds
were better than the exchange generated positive net returns. This concurs with
the idea that the betting exchange provides the most accurate forecasts for unknown
events and is consistent with a form of the efficient market hypothesis. We also
analyze how the implied probability distribution of voting intentions compares with
opinion poll distributions and expert forecasts.
Similar to some OTC financial markets (for example, the securitization market
analyzed by Hollifield et al. (2012) also exhibited a centrality discount), we also found
a centrality discount in the prices charged by the most popular (central) bookmakers
in the gambling market. Although the centrality discount effect is not totally ex-
plained using traditional economic theory, our model offers a possible explanation -
it is simply a property of a Bertrand competition model when played over a network
with preferential attachment.
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6.2 Literature Review
The importance of gambling markets for predicting unknown events has been exten-
sively covered by economists and are generally held to be one of the most accurate
forms of forecasting in various domains such as sport, politics, and entertainment,
Rothschild (2009), Arrow et al. (2008) and others. This forecast accuracy is due to
the financial incentives of gathering information and embedding this into the market
price, the so-called ’Wisdom of Crowds’ effect, popularized by Surowiecki (2004). The
Iowa Electronic Markets’ election prediction markets have outperformed the accuracy
of the large-scale polling organizations, Berg et al. (2008) and Senatorial elections in
the US in 2008.
In particular, the literature of using gambling market implied-probabilities in UK
elections range from, for example, Wall et al. (2012) which looked at constituency
level betting market data to forecast seat shares in the 2010 UK general election,
to Rosenbaum (1999) on the accuracy of betting market forecasts in the 1997 UK
general election. This paper approaches a less studied aspect of these prediction
markets, which is the bookmakers’ individual pricing behavior and, in particular,
their bid-offer spread and the confidence or belief in their estimates of final value,
which can be implied from the interval level bet prices. These interval level bets,
which are odds prices for a specific vote share interval, for example, the odds price of
a party gaining between 10% and 20%, provide an approximation to the probability
distribution of the point estimates of expected final outcomes.
Market microstructure literature would suggest (see Biais for a comprehensive
summary of the microstructure literature Biais et al. (2005)) that bookmakers’ odds
are expected to move on exogenous news (information effects) about the likely out-
come of the event but also on account of the flows of bets that they receive (inventory
effects). It appears that inventory effects were not a driving factor of bid ask spreads
in the gambling market over the time period (1 month) that we monitored prices and
prices moved very little intraday. The conventional bookmakers’ strategy has been
described by Wall et al. (2012) as ’uses expert knowledge to derive the probability
of a given outcome, and then offers customers’ odds’ at which they can back that
outcome.’ According to Levitt (2004), ”The market for sports gambling is structured
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very differently from the typical financial market. In sports betting, bookmakers an-
nounce a price, after which adjustments are small and infrequent. Bookmakers do not
play the traditional role of market makers matching buyers and sellers but, rather,
take large positions with respect to the outcome of game.” This structure is reminis-
cent of many OTC financial markets such as corporate bonds and derivatives, where
liquidity in each individual issue is small, but trade sizes can be quite substantial,
ensuring that dealers are incentivized to attempt to price each security as accurately
as possible.
6.3 Background
6.3.1 UK General Election Basics
In the UK, General Elections take place every 5 years in May, unless Parliament
votes to hold an election sooner, which is what happened to initiate this election in
December 2019. Candidates compete for a seat in the House of Commons and the
election is comprised of 650 individual elections for each seat or constituency, which
each have a similar number of voters. The party that wins a majority of seats, gets
to form a government for the next 5 years.
At the start of the election process, there were several important features. Brexit
and the consequent importance of the Brexit party vote share were paramount, as it
was feared that the Brexit Party votes would hurt the Conservatives disproportionally
in its marginal seats. The competitor, Labour, (the UK general election has been
won by either Conservative or Labour at every election since 1918 2) was polling very
poorly due to its new leadership and political agenda. This led to initial implied
probabilities of 85% for the Conservatives winning the most seats but also a 50%
chance of a hung parliament, where no one party has more seats than the sum of the
others.
Our analysis focuses on two types of data, the prices (probabilities) associated
with the final winner (most seats) and the final vote percentage for each party. The
vote to seat problem, that is, the inference of seat share from vote shares, is briefly
discussed below.
2www.commonslibrary.parliament.gov.uk
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6.3.2 Vote to Seat Prediction Problem
This first past the post system, FPTP, or technically the Single Member Plurality
(SMP) electoral system, in 650 individual constituencies complicates the forecasting
of the final most seats result from small national samples as each party has core con-
stituencies that require large swings to change the result and other constituencies that
need only small swings in the percentage vote to change the winner. Consequently,
predicting vote share is a simpler problem compared to predicting seat shares due to
the costs of polling representative samples.
The problem of vote share to seat share has been analyzed extensively, and a
comprehensive summary of the vote to seat problem is provided by Whiteley (2005).
There are three main approaches to the problem. Firstly, the ’cube rule’ and various
later extensions, which are heuristic rules that are derived from the original empirical
observation that the ratio of seat shares to the ratio of the cube of vote shares was
approximately equal. This simple rule has been found reasonable success in predicting
seat shares where there are two main competitors. Other power-law formulations
have been tried with varying levels of success to take account of election-specific
idiosyncrasies such as vote fragmentation and geographical clustering. The second set
of methodologies is econometric and includes detailed data about previous elections’
vote and seat share data. Lebo and Norpoth (2007); Whiteley (2005) both employed
time series models that include both a component of previous vote shares, seat shares,
and current opinion poll data in an attempt to forecast the predicted seat share.
Coefficients were calibrated using all previous UK election data since 1945.
Given the complexities and idiosyncrasies of each election, a perfect general model
of seat shares is difficult to achieve; however, the betting markets ask a slightly
different but simpler question – what is the probability that a particular party wins
the greatest number of seats on the election date. The question reduces the necessity
of forecasting seat numbers to which party wins the most seats, which is equivalent
to which party has the greatest vote share over a threshold dependent on each vote-
share. Figure 6.1 illustrates the nonlinearity of this threshold at a point in time. It
shows that, because of the constituency nature of the election, the percentage vote
share needed to win depends on both the relative vote-share and the distribution of
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the shares.
Figure 6.1: Vote Share Thresholds to Win Election
(electoralcalculas.com)
With implied probability density functions of each party’s vote share, we can
compute winning probabilities of the greatest number of seats without forecasting
the seat numbers directly.
6.4 Probabilities and Bid-Ask Spreads from Betting Data
6.4.1 Dataset
Data were collected from 19 bookmakers (16 consistently active) over the period
12 November to 12 December 2019 from published betting prices on the internet
– oddschecker.com, a betting aggregation portal, individual bookmaker sites, and
the Betfair betting exchange data. Two data types were collected – pricing data of
winning the election (defined as winning the most seats) and data indicating the size
of the vote share for the three main parties. The odds data were then translated into
probabilities to compare bookmakers’ actual spread quotes with our theoretical spread
predictions. We also compared the implied belief distribution versus the opinion poll
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data at the time. Data collection can be difficult as bookmakers deter automated
data scrapping from their websites by changing the location of betting prices.
Figure 6.2: Sample daily odds prices from main bookmakers
Figure 6.2 shows a screenshot of a typical daily data source from oddschecker.com,
summarizing the quoted betting odds from the major bookmakers. Figure 6.6 shows
a sample screenshot from a leading bookmaker showing the interval level bets on the
percentage vote bands for one of the political parties. These interval level bets allow
us to calculate a distribution of beliefs around the mean forecast.
6.4.2 Implied Probability Bid-Ask Calculation
Odds can be easily transposed to probabilities by the following formula. If a book-
maker makes an odds price for the Conservatives (C) to win the election of C1 to C2,
then the associated probability is: P (C wins) = C2C1+C2 . For example, if the quote
was 2:1, then the probability of winning is 0.33.
We ignore the very small and nationalist parties and focus only on Conserva-
tive, Labour, and LibDem parties (and the Brexit party pre their 11th November
announcement of not standing in conservative held seats, after which their expected
vote share collapsed to nominal levels).
Bookmakers do not generally provide odds that allow a gambler to lay (sell) a
particular bet, but we can implicitly obtain the odds of the bookmakers’ ’bid price’
odds by simply computing 1 – P(Labour Wins) – P(LD Wins), that is what is,
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the probability of conservatives not winning by betting on the other two possible
outcomes.
Event Win Odds Win Probability Offer Win Probability Bid
Conservatives 1:20 95.24% 89.92% (implied)
Labour 10:1 9.09% 3.77% (implied)
LibDem 100:1 0.99% -4.33% (implied)
Totals 105.32% 89.36%
Table 6.1: Win and Lose Probabilities derived for Odds Prices
This methodology allows us to view the bookmaker prices as a bid-ask spread pair
in probabilities for each event. The quoted win probabilities over all possible events
do not sum to 1, and the excess over one is known as the overround. The overround
of 5.32% is the excess bookmakers’ prot if they laid (sold) each of these bets in equal
quantities and is also the expected loss to customers since it is a zero-sum game.
Bookmakers can prot from these prices, and in particular the overround, in two ways,
rstly if the volume of bets placed is in the exact ratio of the odds is sold (laid), then
the bookmaker has a guaranteed prot of 5.32%. i.e., if bookmaker laid £95.24 at
1:20, £9.09 at 10:1 and£0.99 at 100:1, then whichever of the three outcomes occurs,
the bookmaker makes a risk-free prot of £5.32. Secondly, for any open bets that
the bookmaker has sold, the expected value to the bookmaker of these bets is the
dierence between the implied probability sold and the true probability multiplied by
the volume staked on each bet.
If we assume risk-neutrality and rationality, that is, bookmakers only care to max-
imize their expected payoff over time, then this implies that each event should have
a positive expected value and hence overestimate the true or perceived probability,
since the bookmaker cannot be sure what volume will be received for each event. In
extremis, a risk-averse bookmaker would adjust prices to maximize the chances of
laying the bets in the correct ratio, and the risk-neutral bookmaker would prefer to
sell the bet with the highest expected value.
Monitoring the individual bookmaker prices over the month suggests that prices
are made with most regard to expected final value as price movements are infrequent
and tend to move slowly with the changing expected mean of the distribution of vote
shares. See Wang and Pleimling (2019) for a discussion on Wager distributions at the
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aggregate level.
The average daily volume of bets split was approximately 48% Conservative, 45%
Labour, and 7% others. (source: oddschecker.com, daily % of bets placed through
the site). This suggests that the bookmakers did not adjust prices to encourage the
risk-free proportion of bets and also that they entered the election with a negative
inventory exposure to a Labour win and hence would have been profitable since the
conservatives won the election. Prices appeared to move very little on inventory
effects and moved purely on new information regarding the outcome, consistent with
the bookmaker description given by Wall et al. (2012).
6.4.3 Summary Win Probabilities
The table in figure 6.3 shows the summary results of applying this methodology to the
data set and yields the following bid ask spread results for the expected win, defined
as the party winning the greatest number of seats, using the individual bookmaker
prices and the exchange market as a comparison. The bid ask prices are the highest
bid and lowest ask prices across all bookmakers. It should be noted that these are
derived from the actual trading prices with no data adjustment for any potential bias:
Figure 6.3: Summary of Implied Bid Offer Probabilities
The difference caused by the longshot bias is quite apparent in figure 6.3 between
the best of the individual bookmaker mid prices compared to the exchange mid prices:
The outsider, Labour, seen in Figure 6.4, is consistently assigned a higher proba-
bility (lower odds) by the bookmakers than at the exchange. Similarly, the favourite,
Conservative, also seen in Figure 6.4, has consistently lower probability (higher odds)
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Figure 6.4: Average Implied Win Probabilities from Odds Prices
than the exchange using the mid prices. The structural benefit of the exchange al-
lows gamblers the opportunity of adding extra supply to the outsiders (they can lay
outsiders directly) and so will tend to mitigate the longshot bias of the bookmakers’
prices. The mid-prices suggest that the bookmakers make better (lower) prices than
the betting exchange, but this in fact is not true. The larger bid offer spreads with
the bookmakers means that the exchange is still a cheaper source of favourite (Con-
servative) probabilities. This dataset thus allows us to quantify the extent of this bias
which I don’t believe has been empirically estimated before in election markets.
6.4.4 Bilateral and Exchange Pricing
Unlike most financial markets, the gambling market has both types of market mech-
anisms trading a homogeneous product – the final election outcome probabilities. In
the UK gambling market there are both individual bookmakers making OTC type
prices and a betting exchange (the Betfair exchange) with a continuous double auction
limit order book open to everyone.
Figure 6.5 shows that spread prices on the exchange are consistently tighter than
not only individual bookmakers prices but also the best bid and best offer over all our
16 active bookmakers. This is a well-known phenomenon and was one of the reasons
that initially, betting exchanges were thought to be the future of online gambling. For
reasons not well understood, this has not occurred and betting exchanges account for
< 15% of the online volume.
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Figure 6.5: Obseverd Exchange, Bookmaker and Best of
Bookmaker Spreads
6.4.5 Adjusting Implied Probabilities from Bias
Inferring the true event probabilities from the probabilities implied by the betting
prices suffer from two well-documented problems; the behavioral bias that is known
as the longshot bias, which is the tendency for gamblers to under-bet the favorites
and over-bet the outsiders and the overround problem, Peel et al. (2003). Although
for most of our analysis, specifically, predicted and actual spreads, we use only the
quoted prices without adjustment, the calculations for the variance of beliefs require
a different method as there are typically nine possible event bands that make the
additive method of reducing the overround inaccurate.
The most researched stylized fact of gambling markets is the favorite-longshot
bias and was first noted by Griffith in 1949 and has been observed in most non-
exchange betting data. Equilibrium market prices are a biased estimate of the true
probability of an event occurring, and the expected return to gamblers on longshots
is lower than the expected return on favorites at the bookmaker equilibrium prices.
See, for example, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) and Peel et al. (2003) for a complete
discussion of this phenomenon.
There are two sets of competing theories to explain the empirical observation of
the apparent irrationality of over-betting on the worse-expected value events relative
to the best-expected return events. Firstly, a neoclassical approach that explains
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this by proposing risk-loving utility functions – the return to gamblers on favorites is
small relative to the return from outsiders. Secondly, behavioral theorists suggest an
approach that concerns cognitive errors and probabilistic misconceptions. Cognitive
psychology has demonstrated that people are systematically poor at differentiating
between small and tiny probabilities and treat both similarly Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). Odds of 100:1 or 200:1 (P= 1% and 0.5%) do not affect the demand for that
event bet; hence bookmakers prefer to offer at the lower odds, thereby distorting the
true win probabilities. Also, people exhibit an irrational preference for certainty over
highly probable outcomes, which leads to the under-pricing of favorites - odds of 1:20
and 1:30 (95% and 96% probability) again cause limited demand changes and hence
bookmakers tend to prefer to make the 1:30 price. Snowberg and Wolfers (2010)
tested a dataset consisting of over 5 million horse races over 1992-2001 and concluded
that misperceptions in probability drove the longshot bias.
In the case of the distribution of vote-share beliefs, the longshot bias leads to
bookmakers reducing odds for low probability event vote-shares more than for higher
probability vote-shares, and the effect of this is that the raw implied probabilities
from the odds data will imply a greater variance than the true distribution of beliefs
over final outcomes.
The total π of the implied probabilities for each event is known as the booksum
and the excess, π−1, the overround. Methods have been devised to extract true event
probabilities from this overround by normalizing each event’s implied probabilities to
closer to the true event probabilities. The question of how to translate these betting
probabilities into accurate event probabilities has been widely studied, as knowledge
of true event probabilities can be used to predict future events, Vovk and Zhdanov
(2007) and others.
There are four main methods of translating the actual event probabilities from
the betting probabilities and removing the bookmakers’ overround (see Clarke (2017))
for a full description). Firstly, the Additive Method distributes the overround evenly
between the n outcomes as a probability adjustment. The second, and most commonly
used method in the literature, is the Normalization Method, which normalizes each
implied probability by the booksum, π. Suppose event A has implied probability πA,
this is adjusted to the true probability P(A), by P (A) = πAπ . This method allocates
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the same proportion of the overround to each event and thus does not address the
longshot bias. A third method was proposed by Shin, H. S. (1993) and used an
iterative method based on an assumed fraction z of informed traders to compensate
for the informed traders’ effects on prices.
The final method, and the one we use in this paper to normalize the belief prob-
abilities, is known as the Power Method and is originally attributed to Victor Khut-
sishvili and is described by Vovk and Zhdanov (2007) and Clarke (2017). It is the
basis for many commercial automated betting algorithms at several bookmakers. The
method is a natural extension of the Additive and Normalization Methods and raises
each implied probability to a fixed power k in order to reduce the booksum to 100%.




A = 1. The effect is that the overround is eliminated and
affects the low probabilities more than the higher probabilities. This method’s pre-
dictive power has been empirically demonstrated to be superior to the other three
methods after applying it to over 20,000 actual sporting events. This method also
appears to compensate for the inherent longshot bias.
6.5 Implied Beliefs and Opinion Polls
6.5.1 Implied Belief Calculation
Some bookmakers provide odds prices for certain percentage vote share bands (known
as interval level bets), and these odds can be translated into probabilities and hence
an implied distribution with the mean corresponding to the mean belief of the final
vote share and distribution around it. See figure 6.6 for a sample data of interval let
bets from 888sport bookmaker.
Figure 6.6: Sample interval level bets from 888Sport bookmaker
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This set of contracts reveals an approximation to the full probability distribution
of market expectations. Beliefs extracted from the betting market were transformed
using the Power method as described by Clarke (2017) because to calculate the implied
buying price using the selling prices of all of the other interval level bets requires too
many crosses of the bid-ask spread (8 crosses of the spread) and so calculations are
not helpful.
Quoted N-Method P-Method
Event Odds P(Win) P(Win) P(Win)
under 14.99% 100:1 0.99% 0.79% 0.47%
15-19.99% 80:1 1.23% 0.98% 0.61%
20-24.99% 40:1 2.44% 1.94% 1.34%
25-29.99% 18:1 5.26% 4.19% 3.28%
30-34.99% 7:1 22.22% 17.69% 17.44%
35-39.99% 7:1 36.36% 28.94% 30.90%
40-44.99% 13:1 38.10% 30.32% 32.61%
45-49.99% 6:1 14.29% 11.37% 10.44%
over 50’% 20% 4.76% 3.79% 2.92%
Total 125.66% 100% 100%
Table 6.2: Summary of Conservative Party Event Odds and Implied
True Win Probabilities using N and P method
Table 6.2 shows a sample data field showing the event and quoted odds by a lead-
ing bookmaker on 14th November 2019, together with the normalized probabilities
(normalizing each probability by the extent of the overround) and the power nor-
malization that eliminates the overround by raising each probability to a power and
somewhat compensates for the longshot bias. The mean and standard deviation are
easily calculated from this frequency table as 38.97% and 6.25%, respectively. The
mean and variance are then used to fit a normal distribution to the data.
Figures 6.7 represent the histograms of beliefs taken from bookmaker prices on
interval level bets of vote share for each party. The probabilities are normalized in
the usual way and give an insight into the both the mean and the variance of the
point estimates of vote shares.
Graphically, the beliefs data seem well modelled by a normal distribution that is
also drawn over the histogram for illustration (using the sample mean and variance).
This fitting process is repeated for each bookmaker and also for every day in order
to give a daily average belief distribution of the expected vote shares of each party.
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Figure 6.7: Histograms of Implied Observed Belief Distributions
Goodness of fit of a normal distribution to the data can be confirmed with a
standard chi-squared goodness of fit test. Table 6.3 shows the average daily chi-
squared test statistics for each party.
Conservatives Labour Libdem
χ2 statistic 3.97 3.85 3.62
95% Critical Value 9.35 11.14 7.38
Table 6.3: Average Test Statistics for Normality of Data
The χ2 statistics are all comfortably below the critical value and so we are confi-
dent that the normal distribution is a good approximation for the belief data which
confirms the graphical intuition.
Figure 6.8 plots the mean values of these implied distributions, which not sur-
prisingly, due to non-arbitrage consistency of the odds prices, are consistent with the
both the win probabilities and opinion poll data. Figure 6.9 shows the diminishing
standard deviation of the belief distributions over time, which is consistent with our
modelling assumptions.
As shocks that might substantially alter the perceived outcome fail to occur, mean
beliefs trend towards the final outcome monotonically. In addition, the standard
deviation (or lack of confidence) in these beliefs decreases in a linear manner as the
chances of shocks decrease linearly with time.




SD of Votes Shares
6.5.2 Opinion Polling and Expected Beliefs
Opinion polls are a perennial feature of most political elections, and 63 opinion polls
by 12 opinion pollsters were conducted over the period 1st November – 11th December
2019, with an average of 2 polls published per day. The problem with opinion polls
is that they do not exactly measure what we need to know to price a bet on the
outcome. The opinion polls aim to measure (with some sample error) the voting
intentions on a given day. They do not measure what probability these voters might
switch their vote on the actual day of the election due to a variety of factors or the
confidence level of each respondent.
The Pew Research Centre has examined how and in which order questions are
asked and how these affect the answers given. Determining voter preference among
the candidates running for office would appear to be a relatively easy task by simply
asking them who they will vote for on Election Day. Differences in how this ques-
tion is asked and placed in the questionnaire can affect the results. They find that
many people have given little thought to the campaign or are genuinely ambivalent
about their choices. For these voters, the structure of the questionnaire impacts their
answers.
Poll respondents are typically asked a question along the lines of ‘if the general
election were tomorrow, how would you vote?’. It is difficult to know how seriously
respondents take such questions and what degree of certainty their response implies
(see van der Eijk et al., 2006 for a fuller discussion on opinion poll limitations).
Suppose a polling company could sample the entire population and obtain the
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vote shares for each party. This would have a sample error of zero but would not be
a precise forecast for the vote share at some future date, although presumably, it is
an unbiased estimator due to the independence of potential news shocks. The nature
of the polling business is to use this estimator as a proxy for future election day vote





Figures 6.10 and 6.11 indicates the consistency between the betting market and
opinion polls estimation of party vote share predictions. The opinion polls have
greater volatility than the mean implied vote shares from the betting market. Also,
the opinion polls are just a point estimate (with a sampling error), whereas the betting
market also produces a confidence band for these estimates vis the interval level bets.
Additionally, the betting markets ask the more interesting question with regards
to pricing – what the is likely distribution of beliefs over the election date and takes
into account the current voting intentions and the variance of changes that might
occur due to exogenous events or last-minute switching. Consequently, although the
mean of the betting market distributions is similar to the pollsters mean, the stan-
dard deviation is much higher – a standard deviation of approximately 6% versus the
pollsters’ typical reported (sample) error of 1.5%. As time progresses, the betting
market distribution variance reduces as the possibility for exogenous shocks reduces,
and this is indeed what the empirical data reports. The betting markets effectively
ask the question: ”how do you think other people will vote?” which is different from
asking, ”How would you vote?” On the day before the election, the 6 opinion polls
were published, and the results are summarized in Table 6.4.
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Poll Average Poll Range Market % Final %
Conservative 43.83% 41-45% 42.88% 43.60%
Labour 33.5% 31-35% 33.88% 32.2%
Lib Dem 11.33% 9-14% 13.13% 11.50%
Table 6.4: Opinion Poll Summary - Election Day -1
Although the average of the final six final polls published was very close to the final
realization, the range of the polls’ estimates was quite large – average absolute error of
4, which is the same absolute error as the betting market. The average RMSE of the
pollsters’ forecasts was 2.54% compared to the market RMSE of 2.44%, suggesting
that the market forecast was slightly better than the average opinion poll. The betting
market error could be an example of the bias inherent in prediction markets – the
longshot bias of small probabilities, the home bias, which is the desire of gamblers
to bet on their home outcome – seen in International football and US baseball. See
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) for a complete discussion of possible prediction market
bias sources.
6.6 Model
6.6.1 Network Structure of the Betting Market
A network can be used to describe a market, where the nodes of the network rep-
resent the economic entities and the links represent potential trading relationships
between them. In the gambling market, we have bookmakers and customers, and the
customers connect to the bookmakers in some way and represent a possible trading re-
lationship. This basic structure is known as a bipartite network (two node types), and
we can calibrate this network with empirical data. The gambling market structure’s
main parameters can be inferred from the UK Gambling Commission’s annual report
and survey of gambling behavior. The Gambling Commission is the UK’s main reg-
ulator for gambling activity and conducts regular surveys to track problem gambling
and changes in gambling behavior. Since 2015, they have also tracked how gamblers
hold many separate accounts, and in 2019 this was reported as 2.7 accounts per gam-
bler, with 44% of gamblers having only one account. These are self-reported numbers
144 Chapter 6. Gambling Markets as Common Value OTC Markets
but appear to be steady over the last five years. (www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk).
An unfortunate consequence of regulation to protect vulnerable gamblers is the more
onerous account setup procedures which appear to have had the effect of slightly dis-
incentivizing the opening of competing accounts – 3.5 to 2.7 over the five years. It
should be noted that the majority of bookmakers for sports betting also make prices
for political events.
Figure 6.12: Average Number of Online Accounts, taken from the
Gambling Commission
The Gambling Commission reports that 44% of clients have only one account,
with the mean number of accounts as 2.7. We can simplify this distribution as the
clients belonging to 2 groups - a group that selects only one betting account and
a second group that selects five accounts. That is, 44% of clients randomly choose
only one bookmaker, and the second group of 56% of clients randomly chooses five
bookmakers to produce a link distribution consistent with the Commission’s data.
Clients choose their bookmakers for multiple reasons, including; tightness of
spreads, range of betting products, online technology solutions, financial solvency,
etc. The largest and most popular bookmakers spend over £1.5B 3 in the UK in ad-
vertising per year, and so it is reasonable to assume a certain amount of preferential
selection for these bookmakers. i.e., the client who wishes to open one betting ac-
count is more likely to choose an already popular one. The combination of this client
degree distribution (which is a common feature of many socio-economic networks)
combined with the preferential selection for certain large bookmakers means that the
largest bookmakers have a higher ratio of degree 1 clients to degree 5 clients than
3www.responsiblegamblingtrust.org.uk report on UK Gambling advertising
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the peripheral bookmakers. This, in turn, means that the most popular bookmak-
ers tend to price their odds towards the monopoly level price, and the less popular
bookmakers, which are subject to more competition, tend to price their odds for a
competitive market. Normally, when the price maker is more informed than the price
taker, the monopoly price is higher than the competitive price. However, if the clients
are equally or better informed than the bookmaker, the reverse can be true. This
is due to the winners’ curse dominating the payoffs. See section 6.9 for a complete
discussion.
We will assume that at each time t, both bookmakers and clients have an equal
standard deviation of beliefs in the final outcome - i.e. all players have the same
degree of uncertainty as to the final value. We also make the assumption that there is
prefferential selection for the largest and most popular bookmakers and although
we don’t have the data for the numbers of clients, we use quoted UK gambling
revenue figures as a proxy for popularity. Suppose bookmaker i has percentage of
total market revenue of RVi = UK gambling revenue / total UK gambling revenue,
then the probability of bookmaker i being selected by a new client is equal to RVi.
Suppose there are M clients and a fraction α clients are degree 1 and (1 − α)
clients are degree 5, then each bookmaker Bi, r has an expected ratio f of 1 degree





which is a strictly increasing function in α and also strictly increasing in RVi, i.e. the
ratio of 1-degree clients (no competition) to 5-degree clients (competition) increases
with both the amount of preferential selection and with the proportion of 1-degree
clients in the market and is the primary reason for centrality discounts and premiums
in market networks
It follws that if the expected payoff for bookmaker i is:
E[Π] = M(αRViE[Πdeg1clients] + (1− α)(1− (1−RVi)5)E[Πdeg5clients]) (6.2)
Typically, the monopoly price is greater than the competitive price but in a common
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value situation, the reverse can be true due to the winners’ curse effect. If however,
the optimal spread for 1-degree clients is lower than the optimal spread for 5-degree
clients, the blended maximimizing spread will be higher for less popular bookmakers
and cause a centrality discount.
6.6.2 Multi-Period Unknown Common Value FPSBA Model
Suppose a bookmaker is connected to n customers, and each customer is connected
to m (n >> m) bookmakers. The bookmaker wants to make a betting price for a
Conservative win in the General Election, defined as winning the most seats out of
all the other parties, and the connected customer will place a unit bet with their
connected bookmaker that has the best (lowest probability) price for this event. This
is a Bertrand competition model in odds (probabilities) prices and can be analyzed
using a common value FPSBA representation as described in the previous chapters.
The betting market most closely resembles the FPSBA as the bookmakers can
only observe previous competitor prices (published historical odds) as there is no re-
altime centralized exchange to compare prices. Bookmakers do not observe the other
(unknown) competitor prices during the actual odds quoting process, as the exact net-
work structure is unknown, i.e., you do not know whom you are competing against in
each quote. It is also a one-shot price – bookmakers cannot change their price while
quoting with a customer and have no accurate knowledge of competitors’ prices. A
critical feature of ascending auctions is the ability to sequentially improve your price
as other prices become apparent. For these reasons, we use an FPSBA as a modeling
concept rather than an ascending auction process to model the trading interactions.
However, it should be noted that the bookmakers do have more information than is
usually assumed in a standard FPSBA due to the availability of historical quotes,
which would allow them to infer likely competitor prices.
Although auction theory categorizes auctions as belonging to 4 main types (FPSB,
Vickrey, Dutch, English), MaKafee et al. (1987), real-world auctions often have
idiosyncrasies that deviate from the strict definitions. In the betting market, the
two types that most closely resemble the pricing dynamics are an FPSBA and an
English (ascending) auction. Although it appears possible for each bookmaker to
observe the other bookmakers’ prices (and hence adjust their own price/valuation) in
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the manner of an ascending auction, because of the limited connectivity of the clients
and the limited information of the network connections, bookmakers do not know
which competitor prices are relevant in the competition.
The bookmaker forms beliefs over the likely win probability of each party, and
we assume (see section 6.5 for the empirical evidence) that the vote share of each
party is distributed as a normal random variable with the Conservative Vote Share,
CV S ∼ N(µC , σC) , Labour Vote Share, LV S ∼ N(µL, σL), which we assume are
dependent normal random variables as a large reading fr one will translate into a
small reading for the other.
The probability p, that the Conservatives gain a higher vote share than Labour
(discounting the LibDem and Brexit party chances) is given by
p = P (Con wins) = P (CV S > LV S) = 1− Φ
 (µL − µC)√
σ2L + σ
2
C + 2COV (CV S , LV S)

(6.3)




C + 2cov(CV S , LV S), then the distribution
of the excess Conservative vote share is distributed as Cexcess ∼ N(PT , σD)
Bookmaker i estimates this true value PT , the excess vote share, on election day
(t=T) with a certain error or confidence.
Since odds and probabilities are interchangeable, for simplicity we let the book-
maker make a probability price p ∈ [0, 1] for the bet on the success of the Conservative
party in the election.
As in previous chapters, we model this measurement or estimation process by
bookmaker i, receiving a signal Si,t = PT + εt, at time t, which is an estimate of the
Conservative’s excess vote share that realizes on election day with mean PT , the true
excess realized vote share. εt ∼ N(0, σD) with variance σD
Bookmaker i, makes a betting price at time t of Bi,t = Si,t + δi to his connected
customers and these customers select the bookmaker with the lowest (probability)
price to trade. δi is the overround or profit margin selected by the bookmaker for
this bet.
We simplify the behaviour of customers as follows – for each customer of degree
k, (so is connected to k bookmakers), each customer forms a belief R as to the correct
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winning probability of the event. The customer then checks the prices of his connected
bookmakers, and if the odds imply a lower probability of winning than their estimate
R, a unit trade occurs.
The payoff for bookmaker i, in competition with k-1 other bookmakers j is:
Πi =
 Bi,t−PT : ifBi < Bj∀j ∩Bi < R0 : otherwise
 (6.4)
i.e. bookmaker i makes a payoff of Bi,t−PT = εi + δi, if Bi,t is the lowest price in the
network of the customer connections and is also better than the customer’s estimate R,
which is a Bertrand price competition model in odds prices with a common unknown
true value. This means that in equilibrium, the bookmaker with the highest adjusted
signal error (the estimate plus the overround) is selected to trade.
In a market with a single client who receives a signal Si = PT + εi where εi is
drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation σC and sets
a reservation price equal to Si (their estimate of the true probability)and n (n ≥ 1)
bookmakers, where the bookmakers receive an independent signal Si = PT + εi where
the εi are drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and SD σB , the expected
payoff for a bookmaker i is a function of all the bookmakers’ margins and the signal
standard deviations of bookmakers and clients, moreover:












Φ[ sσC ]φ(s+ δiσB )ds (6.5)
Where δi is the bookmaker’s profit margin, δ−i are the profit margins of the
competing bookmakers, σB is the standard deviation of the bookmakers’ belief over
the final point value estimate.
This model of expected payoffs, shown in figure 6.13, gives some insight into the
reason the overround should never be zero and is an illustration of the winners’ curse
effect – the conditional probability of making a wrong (losing) price after having been
selected to trade is greater than the unconditional probability of making a losing price.
The winner’s curse can only be avoided by adding an overround to your estimate of
true value and there exists an optimal amount of overround that needs to be added to
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Figure 6.13: Illustration of Winners Curse due to Overrounds
maximize expected payoffs. We assume that each bookmaker looks to maximize this
expected payoff and are risk neutral, and hence only care about expected returns. This
can be represented as a static Bayesian game and has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
solution as per the other chapter.
Summarizing the important assumptions of this model:
• Risk Neutral - bookmakers maximize expected payoffs and are indifferent to
inventory and variance of payoffs
• Rationality - bookmakers make prices that are independently profitable – rel-
ative to their beliefs, each event odds bet has a positive expected payoff. This a
consequence of 1 – the expected utility of a losing bet can be positive if it offsets
some risk)
• All bookmakers have same variance of error in estimate of final values.
• Distribution of errors is common knowledge which is itself common knowledge.
At each time period, t, each bookmaker looks to add a profit margin δi,t to their
expected true final outcome value and makes a price of Bi,t = Si,t + δi,t , and at each
time period t, the mean and variance of the distribution of Si,t may change due to
exogenous events. The excess margin δi,t need not be the same for each event and∑
E δi,t = π > 1 is summed over all events E and π − 1 is known as the overround.
Each bookmaker is simultaneously attempting to maximize their expected payoff
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and theoretically there is an amount of margin that each bookmaker adds that cannot
be unilaterally improved upon. This Bayesian Nash equilibrium (it is a Bayesian game
because of the belief assumptions of all the players and the common prior assumption)
can be solved numerically with the algorithm of the previous chapter.
In this competitive setup as described, at each day t, each bookmaker has a Nash
Equilibrium amount, δi , to add to their estimated final value, and an amount −δi to
subtract from it in order to generate a 2-way probability price in an event’s outcome,
given a common final event distribution function F.
The bid-ask spread is the difference between what prices a customer could back
and lay an outcome with the same bookmaker. We investigate if the bookmakers’
bid-ask spreads in odds prices approximate a Nash equilibrium bidding strategy by
analyzing the empirical data and estimating the relevant variables required to cal-
culate the theoretical spread levels. The expected payoff function includes three
unknown quantities that we will calculate or estimate from the empirical dataset.
Firstly, the functional form of the distribution of beliefs, which we shall approximate
as being normal and is consistent with the empirical data, secondly, the mean and
variance of these beliefs, which we also calculated from the data and lastly the num-
ber of competitors and network position each bookmaker faces when making a price
to a customer. We infer this distribution from the UK gambling commission survey
reports. We also take the UK betting revenue as a proxy for popularity (preferen-
tial selection) in constructing preferential attachment in the network to examine the
centrality premium and behavioral differences.
6.6.3 Converting Vote Share to Seat Majority Beliefs
The aim now is to produce a seat win probability from the vote share data. As
before, let conservative final vote share be distributed as C ∼ N(µC , σC) and the
expected Labour final vote share be L ∼ N(µL, σL) , then the probability p, that
the Conservatives gain a higher vote share than Labour (discounting the LibDem
chances) is given by
p = 1− Φ
 (µL − µC)√
σ2L + σ
2
C + 2COV (CV S , LV S)
 (6.6)
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Unfortunately, the beliefs are not independent as a large realization for one party
would likely produce a large negative realization for the other party as there is a
fixed population to draw from, therefore the covariance between the Labour and
Conservative vote shares, cov(C,L), is unknown and certainly negative.
However, in order to calculate spreads, we just need the fact that the distribution
is normal with some unknown variance σX since the distributions of both Labour and
Conservative vote shares is normal, any linear combination of these distributions is
also normal. The p(C > L) is already known by the separately quoted win proba-
bilities (point values) and µC and µL are known from the means of the interval level
bet data (belief distributions). We can then solve for the effective variance of this




C + 2COV (C,L) , to use for the effective
variance of the outright win probabilities and the inputs to the theoretical spread
calculations. This variable is the variance of the beliefs or margin of error of the win
probabilities.
Figure 6.14: Standard Deviation of Conservative Party Most Seats
Win Belief Probabilities
Figure 6.14 plots these standard deviations of Conservative most seat win prob-
ability beliefs that are derived from the Conservative and Labour vote share beliefs
after solving for the implied covariance. It can be viewed as a confidence measure
on the mean probabilities (estimates) of winning the most seats. Similar to financial
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markets and standard behavioural theory, we notice over and under-reactions to ex-
ogenous shocks, which is particularly noticeable after the Brexit Party non-compete
announcement on the 11th November. This was unequivocally good news for the
Conservative vote share, which went up, but the initial surge in confidence appears
exaggerated and was subsequently reversed over the next few days. The smoothed
beliefs, also plotted, use 3-day simple moving average to give an indication of market
beliefs that are more consistent with the observed changes in beliefs of the individual
vote shares.
6.7 Observed and Predicted Spreads
We can now examine the predicted equilibriums in our betting market model and
compare them with the data. We have now calculated or observed all of the parame-
ters necessary for the bid-ask spread pricing model, namely, the extent of competition
(network properties) and belief distributions (standard deviations). We now use these
parameters to determine if the bookmaker bid-ask spreads in the market follow either
a Nash equilibrium strategy or a zero profit strategy. For each day, we use the implied
variances of winning beliefs (Conservatives only for brevity) to calculate both the NE
spread and the zero-profit spread that are consistent with these parameters.
Figure 6.15: Mean Observed Spreads and Predicted Spread Levels
Evaluated from Belief Data
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Figure 6.15 shows that the average bookmaker spread tends to follow a strategy
close to the theoretical NE spread calculated from the implied beliefs of winning. The
predicted spreads are more volatile than the observed spreads in the market, and this
may be due to data fluctuations in the belief odds data. In line with the theory on
Bertrand competition on common value items, the bookmakers do not charge zero
expected profit prices in equilibrium.
Figure 6.14 shows the level of noise in the beliefs and smoothed belief levels. Using
the smoothed beliefs as inputs for the equilibrium level gives the following outputs for
a predicted spread level versus the observed spread levels. Also plotted, for reference,
is the calculated zero profit spread levels. These are calculated in the same way from
the payoff functions but with the algorithm target set to zero profits.
Looking instead at the spreads derived from smoothing the belief data, Figure
6.16 gives a very clear result – the bookmakers’ spread strategy appears to follow
these predicted NE spreads quite closely and are much higher than the estimated
zero-profit spread levels. The smoothing uses a simple 3-day moving average of the
beliefs.
Figure 6.16: Observed and Belief Smoothed Predicted Spread
Levels
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6.8 Model Evaluation
A common and straightforward approach to evaluate models on complex systems is to
regress predicted vs observed values, Piñeiro et al. (2008) (or vice versa) and compare
slope and intercept parameters against the 1:1 line. We ran a linear regression between
the observed spread prices and the predicted equilibrium spreads using the market
beliefs of the final outcome variance as inputs. The model produced a nearly 1:1
relationship with an R2 of 90%. A perfect model would have a slope of 1 and an
intercept of zero, and the fitted linear model has a slope of 1.118 with 95% confidence
bands of (0.9036, 1.332) and an intercept of -0.5888 with confidence bands of (-1.951,
0.7729).
Figure 6.17: Observed vs Predicted Linear Regression
Figure 6.17 plots the linear model of the predicted versus the observed values.
Figure 6.18: Residuals of observed vs predicted values regression
model
The plot of the residuals, show in figure 6.18, also shows no obvious structure.
Conducting a ’runs’ test, Bradley (1968), on the residuals, where the null hypothesis
H0: the sequence was produced in a random manner vs H1: the sequence was not
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produced in a random manner was investigated. The result is we cannot reject the
null hypothesis at both the 95 and 99% level.
R2 also represents the proportion of the linear covariance of observed and pre-
dicted values with respect to the total variance of observed and predicted values.
In this sense, the R2 indicates how much of the linear variation of observed values
is explained by the variation of predicted values. Linearity between observed and
predicted values can be tested following (Smith and Rose, 1995). Thus, the R2 of
observed vs. predicted values is a valid parameter that gives important information
of the model performance
It is always possible that our “explanatory variables” are completely useless for
predicting the observed values and are due to natural variability of the data - noise
vs signal. We can formulate this as a hypothesis test with the null hypothesis that
all regression parameters (except the intercept) are zero, that is, we form the null
hypothesis:
H0 : β1 = 0
versus the alternative hypothesis:
HA : β1 6= 0
That is, we can say that under HA, the model has some predictive power over
a constant model. This is accomplished by performing an F-test on the regression
coefficients of the predicted vs observed values.
Figure 6.19: F-test results on the linear regression coefficients
156 Chapter 6. Gambling Markets as Common Value OTC Markets
The F-statistic vs a constant model of 127 says we can reject the null hypothesis
H0 at both the 95% and 99% confidence level and has a p-value of 4x10
−8. That is,
the probability of a type 1 error (data is actually generated from a constant model)
is 4x10−8. Clearly as we have only one explanatory variable, the predicted value, the
p-value of the F-statistic is the same as the t-statistic.
Given the assumptions, noisy data and complexities of calculations, it is notable
that the price competition mechanism over a network manages to produce prices that
are measurably close to the theoretical predictions.
6.9 Centrality Premium Effect
In many financial markets, a centrality premium exists; that is, the more centrally
located dealers charge higher prices than the more peripheral dealers. The betting
market structure is very similar to the OTC market structures of the financial markets,
and we examine the data to determine if any centrality discount or premium exists.
The results show a centrality discount for the more central and active bookmakers,
compared to the smaller, less active ones. This discount is predicted in our common
value network model when there are symmetric information sets and preferential
selection by the customers for a particular subset of bookmakers. It seems reasonable
to assume that given the costs of establishing accounts and the average number of
accounts being three, that the biggest bookmakers are likely to be preferred as one of
the client choices over the smaller ones when opening only a small number of accounts.
This preferential selection is the driving force of the centrality discount, as presented
in the previous chapter.
The 16 active bookmakers that were represented on oddschecker.com (3 book-
makers making sporadic prices were dropped from the analysis) were sorted by total
UK revenue using published online data.
Table in figure 6.20 shows the ranking and average spreads over the 1-month
period prior to the election day.
As time progresses to the election day, the outcome’s variance reduces due to the
reduced probability of election changing news – leader’s debates, speech gaffes, for
example. Since our model estimates a spread that is positively related to the final
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Figure 6.20: Partitioning on Bookmakers by Revenue
value estimate variance, we would expect a drift down in spreads on no significant
news and a sharp drop in spreads on any large positive news that permanently in-
creases a party’s chance of election. The data suggest that this effect does occur –
there is a significantly large drop in spreads after the Brexit party announcement on
the 11th November that they were not going to compete in Conservative-held seats.
This produced a significant increase in the expected Conservative Vote share and a
considerable reduction in a Conservative win’s uncertainty. Spreads for a conserva-
tive win collapsed by nearly 2% - the most significant drop over the whole election
dataset. It could be argued from the data that the Conservatives effectively won
the election on 11th November with the Brexit party non-compete announcement, as
demonstrated by the large reduction in the belief variances
Figure 6.21 plots the average bid-ask spreads of both central and peripheral book-
makers and clearly shows that the central bookmakers consistently make tighter
spreads than the peripheral bookmakers. This is a surprising result, considering
the extra costs of marketing that the large bookmakers spend. This result, however,
is consistent with our model of spread prices with a client-base that is at least as
informed as to the outcome as the bookmakers and bookmakers are subject to a level
of preferential selection as new clients enter the market. In a growing network with
preferential selection, the bookmakers with the largest numbers of links are more
likely to get selected by the clients. Following the network model described in section
6.6.1, we have that each client has a 44% probability of having just one link and a 56%
probability of having five links. The bookmakers are selected with some preferential
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Figure 6.21: Spreads of Largest and Smallest Bookmakers
selection that is based on their popularity. At each time point, we assume that the
clients and the bookmakers have an equal standard deviation of beliefs as to the true
final value.
The bookmakers all seek to maximize their expected profits by adjusting their
profit margin δ, which is given by:
E[Π(δ)] = M(0.44RViE[Πdeg1clients(δ)] + (0.56)(1− (1−RVi)5)E[Πdeg5clients(δ)])
(6.7)
where M is the total number of clients, RVi is the proportion of market share of
bookmaker i.
and the expected payoff from degree 1 clients of bookmaker i, is given by:












and the expected payoff from degree 5 clients is :












Φ[ tσB ]φ( t+ δiσB )dt (6.9)
These systems of equations (over all bookmakers) have a fixed point at which each
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bookmaker is in equilibrium regarding the profit margin added to their estimate and
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can be approximated numerically.
If bookmakers and clients are, on average, equally able to measure the outcome,
the equilibrium spread level for the 1-degree clients is lower than the equilibrium
spread level for the 5-degree clients and was discussed at length in Chapter 3. This
common variance tends to cause a centrality discount in equilibrium when there is a
preferential selection for the bookmakers.
6.10 Conclusion
The UK general election provided a perfect dataset to test the idea in this thesis that
non-centralized markets with common uncertainty over the true value can produce
non-intuitive pricing effects in equilibrium. We collected data over the month preced-
ing the election and showed that beliefs over the final outcome were well represented
at each time point by a normal distribution, which gives a richer representation of be-
liefs than the usual point estimates. We then used these belief distributions to create
a Bertrand unknown common value competition model in odds prices and found that
the quoted prices accorded very well with the model’s theoretical Nash equilibrium
levels. Similar to some OTC financial markets (the securitization market analyzed
by Hollifield et al. (2012) also exhibited a centrality discount), we also found a cen-
trality discount in the prices charged by the most popular (central) bookmakers in
the gambling market. Although the centrality discount effect is not totally explained
using traditional economic theory, our model offers a possible explanation - it is sim-
ply a property of a Bertrand competition model when played over a network with
preferential attachment.
In terms of forecasting and informational content, we find, similar to others, that
the betting markets provide a forecast at least as accurate as polling data. One caveat
is that there is a well-documented longshot bias for small probability events that need





This thesis describes a simple network model of the trading process in a general client-
dealer OTC market, with a common unknown asset value. Clients connect to dealers
via a network of trading relationships, and both clients and dealers form an estimate
of this asset’s true value. Clients request quotes from their connected dealers, and
dealers respond with a firm quote to buy and sell, and the client order transacts at
the best-observed quoted price.
Our model offers insight into the interesting equilibrium pricing between perfect
competition and monopoly by examining the network topology within a framework
of asymmetric information sets. We view dealer bid-ask spreads as analogous to the
signal reductions in first-price auctions and use traditional auction analysis to find
the optimal dealer pricing strategy. We jointly maximize the dealer payoff functions
numerically to find their Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy and examine the effects
of different network configurations and asymmetric information on the equilibrium
bid-ask spread.
As in many traditional asymmetric information microstructure models, we find
asymmetric information to be a significant driving force in determining equilibrium
dealer spreads. The extent of asymmetric information is a primary driver of why
in a network with heterogeneous client links, central dealer spreads can be either a
premium or a discount to the less-central dealer spreads. Setting bid-ask spreads to
either compensate or exploit informational asymmetries depends on both the relative
information sets and network topology, which interact in non-linear ways.
Similarly, we find that the client degree distribution is a major factor in determin-
ing the effects of increasing information transparency on equilibrium bid-ask spreads,
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where transparency is modeled as a refining of the clients’ information sets regarding
the true value of the asset. Clients with low degree (less than 3) experience re-
duced spreads, whereas higher degree clients face higher spreads when transparency
is increased. This is due in part to the increasing dominance of the winners’ curse
effect with improved client information sets and dealers attempting to mitigate this in
equilibrium by increasing spreads. This may offer some explanation as to the mixed
empirical results seen when market transparency has been increased by regulators
and is further evidence of the importance that market network topology plays.
This common value model also generates two types of price dispersion in both the
buy and sell prices. Firstly, from the asset value estimate variance, with increased
dispersion when asset value uncertainty is high. Price dispersion is also shown to
fall when clients become better informed as to the true value of the asset. This price
dispersion is a feature unique to non-centralized markets, with different prices trading
in different parts of the network. Secondly, there is also a prices dispersion between
clients of different degree, with increased degree equating to lower price dispersion as
the variance of the equilibrium prices decreases with degree.
We use the equilibrium results to show how our model can explain some other
puzzles in the empirical literature inconsistent with established economic theory. We
looked at how spreads in low-risk municipal bonds can be greater than medium-risk
bonds, which can be greater still than risky equities. Additionally, illiquid bonds
can have tighter spreads than liquid bonds. These phenomena cannot be explained
by pure informational asymmetry or inventory arguments. In harder-to-value illiq-
uid bonds, inventory models would predict the opposite effect due to the increased
difficulty in offsetting positions and so would command a higher spread. Similarly,
asymmetric information models predict that the harder to value securities would
command a higher bid-ask spread. When the network connections are included, the
combination of clients’ low-degree and relative uninformedness explains these obser-
vations.
Finally, we apply the network model to the gambling market with data gathered
from the UK general election of 2019. We find that a normal distribution well repre-
sents the distribution of beliefs of the true value, and the network topology is similar
to many OTC financial markets. We demonstrate that bid-ask spreads in odds prices
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are consistent with our network model.
We have shown that even a simple Bertrand price competition can give rise to
many non-linear and counter-intuitive effects when executed over a network. The
three elements of this story, information sets, degree distribution, and preferential
selection, combine to explain empirical data that standard linear models do not easily
describe, and our network model describes a parsimonious model of trading in OTC
markets.
Real markets, however, are generally not precisely represented by one-shot games
but by multi-period transactions, where future relationships and learning become an
essential consideration. The network structure in this model does not change - clients
still prefer specific dealers and have a small number of links that drive the topology,
but clients and dealers can learn from the traded prices and possibly change their
network links.
The standard model of rational learning in a network maintains that individuals
use Bayes’ rule to incorporate any new piece of information into their beliefs (Molavi,
P., Tahbaz-Salehi, A. and Jadbabaie, A. (2018)) and involves each agent forming a
prior belief updated by information on each trade observed. Even in simple networks,
this is an onerous task as it requires updating beliefs on all other agents’ information
sets in the network at every time period. Other heuristic methods of learning have
been devised and the leading behavioral model here is the DeGroot heuristic model,
deGroot (1974), which is a simple method whose results have been empirically tested
and shown to outperform Bayesian learning in experimental work, (Chandrasekhar,
A.G., Larreguy, H. and Xandri, J.P. (2020)). This method involves simple averaging
of one’s own and one’s neighbors’ beliefs as new data is revealed. Similarly, the dealers’
strategic nature means that the multi-period game alters the pricing strategy, since
the dealers’ objective function is now the sum of transactions over a long period. For
example, a dealer may price below equilibrium levels to win new customers (network
links) in a dynamic network, drive out competitors, and exploit their superior network
position at a later stage of the game. This predatory pricing phenomena was examined
by Milgrom (1991). In addition, any agent with a superior estimate of the true value
might disguise this fact to retain a competitive advantage because of learning by other
agents.
164 Chapter 7. Conclusion and Discussion
Other avenues for future work include applying this model to the other types
of bipartite market networks, such as the client-client network, where boundedly
rational clients trade with other clients without intermediation, similar to an eBay or
other peer-to-peer network type structure. In the dealer-dealer networks, this is more
complicated as the strategic dealers fall foul of various no-trade theorems, for example,
the seminal no-trade theorem of Myerson, Roger B.; Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983).
The common prior assumption ensures that in equilibrium, entirely strategic dealers
with knowledge of the probability distribution of signals will have no pure financial
incentive to trade with each other, (Milgrom, Paul; Stokey, Nancy (1982)), so an
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P. Erdös and A. Rényi. On random graphs i. Publicationes Mathematicae Debrecen,
6:290, 1959.
E. Estrada and P. Knight. A First Course in Network Theory. Oxford University
Press, United Kingdom, Mar. 2015. ISBN 978-0-19-872645-6.
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Appendix To Chapter 3
A.0.1 Derivation of Monopoly Dealer Payoff Function
This can be solved in 2 ways: from first principles and from the general payoff integral.
Here is the first principles derivation: Let M be the total number of clients and let
there be an equal number of buyers and sellers. Let δ be the bid ask spread chosen
by the monopoly dealer and let each client and the dealer receive a signal as to the
true value of the asset which is normally distributed with mean V, the true value,
and standard deviation σM for the dealer and σT for the clients.
E[Π]=E[profits from buys] + E[profits from sells]
E[Π] = M2 E[(
δ
2 + ε)(1− Φ[
2ε+δ
2σT
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This is expressed in terms of the bid ask spread, so as a function of the semi bid ask
spread:





















Appendix To Chapter 4
B.0.1 Formal Specification of Static Bayesian Games
In a Bayesian game, we specify strategy spaces, type spaces, payoff functions and
beliefs for every player. As in perfect information games, a strategy is a complete
plan of action that covers every possibility that might occur for every player type
that might occur. A type space is the set of all possible types for a player
Like a game of complete information, a game of incomplete information has (i) a
set of players and (ii) their action spaces. These are complemented with preferences
and information components: (iii) a probability distribution over players’ types which
determine their preferences, (iv) each player knows his own type but not the other
players’ types; (v) the probability distribution over types is common knowledge, which
is itself common knowledge; (vi) Payoffs associated with each action space and type
space.
Before the game is played, Nature chooses the different player types. Each type
ti can represent information about player i’s own payoffs, or more generally, other
game attributes in particular, network structure. Thus there is a type space Ti for
each player i ∈ N , representing the range from which Nature chooses i’s type. We




how Nature chooses a type profile (ti)
N
i=1
The normal form representation of a n-player static Bayesian game is:
G = 〈N, (Ai)ni=1, (Ti)ni=1, ((ui(·; ti))ti∈Ti , (pi)ni=1〉
whereN = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of playersAi is player i’s action set Ti = {t1i , t2i , ..., t
ki
i }
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is player i’s type space, and ui : A × Ti → < is player i’s type dependent utility or




Timing of the Bayesian game:






2. Each player i ∈ N learns his own type ti ∈ Ti which is his private information,
and uses his prior pi to form beliefs pi(t−i|ti) over the other player types
3. Players move simulataneosly and choose actions ai ∈ Ai and payoffs ui(a, t) for
i ∈ N are realized
A pure strategy for player i is a function fi : Ti → Ai that specifies a pure action
fi(ti) that i will choose when his type is ti
Types may also be derived from continuous distributions, with the random type
space Ti with a CDF Fi(ti) and density fi(ti)
In the static Bayesian game, G = 〈N, (Ai)ni=1, (Ti)ni=1, ((ui(·; ti))ti∈Ti , (pi)ni=1〉 a
pure strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1(·), s∗2(·), ..., s∗n(·)) is a pure strategy Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N , and for each realization ti ∈ Ti of player i’s
type, the action ai = s
∗






We take player i’s conditional expectations over the random realizations of other
player types t−i , given that player i knows his own type ti
All finite Bayesian games have a Nash equilibrium.
B.0.2 Convergence with an Agent Based Model (ABM)
As a second check, we recreated the OTC auction game in an ABM, where each of
the clients quotes and trades with a set of dealers, and the dealers attempt to max-
imize their individual payoffs. It uses a modified version of the relaxation algorithm
where dealers do not know their payoff function but can measure the effect on their
own payoff by changing spreads. The results are in line with Relaxation algorithm
solutions to the simultaneous dealer payoff functions.
An ABM was created and each dealer tries a higher or lower spread and compares
the average payoff. If the high or lower spreads produce a higher average, then that
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Figure B.1: convergence of dealers’ equilibrium spreads in ABM
spread is adopted instead. All agents perform this operation in turn, similar to the
methodology of the relaxation algorithm. Figure B.1 shows the convergence of the
bid ask spreads in an Agent Based Model producing a mean spread 0.7525 with sd
of 0.0071 vs theoretical Nash equilibrium level of 0.75. Dealers find the equilibrium
after approximately 50 rounds of trading auctions with no knowledge of the payoff
functions
